# PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XVI. No. 61. JANUARY 1941

## JUSTICE: DISTRIBUTIVE AND CORRECTIVE

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IN this paper I shall explain what I take to be the nature of justice; and the method which I shall follow is that of attempting to infer the essential nature of justice from an examination of its actual practical operation. Perhaps the reader will be able to follow the drift of the argument more easily, and be more on his guard against possible misstatements of fact or erroneous inferences, if I mention at the outset the main conclusions to which I hope to lead him. Here they are:

Distributive Justice is the creation of a system of rights (and consequently of duties and obligations) according to the principle of 'equality of consideration' for all; and 'rights' are protected fields for activity within which individuals or groups may pursue their interests. Corrective Justice comes into operation when the scheme created by distributive justice has been infringed; and it may take the form either of Reparation or of Punishment. The particular aim of reparation is to restore the enjoyment of the infringed right (or, if this is impossible, compensation) to the injured party; and the particular aim of punishment is to prevent rights from being infringed; hence the ultimate aim of both reparation and punishment is the maintenance of the system of rights. Thus, *Distributive Justice* is the *creation* of a system of rights according to the principle of 'equality of consideration,' and *Corrective Justice* is the effort to *maintain* this system.

### LAW AND JUSTICE

I have said that I shall attempt to infer the nature of justice from an examination of its practical operation. Where, then, can

we find justice in 'actual practical operation'? Most obviously, I think, in the working of legal institutions. This statement may be questioned on the ground that, while legal institutions may show *legal* justice at work, they do not necessarily afford any clue to *moral* justice. Such an objection is not, however, a very serious one. While legal and moral justice are not exactly the same, they are closely related, as will be evident if we consider the function of law.

Those who are most intimately acquainted with the practical study and administration of law are probably quite as well qualified to state its nature and purpose as are speculative metaphysicians, and so it will be useful if we try to understand what lawyers conceive their main function to be, and in what way they suppose themselves to be concerned with moral justice. While we need not accept a lawyer's *theory* of moral justice, the way in which legal institutions are *practically* administered will be of immense significance to the moral philosopher if those who create or develop those institutions are guided by the belief that their function is to give practical expression to the principles of moral justice.

Now Salmond, who was a judge of the Supreme Court of New Zealand, tells[1] us that the real clue to the nature of law is to be found in the procedure of the courts. The primary purpose of these courts is to maintain right, redress wrongs, administer justice. Justice is the end, law being merely the instrument or means. Hence (he adds) a complete analysis of the idea of law involves an analysis of the ethical element involved in it. Justice[2] may be divided into moral (or natural) justice and legal justice. The former is perfect ideal justice (not to be identified with the moral ideas of any given person or people at any given time); and the latter is the more or less imperfect realization of this ideal in a legal system. Natural justice is related to legal justice as the truth is related to an authoritative creed. A creed may go far wide of the truth, but it does represent—when it is a conscientious attempt to fulfil its proper purpose—an effort to express the truth.

If we may rely on Salmond's account of the character of his professional duties, then the position is this: In any given community the members regard some actions as just and others as unjust. Moral opinions will, of course, differ in some respects; but, so far as there is general agreement, this agreement will represent the *common moral consciousness*. The function of the legal department of the State is to make more precise and explicit the main content of this general moral opinion, and to formulate rules of behaviour under its guidance. Sometimes the legal machinery will lose touch with the real outlook of the community; but, taken over a long period, it will tend to reveal, on careful scrutiny, the main

[1] Salmond, *Jurisprudence* (8th edition), pp. 39 ff. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 58 ff.

principles which underlie our common notions of what is just and unjust.

### Distributive and Corrective Justice

In attempting to understand the nature of justice as it is revealed in the working of legal institutions, the most convenient method for the moral philosopher is to divide justice into two main branches —Distributive Justice and Corrective Justice—and to consider each in turn. As this division is not, however, usually employed by jurists, it requires some explanation. So far as the ordinary citizen is concerned, the two most important branches of law are 'civil' and 'criminal.' The 'civil law' means the whole body of law which (*a*) creates and declares the rights, duties, and obligations of the members of a community, and (*b*) ordains restoration or compensation when a right has been infringed. 'Criminal law' is concerned with (*c*) punishing the violation of rights, duties, or obligations. Now, while Distributive and Corrective Justice cover the same field as that covered by civil and criminal law, the distinction between 'distributive' and 'corrective' does not coincide with that between 'civil' and 'criminal.' 'Distributive' covers part (*a*) of 'civil'; 'Corrective' covers part (*b*) of 'civil' (under the name of Reparation), and (*c*) the whole of 'criminal' (under the name of Punishment).[1]

## A.—DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

### Sources of Law

Our theories about the nature and function of law are likely to be better grounded if we inquire first about the sources of law. Many of us are apt to assume that law is the body of commands laid down by a sovereign for his or its subjects. Now it is true that some of our law in this country is derived from the will of the sovereign (the King in Parliament), but that is not true of all our law; and—what is equally important—even the law which issues from the sovereign must be interpreted before we can tell what it actually is, and this interpretation is performed by the courts of justice. Parliament may have legislated with a certain object in view; but whether the legislation corresponds to this intention it is for the courts to say. What the law in fact is is the law as interpreted and applied in the courts. Hence the question "What are the sources of law?" must be answered by discovering the sources of the law which

[1] The distinction here drawn between 'civil' and 'criminal,' while sufficiently accurate for our purposes, is not entirely correct. See Kenny, *Outlines of Criminal Law* (14th edition), chap. i.

is applied in the courts. These sources are (*a*) Custom, (*b*) Judicial decision, (*c*) Agreement, (*d*) Legislation by a person or body specially charged with this function.

(*a*) *Custom.*—The further we look back along the line of social evolution the more prominence does customary law assume, and the less evidence is there of explicit legislation. While the extent to which primitive peoples are slaves of custom has often been exaggerated, it is true that the rules of behaviour under which they live tend to be regarded as 'natural' or as of direct divine authorship. There is great reluctance to trifle with these rules openly. In point of fact, however, they are gradually altered in response to changing needs and beliefs; although the change is so gradual that the belief in their unchanging character is not destroyed. The gradual alteration and the belief in unalterability can co-exist because, as a rule, the customary law is unwritten. It lives in the consciousness of a people; and so the distinction between "what it is" and "what, at any given time, they think it is" cannot easily be drawn. It is thus peculiarly liable to be affected by the imperceptible growth of habits. While the conception of 'what ought to be done' is not at all the same as the conception of 'what is done,' still, we ourselves know how strongly habitual behaviour tends to become erected into a norm for behaviour. It must not be assumed, of course, that this tendency is fundamentally irrational.

(*b*) *Judicial Decision.*—Rules of behaviour must be stated in more or less general terms, and sometimes it is difficult to select the appropriate rule for application to a particular situation. There may be cases so peculiar that their occurrence can hardly have been anticipated. Yet jurists will hardly admit that there is any case for which it is impossible to find a legal decision.[1] In the last resort, a judge will fall back upon the plea that his function is the administration of justice—justice according to law so far as there is relevant law, and, if there is not, then justice according to equity or conscience. But it is seldom that a judge requires to take this extreme position. He can generally find some existing rule which supplies him with a clue, although the use which he makes of it may amount to the enunciation of a new rule. Whether or not the rule implied in his judgment constitutes a binding precedent, it tends to be treated with respect and followed. The influence of judicial decisions in the development of law is not confined to communities having judicial machinery operated by officers of state. One finds that in early types of civilization wise men are called upon to declare and apply 'the ancient laws and customs' in face of particular disputes. Such men may have no political power but merely the authority which comes from their being respected as just and learned in the

[1] Oppenheim, *International Law*, vol. ii (5th edition), p. 4 note, and p. 64.

ancient laws. Their influence upon the growth of law—particularly of unwritten law—must have been very great.

(*c*) *Agreement.*—Sometimes particular rules are, by mutual consent, framed to regulate the behaviour of parties in relation to each other; and, if the public interest does not require otherwise, these agreements may determine the legal rights and duties of the parties. 'Understandings,' accepted over a considerable period by a large or important body, may receive judicial notice and permanently affect the laws of the community.

(*d*) *Legislation.*—It is clear, therefore, that a community may have a well-developed code of law without there being any body specially charged with the function of legislation. But a stage is reached when complexity of life demands such machinery for speedy, authoritative, publicly proclaimed alteration of the law. Legislation in this strict sense is latest in coming into operation; but, once established, it quickly becomes the most important both in point of output and in point of authority. While, as we have noted, it is the courts which decide what rules have been established by legislation, still the rules which (in the view of the courts) have been promulgated by the legislature take precedence of rules derived from any other source.

In discussing the sources of law, I have had in mind the law of this country; but I understand that, with some minor modifications, what I have said holds good of any civilized code.

## The Nature of Law

In view of the variety in the sources of law, we cannot define it in terms of any one of its sources—as, e.g., the command of the 'sovereign.' Even the conception of law as a 'command' is misleading, for law is concerned to define *rights* quite as much as it is concerned to define *duties*. We can, however, roughly describe its nature and practical purpose; and so, without spending time over the finer points of definition, we may describe law as "a body of rules which, for the promotion of justice, define for the members of a community what they may, ought, or ought not to do." In our country the declaration of the law is the function of the judiciary, and these declarations are made on the basis of the material supplied by the four sources mentioned.

It will be noted that law does not merely forbid or enjoin. It also permits. That is, it creates rights as well as duties and obligations. Perhaps, instead of saying that law creates rights and duties, we ought to say that the making of a rule of law *is* the creation of rights and duties.

## Rights and Duties[1]

To speak of lawmaking as the creation of rights and duties may suggest that rights and duties are separable. Actually they are not.[2] While it is true that duties may be created for A without rights being at the same time created for him; still, the creation of duties (or rights) for A is at the same time the creation of rights (or duties) for B. Sometimes it is the duty upon which most stress is laid (as in the levying of taxes), and sometimes stress is laid on the right (as in the right to vote at parliamentary elections). But the duty of paying taxes is correlative to the public's right—through its officers—to receive and expend the money; and the right to vote is correlative to the duty of others to provide facilities for, and not to hinder, the exercise of the right.

This necessary relation between rights and duties is due to the fact that rights are *logically* prior to duties. What the legislator primarily aims at is the creation of a right, and this necessarily involves the imposition of a duty. It would be freak legislation which created duties for their own sake. Duties exist merely in order that rights may be enjoyed. Rights do not exist merely in order that duties may be performed.

## Rights and Interests

It is important, therefore, to understand the nature of a right. A right is legal permission to act in a certain way with the offer of protection when so acting. There is no *demand* that one should so act, but simply the permission to act with the offer of protection *if* one wishes to do so. It is taken for granted that an individual may have certain interests—certain ends to be secured by action; and the legislator says, in effect, "You may please yourself whether you pursue these ends. If you have a mind to pursue them, then I shall prohibit others from interfering." A right, then, is a legally protected field for the pursuit of an interest.

## Conflict of Interests

If the interests of one person were compatible with the interests of all others, no legal protection would be required. It is the fact

[1] This section and the following section on "Rights and Interests" are summary statements of conclusions at which I have arrived from a much more elaborate consideration of rights and duties in a work as yet unpublished.

[2] I am aware that my view on this point is not universally accepted; but its soundness can be completely demonstrated. The argument is, however, too lengthy to be included in this paper.

that A's pursuit of his ends often cuts across B's pursuit of his which requires the intervention of law. This conflict of interests is of special importance, because it gives rise to practical problems for the lawyer, and to a fundamental theoretical problem for the moral philosopher. The lawyer must adopt some principle in dealing with the conflict; and, when the moral philosopher understands the kind of principle which is being used in what is considered a 'just' administration, then he has a clue to this mysterious thing called 'justice' which law is endeavouring to embody and express.

### Methods for Dealing with Conflict

In case of conflict, one interest may be completely protected and the other wholly disallowed; or a compromise may be effected which gives to each a limited scope for satisfaction. How, then, do we decide the extent to which an interest may legitimately be pursued and protected? There are two main alternative principles.

(*a*) *"Poetry is Better than Pushpin."*—We may begin by assuming that each possible end has an intrinsic value or disvalue, and attempt to range these ends in order of merit. To the person interested in the promotion of an intrinsically better end we shall give more extensive opportunity than to the person who wishes to pursue an intrinsically worse end. If we conclude that the writing and reading of poetry is better in itself than the playing of pushpin, we shall give wide opportunities for the former and few for the latter, if the demands of the two ever come into conflict.

(*b*) *"Each to Count as One."*—We may, however, adopt an entirely different principle. In the administration of justice, it may be said, we are not concerned to assess the alleged intrinsic value or disvalue of ends. Our first endeavour must be to discover what individuals take to be good. Concerning the things which A regards as good, we must get some rough idea of the order in which he places them; and the same sort of information must be found with regard to B's valuations. If life to A is futile without poetry, and to B a tragic farce without pushpin, then we know that, as poetry is to A, so is pushpin to B; and we must leave to each the same scope for pursuing his heart's desire. This is to put the principle crudely, of course. A more elaborate explanation would say that we regard any interest as having a presumptive claim to protection simply on the ground that it is an interest of a person. That is to say, we begin by according to each person 'equality of consideration.' We then consider the importance to him of a particular interest, the presumption being that it should have scope equal to that of interests which are of equal importance to others. This presumption may be over-ruled by the long-term effect of one interest upon others. Further, there may be

interests (in committing murder or business fraud, for instance) which are utterly disallowed on the ground that they are quite incompatible with the principle of 'equality of consideration' itself. Whilst the principle of 'equality of *consideration*' is supreme, its practical application will demand many qualifications of the rule of equality of *opportunity*. But the various qualifying considerations are all concerned with the relation of a given interest to the possible satisfaction of other interests. Any supposed intrinsic value or disvalue in objects is not a qualifying consideration.

### Principle of Justice is 'Equality of Consideration'

Which of these two methods is the one actually followed? I have not the slightest doubt that something *like* the first one has had a considerable influence on the development of our law. The fact that an interest is in, say, the promotion of one religious cult rather than another has often resulted in its being given greater legal protection. The fact that an interest is an interest of a man rather than a woman, or a white rather than a black, has given it precedence in the eyes of the law. But two points should be noted in this connection. (1) In the first place, it is hardly true to say that such discrimination is evidence for the use of the first of the two principles which we have distinguished. More in accordance with the facts is the view that this discrimination follows no clear principle at all. No doubt the protection of one religious cult and the prohibition of another has, on occasion, been inspired by the belief that the one is based on true belief and the other not. But impartial inquiries into truth do not commonly precede such legislation. Usually, where the cults are considered on their merits at all, the one favoured is thought of as advancing the *interests* of the community or of mankind to a greater extent than the other. I see no reason, however, for supposing that discrimination between interests is to any important extent based upon the notion that there are certain things *intrinsically* good to be promoted, e.g. knowledge, virtue, and pleasure. The spreading of knowledge—knowledge helpful to an enemy, or the communication of which would lead to a serious breach of the peace—is penalized. Opportunities for the developing of one's virtuous will must not be allowed to interfere too much with the comfort, peace, and security of others. Whether the amount of pleasure which a man gets from rough-handling his fellows on the football field is greater than he would get from attacking strangers in the street is not a calculation which enters into the question whether he should be allowed to indulge in the one rather than the other.

(2) In the second place, it is to be noted that, when we speak about the removal of injustices in the actual law, the kind of emenda-

tion for which we agitate implies a demand for the application of the second of our two principles—the principle of equality of consideration. We demand religious toleration, the abolition of serfdom, equality in political and property rights for men and women, and so on.

Now, if we are correct in affirming that what is called 'healthy' and 'enlightened' legal development follows this second method, and if it be true, as Salmond says, that the practical aim of legal institutions is the administration of justice, then the principle of justice is the principle of equality of consideration.

Such a conclusion finds support from other than legal pronouncements. The moral maxims and the theoretical attempts to formulate the standard of morality which meet with the most profound response in the hearts of men are of this order: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," "Liberty, equality, fraternity," "When Adam delved and Eve span, who was then the gentleman?", "The poorest he hath a life to live in England as well as the richest he," "Each to count as one and none as more than one," "Treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of others, always as an end and never merely as means"—all more or less clear expressions of the principle of equality of consideration.

## Equality and Equity

Two difficulties in this conception of justice may be noted. The first is connected with the stress on the conception of equality. How, it may be asked, can this be a satisfactory account of justice when we clearly admit that unequal treatment is sometimes just? Probably few reflective persons will consider unjust the provision of free meals and books to the children of poor parents while these benefits are denied to the children of the wealthy.

This difficulty can, I think, be resolved if we remember that 'equality of consideration' refers to an attitude of mind in our treatment of others; and it does not express itself in equality of *treatment* unless the persons concerned are themselves equal in the matter to which the treatment is relevant. This attitude of mind does not assert that all men are equal in all respects. It probably does work on the *presumption* that all are equal, requiring *evidence* of inequality, and demanding equality of treatment so far as this evidence is not forthcoming. It is, however, compatible with the recognition of inequalities in men, and with the demand for inequality of treatment. This inequality of treatment must be proportionately equal, though, to the relevant inequalities of the persons concerned. I am prepared to hear the old objection that calculation in these matters is impossible; but I am afraid that the objection leaves

me quite cold. If 'equity' did not, in its early use, mean something like 'proportionate equality' I should very much like to know what it did mean.

### Duties and Obligations

The second difficulty is that justice, on my view, seems much too negative a conception. It seems to resolve itself into the mere non-interference with the rights of others, and to exclude the idea of demands for our positive assistance to others. But this difficulty only arises if we take too narrow a view of the nature of our rights. Certainly, if one can conceive of a community so simple that each member is entirely self-supporting independently of the others, then justice in such a community would be of this purely negative kind. It would consist in the non-interference with those spheres for action assigned to each individual as his rights. But while this is the basic notion and irreducible minimum of just conduct, few associations are of the simple kind mentioned above. Most associations—certainly all political societies—involve co-operation and interdependence. Any given member has not merely rights which involve non-interference on the part of others, but also rights which require positive-co-operation on the part of others. It is this distinction which jurists have in mind when they say that some rights ('real rights') are correlative to *duties* (negative duties owed by all men), while other rights ('personal rights') are correlative to *obligations* (positive duties owed by specific persons). These obligations, however, follow from the principle of 'equality of consideration' quite as logically as do negative duties; for, granted division of labour and economic interdependence, mutual consideration demands from each person some contribution to the common good. The idea underlying the imposition of obligations is greatly obscured by the extraordinarily complex nature of modern society, and by the way in which the fulfilment of obligations is, in practice, mixed up with 'acts of grace.'

### Conclusion

Distributive Justice, then, is concerned with the pursuit, by individuals and groups in a community, of those ends which they take to be good. Having as its ultimate standard, not the conception of some intrinsic good or goods to be realized, but the principle of equality of consideration, it distributes rights (on the basis of proportionate equality or equity) to the pursuit of those interests, prescribing, at the same time, the duties and obligations implied in the distribution of rights.

## B.—CORRECTIVE JUSTICE

### Its Meaning

'Corrective justice' may be described as the end which judicial institutions have in view when dealing with breaches of the system of rights and duties. No doubt the term could be used in a wider sense so as to cover also amendments of the law. When actually existing law is admitted to be unjust and altered accordingly, its amendment could quite legitimately be called corrective justice. But as law is never really static, being always in process of change, the continual creation and modification of rights and duties is best regarded as the process of distribution. There is a clear difference between the act of amending law and the act of dealing with a transgression of the law, and it is to the latter that I apply the term 'corrective justice.'

### Reparation and Punishment

In corrective justice there are at least two perfectly distinct conceptions—Reparation and Punishment. When I say that these are distinct conceptions, I mean that they are so to the modern jurist. In earlier times the distinction was not always clearly recognized; and some of the curious penalties prescribed in early codes were due, in part at least, to confusing the notions of reparation and punishment. A like confusion is—I am inclined to suspect—responsible for some of the unsatisfactory discussion of the problem of punishment by moral philosophers. The confusion is, in a way, pardonable; because, in practice, an act of reparation is often attended by hardship, and we sometimes prescribe both a punishment and an act of reparation. Further, while in English procedure civil actions are normally concerned with reparation, and criminal prosecutions with punishment, there are certain kinds of civil action the object of which is to secure punishment. Nevertheless, it is vital that we should distinguish the conception of reparation from that of punishment.

It does not, of course, follow 'from the nature of things' that there should be two, and only two, modes of corrective justice. Legal institutions might confine themselves to securing reparation, or they might concentrate upon the infliction of punishment. In point of fact, reparation is the only[1] thing aimed at in some cases, and punish-

[1] Mr. Mabbott, arguing in favour of a Retributive theory of punishment, asserts (*Mind*, April 1939, pp. 161–164) that punishment is a corollary of law-breaking, and that a legislator does not choose whether he shall punish breaches of the law. This assertion is quite inconsistent with the facts. The

ment the only thing aimed at in other cases. Further, I am inclined to think that a third mode of corrective justice should now be recognized, namely reformation, in view of the increasing tendency to substitute compulsory attendance at reformatory institutions for fine or imprisonment in the case of certain classes of offenders against the law. In this paper, however, I shall deal only with the two most definitely recognized modes of corrective justice.

### Immediate Aims and Ultimate Aim of Reparation and Punishment

The essential difference between Reparation and Punishment has already been mentioned in an earlier part of this paper. Reparation, which is ordered by the decree of a civil court, is the restoration of (or compensation for) a right which has been infringed. Punishment, which is (usually) ordered by the decree of a criminal court, is the infliction of pain or suffering upon the person who has infringed a right. The difference is a difference in the immediate aims of the two modes of corrective justice. The one tries to make up to the injured party what he has lost, any suffering endured by the injurer in the act of reparation being purely incidental. The other aims at suffering for the wrongdoer and is not concerned with making good the loss to the injured party. A thief may be ordered to return stolen goods and, at the same time, be fined or imprisoned. The return of the goods is not designed to cause discomfort to the thief. The fine or imprisonment is not designed to recompense the owner of the goods.

But while the immediate aims of reparation and punishment are different, it may be that the ultimate aims are the same. Indeed, they must have something in common if they can both be rightly called forms of corrective justice. Investigation will show that, while reparation is an attempt to restore the enjoyment of infringed rights, punishment is an attempt to safeguard rights from being infringed; i.e. corrective justice in both its forms aims ultimately at the maintenance of that system which distributive justice creates.

## I. REPARATION

So far as reparation is concerned little need be said, for the subject presents no theoretical difficulties. The recognition of what I have called its ultimate aim is directly involved in the statement of its immediate aim. A right has been infringed? Then its enjoyment must be restored. If simple restoration cannot be effected, then equivalent compensation must, if possible, be awarded.

vast majority of 'civil' actions aim at proving breach of law and securing reparation, the question of punishment not being raised at all.

## II. PUNISHMENT

The subject of punishment,[1] however, has given rise to a great deal of controversy—much of it, I think, more remarkable for its ingenuity than for its judgment. But I shall not embark upon elaborate discussion of the rival theories. As my purpose is to present a theory of punishment which will cover and interpret the facts, let us look at the main facts about punishment as it is systematically and judicially applied in our own country.

### (*a*) Kind of Act Punished

We shall begin by looking at the kind of act which is punished. Consult any work on criminal law, and you will find there the list of the main punishable offences. (Not all possible crimes are listed, of course, for some of them have not yet been committed.) What you find is that every crime is an act infringing—or seriously endangering—some more or less important private or public right.[2] What is equally significant is that, from time to time, some acts cease to be regarded as crimes, and others are added to the list, according to variations in general opinion as to what interests should or should not be protected as rights. Criminal or punishable acts are, in all cases, acts which are or have been considered antagonistic to rights.

### (*b*) Liability to Punishment

Liability to punishment depends (i) upon the commission of some overt act. It is not necessary (as is the case in liability for reparation) that the act should succeed in infringing the right. An 'attempt' is in many cases punishable, although the mere forming of an intention is not. A person may alter an intention before the stage of overt action has been reached. Before a person can be charged with 'attempted . . .,' there must have been sufficient overt action to show that, but for miscalculation or external interfering circumstances, the right would have been infringed.

But the external overt act, though necessary, is not sufficient to create liability, for (ii) the mental state of the agent is important. As in liability for reparation, so in liability to punishment, there

[1] For somewhat more elaborate treatment of this subject—from the ethical and legal aspects—the reader should consult the excellent article by Dr. A. C. Ewing in *Mind*, July 1927, and the first few chapters of Kenny's *Criminal Law*.

[2] Kenny (*Criminal Law*, p. 4) asserts that rights are not always involved, but the instances he gives are, to my mind, cases in which rights are clearly involved.

must have been an intention to do this particular act. But (unlike the English general rule regarding reparation) there is a still further condition of penal liability. The wrongdoer must know the act to be wrong, or his ignorance of its wrongness must have been due to negligence. That is to say, his inner disposition in doing the act must have included an element of carelessness or indifference as to whether he was about to commit a wrong or not.

It should be added that when a person's mental faculties are so deranged that he cannot be counted upon to react as most men do to a given stimulus, penalties are not applied to him. Should he show a tendency to commit serious wrongs, he will be put under direct bodily restraint.

### (*c*) Nature of Penalty

The penalties imposed upon wrongdoers—death, fine, imprisonment, corporal punishment—are such as are deemed disagreeable and undesirable to them. We must, of course, distinguish between disagreeable consequences attached as penalty to an act and disagreeable consequences which are simply natural effects. A boy stealing apples, on being chased by the owner of the orchard, jumps over a wall and breaks his ankle. The consequent pain is not punishment. If he is caught and spanked the consequent pain is punishment.

### Interpretation of the Facts

These facts concerning the judicial application of punishment have been presented in a broad general way, and it must be recognized that an exact detailed account of the law relating to punishment would show that my simple statement of general principles requires some qualification. But this simple statement is sufficiently accurate to justify the inferences which I propose to draw. I infer, from reflection upon the facts, that the principal aim of punishment must be *to influence behaviour, through the will, so as to induce the person punished and others to refrain from acts which violate rights.*

That the aim of punishment is *to influence behaviour* is clear from the nature of the penalties inflicted. Though natural consequences are different from punishment, the infliction of the latter is influenced by experiencing the effect of the former. If a boy knew that he would suffer a broken ankle every time he stole apples, it is most likely that he would refrain from stealing apples, although it is not likely that he would be deterred by the knowledge that he would get scratched hands. Now it is noticeable with regard to the infliction of penalties that they are of that disagreeable sort which, were they inevitable natural consequences, would tend to discourage the action

which brings them about. Also, they differ for different crimes. Again, they are altered in degree of severity according as experience shows their effect or lack of effect upon behaviour. How, then, can we possibly avoid the conclusion that punishment is inflicted in order to influence behaviour? Punishment does not of itself follow wrongdoing. It is something devised and inflicted at the cost of a certain amount of time, energy, and thought; and this trouble is hardly likely to be aimless. The obvious interpretation is that the aim is to influence behaviour.

It is equally clear that behaviour is to be influenced *through the will*. A person is not liable to punishment if a certain disposition of the will has not been present in his action. He must have intended the act and shown an indifference to the maintenance of others' rights. He prefers the doing of X to the doing of his duty; and the penalty adds a consequence to the doing of X which is calculated to make it, on the whole, more disagreeable than the doing of the duty.

Does this mean, then, that punishment aims at producing *virtue* —a will 'good in itself' apart from any consequences which it may effect, a will which does its duty *because* it is its duty? No. Punishment aims at *conformity* to duty, and not at conformity to duty from a certain motive. The penalty presents to the erring will a new factor to be taken into account in the calculation of personal gain and loss. That it is conformity to duty which is principally aimed at is shown also indirectly by the treatment of mentally deranged persons. A penalty is not inflicted on an insane wrongdoer because it is assumed that the person will not react normally; but other means are taken to prevent repetition of the act. We may conclude, therefore, that the imposition of the penalty is designed to influence the will *so as to induce the person punished to refrain from acts*.

Finally, the kind of act punished makes it clear what kind of act the individual is to be discouraged from doing. It is the *act which violates a right*.

### Conclusion

Thus the ultimate aim of punishment is seen to be the same as that of reparation. The special, immediate aim of reparation is to restore rights which have been infringed. The special aim of punishment is to deter from the infringement of rights. Both of these special aims are part of the general aim of maintaining a system of rights.

As the nature of punishment has aroused so much discussion, it may seem incredible that its true nature and aim can be so briefly and simply stated. But let the reader ask himself the question, "What ought a theory of punishment to supply us with?" and he will, I think, agree that a theory of punishment ought to make the actual

practice of punishment intelligible. Let the reader further ask himself whether the facts about the systematic and judicial application of punishment are rendered intelligible on my theory; and I think he will agree that they are. This theory takes into account the kind of action which is punished, the nature of penalties, and the conditions of liability to punishment. This theory also gives punishment an intelligible relation to that other form of corrective justice called reparation. It has the further merit of relating corrective justice to distributive justice, for—to repeat what I have already said—it supports the view that corrective justice is designed to *maintain* the system which distributive justice has *created*.

# ART WITHOUT FORM?

## A QUESTION PRIOR TO AN AESTHETIC OF POETRY

E. F. CARRITT, M.A.

Roger Fry in *Last Lectures* threw out the suggestion that the inferiority of neolithic to palaeolithic painting might be due to the birth or growth of language and the consequent temptation to dull the vivid sensibility for individual life by the practically useful habit of abstract or generalized thinking. Whether or no the birth and growth of language involved a set-back for graphic and plastic art, it certainly first made poetry possible. And the question which puzzles me is this: Would any art analogous to poetry have been possible without speech? What if a tongue-tied race had invented a system of ideograms or purely conventional gestures?

I suppose the first stage would have been that anybody wanting a knife might have drawn a schematic knife in the sand and made a gesture of grasping. Then, if in some obviously unpractical situation, say in the absence of enemies or of the other sex, they had gone through the gestures of courtship or of battle, we should have the love- or war-dance, the pure mime, supposed to be the forerunner of lyric and of drama. If they had next drawn a set of such gestures, we should have had the germ of anecdotal, historical, illustrative, "heroic" painting, that *genre* which Reynolds thought the noblest of his art, that "poetic" element which some modern theorists would banish from painting to the silent film. That both the acted and the painted mime would have been arts seems clear, but even clearer that neither would have been poetry, which must include real or imagined vocal sounds. Indeed, rigorous iconoclasts are found to demand that even from poetry all its significance or reference, all elements except the purely formal one of sound, should be eliminated.

Suppose, then, a further step. Suppose that instead of more or less realistic pictures of persons acting or of natural objects, these speechless artists had invented a system of pure ideograms, in which persons, things, qualities, actions, events, relations, were symbolized by visual signs with no more intrinsic relation to the thing signified than musical notation has to the tune, or my car number to my character, but also with no suggestion of any spoken words. This, I suppose, would be what writing is to a man born stone-deaf. Could such a system of reference be used for artistic purposes?

Could it achieve beauty? I am tempted to think it could, though certainly not poetry. It is hard for us to imagine such a usage, for we have all talked before we could read, so that writing seems essentially to presuppose speech. But we are told that there has actually existed in China an ideography which could be quite indifferently read off into several spoken languages and having no special affinity to any one. Certainly in 1668 Bishop Wilkins, in his *Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language*, proposed "the expression of our conceptions by Marks which shall signify things not Words." Leibniz' *De Re Combinatoria* seems to have had the same idea.

To a small extent what happened in China happens in our own experience. "X" can equally be read as ten or *sehn* or *dix* (and conversely all these can equally be symbolized by 10). "&" is no more "and" than it is "et" or "und" or "e." The best modern instances of ideogram are no doubt the signs of number, mensuration, and mathematical operation: $(\div + \surd)$; but fairly complicated ideas not closely connected with any linguistic signs are represented by dashes, parentheses ("this is by the way"), inverted commas ("these are the words he used"), notes of interrogation ("this is a question"), and the use of capitals (either "this is a new thought" or "this is a proper name").[1]

If, then, we ask whether such pure ideography could be used with artistic effect, on the one hand we feel inclined to answer, Yes; for by its means surely there might be brought before the minds of the deaf and dumb the very same human experiences and aspirations which are brought to us by poetry, whether in prose or verse, or by a mime. On the other hand, we feel driven to say, No; for in all those arts the sensuous quality of some medium, either sound or gesture, whether actual or imagined, seems necessary to the aesthetic effect; but here we must assume that the sensible nature of the ideograms would be as irrelevant as the fount of type used in printing Shakespeare or the colour of the ink in which Mozart is scored. Either of these might give a slight aesthetic pleasure, but this would not fuse with the music or the poetry, as sounds do with sense; it would be just as beautiful if it recorded doggerel.

On the other hand, the sound of a verse, though it often seems

[1] It is obvious that the same written signs may suggest different sounds and ideas to different nations ("pain"), or the same sound and different ideas to one nation ("ball"). The same written signs are very differently pronounced by a Cockney and a Tynesider: (Doctor: "Can you walk yet?" Patient: "Work! I can't even walk!"). I pronounce Greek rather differently from some of my friends, and so, I presume, did an Athenian from a Syracusan. Conversely, "cougher" and "coffer" represent to an Englishman the same sounds but different ideas. "BAG" and "bag" the same sound and the same idea.

to contribute as much as anything to its beauty, may be trivial if we are quite ignorant of the meaning, or if that meaning, by a negligible change of sound, is much altered.

Consider the classical controversy over the phrase:

> Our noisy years seem moments in the being
> Of the eternal silence.

Saintsbury (*History of English Prosody*, iii, 74–77) maintained that the beauty of the sound was quite independent of the meaning. But he spoiled his case by a malicious paraphrase, intended to show that with an identical meaning the beauty might vanish:

> Our { loud-sounding / clamorous } twelvemonths appear { minutes / seconds } in the unending soundlessness.

It is a pity he could not resist this. The substitution of precise terms for more colloquial generalized words with vaguer connotations either changes or destroys the meaning. "Noisy music" does not mean the same as "loud-sounding music." Everybody would know what "our noisy years" meant, but I should attach no meaning at all to "our clamorous twelvemonths." And it seems impossible to conceive how a loud-sounding twelvemonths could appear to be a second in a soundlessness of any duration.

So against this Andrew Bradley's contention (*Poetry for Poetry's Sake*) is undeniable, that the beauty of the sound depends almost entirely on some subtle adjustment to the meaning. But Bradley goes further. Perhaps in reaction against Saintsbury's unfairness, he seems to allow that the meaning of the paraphrase *is* the same and to conclude that, since that has no beauty, the beauty lies wholly in the union of the two, and the mere meaning has as little as the mere sound. That mere meaning has no strictly poetic beauty must be granted, but has it none? Take a fairer paraphrase, such as might be offered by an intelligent schoolboy: "All the turmoil of our lives is a brief episode in the endless tenor of the universe." Or substitute a different poem:

> We are such stuff
> As dreams are made on, and our little lives
> Are rounded with a sleep.

or

> *πάντα γέλως και πάντα κόνις καὶ πάντα τὸ μηδὲν.*

Have not all these something in common which has aesthetic value, something which I can only describe as the contemplation of the human tragedy, something which would also be indicated without metaphor or simile in the vernacular "It will be all the same a thousand years hence" or "We must all die"? It will probably

be replied that all these phrases have different meanings, that they have nothing aesthetically in common. We must therefore take instances of translation and choose instances where the translators, believing that they were dealing with inspired meanings, have striven to present the same meaning. I will take two such sets of instances, where, in my view, there is an element of meaning common to the instances already quoted:

(1) A thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday, seeing that is past as a watch in the night (Ps. xc. 4).

*χίλια ἔτη ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς σου ὡς ἡ ἡμέρα ἡ ἐχθὲς ἥτις διῆλθε, καὶ φυλακὴ ἐν νυκτί.*

Nam mille annos si praetereat, sunt in oculis tuis ut dies hesternus vigiliaque nocturna.

(2) As for man, his days are as grass; as a flower of a field, so he flourisheth (Ps. ciii. 15).

*ἄνθρωπος ὡσεὶ χόρτος αἱ ἡμέραι αὐτοῦ, ὡσεὶ ἄνθος τοῦ ἀγροῦ οὕτως ἐξανθήσει.*

Ipsius mortalis similes faeno dies esse, sient flos agri, sic florere ipsum.

In set (1) and again in set (2) the sounds are quite different in the different tongues, but I think it clear that in each set there is an identical core of meaning which has a recognizable aesthetic quality. I should myself say that the two sets also share such an identical core, which is also identical with that of the passages quoted earlier; that in all these there is an identical aesthetic quality which is different from the aesthetic quality common to such a pair of passages as:

Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
But to be young was very heaven.

and

The delightful commerce of the world
. . . . . .
When we were young, when we could number friends
In all the Italian cities like ourselves.

Now if the ideographic technique I have imagined should exist, which could indicate or refer to things and our experiences of them directly, without the intermediate reference to vocal sounds; and if this technique were employed by an artist obsessed by the same sort of experience which was obsessing the writers of all those passages about death, would he produce a beautiful work of art? And if so, would it be just a different work differing from theirs as they differ from one another and as a carved crucifix differs from a painting, or would it be of a totally novel kind, in that it would make directly the reference that they make indirectly, sharing indeed their

common reference, but dispensing with any sensuous aesthetic medium such as they all have? Would it be only like looking at an object through a different coloured glass, or rather like for the first time touching it? And if the latter, would this substitution of (as it were) tangibility for visibility mean a total loss of beauty, or the substitution of a different beauty, or the apprehension face to face of a beauty we had previously seen through various glasses darkly?

When Kant said that the moral law within him was sublime, he clearly ascribed to it or to its contemplation an aesthetic character. And he surely did not think that this in any degree depended upon the sound of the words *Moralisches Gesetz*. No doubt his aesthetics distinguished sublimity from beauty as not depending for its aesthetic value upon form. And we might feel tempted to say that the aesthetic experience communicated by the ideographic artist would be sublime. But if the contemplation of death or martyrdom is sublime, might not that of youth or happy love be beautiful? Might not the contemplation of some passionate or dramatic episode in my own youth or among my neighbours or in historical or imaginary persons have aesthetic quality? And might not my attention be directed and focused upon it by symbols totally lacking in aesthetic quality, or at least with none that could fuse with that of the experience indicated?[1] And if so, would not the use of these symbols be an art? And if so, would it be just another art, or would it, for better or worse, be unique? Does a man born deaf have an aesthetic experience in reading poetry, and, if so, is it like any we have?[2]

Helen Keller said she enjoyed poetry much more after she had acquired speech (i.e. I suppose, had learnt to associate certain motor sensations of the larynx with written symbols). A verse of her own composition is given:

> The forest trees have donned
> Their gorgeous autumn tapestries,
> A mysterious hand is silently stripping the trees.
> And with rustle and whirr the leaves descend
> And, like little frightened birds,
> Lie trembling on the ground.

[1] Had a mediaeval knight contemplating an escutcheon any aesthetic experience, comparable perhaps to that of reading the *Forsyte Saga*?

[2] Consider an analogy. A blind man or a man with his eyes shut certainly apprehends no beauty in a rainbow, and surely not the same that we do in a rose or a statuette. Is the beauty which it is claimed he can feel in a statuette like what we see there or more like what we might feel in a delightful fabric or a delightful breeze, or, again, more like what we might feel in reading

> "Perfect little body without fault or stain on thee,
> With promise of strength and manhood full and fair,"

or *Vera incessu patuit dea*?

She said that she knew that "rustle" and "whirr" were onomatopoeic and explained the meaning of that word, but I suppose she only knew this in the way in which she knew that autumn tapestries were gorgeous. When asked whether she thought more in finger language or in vocal language, she replied: "I think my thoughts as I spell them on my fingers." Whether either of these motor sensations would be more capable of fusing with the experiences they referred to than a written ideography I cannot tell.[1]

In answer to the question whether an ideographic symbolism could achieve beauty, all my aesthetic presuppositions incline me to answer, No, just because it would be quite arbitrary and conventional. The medium or "form" would be indifferent; as we have seen that musical notation might be altered and nothing of the music changed, whereas in poetry translation gives a different poem or none. And I have always believed that beauty consisted in the fusion of a sensuous image with an inner experience which it expressed, so that the expression seemed as inevitable as a smile. But here there would be no such fusion. This belief of mine was shared by Bradley, and a few more sentences from the same essay will elaborate it better than I can. He is protesting against the antithesis of a sheer subject-matter and a sheer form as rivals for the ownership of the beauty of a poem. He suggests that such a subject-matter would be "something real or imaginary, for instance the Fall of Man, as it exists in the minds of fairly cultivated people," and this subject, he points out, is not to be found in *Paradise Lost*, and therefore cannot be that in which the beauty of the poem consists. He accordingly substitutes an antithesis between two elements which are to be found in the poem, one which he calls the substance, for instance the events, characters, and scenes in *Paradise Lost*, and the other the form or measured language in which they are described. And he maintains that to ask in which of these the beauty of the poem lies is absurd, because neither without the other could be what it is. "They are one thing from different points of view and in that sense identical." "The experience is of something in which the two are absolutely fused." I will not for the present contest that this is true of any *poetic* experience. Let it be granted that the expressions τετέλεσται, "it is finished," "consummatum est" (St. John xix. 30) and κεκαρτέρηται τἄμα (*Eur. Hipp.* 1455) just have different beauties and that it is vain to ask whether their beauties depend more upon the similar experiences they express or upon the different sounds which express them. I am still driven to question the corollary, implied by Bradley

[1] American Association to Promote the Teaching of Speech to Deaf Mutes, Report of Fourth Summer Meeting, Chatauqua, N.Y., 1894. "H. Keller," by J. McFarland.

and more explicit in Croce and others, that *all* aesthetic experience essentially involves such an indissoluble fusion of substance or fact referred to and sensuous form or means of reference. Could there not be a way of suggesting or stimulating an aesthetic activity in which the referring medium was quite indifferent and in which the value therefore depended wholly on the experience stimulated or referred to? Here, I think, Bradley himself falters. He admits that, if I have forgotten every single word of *Hamlet*, I may retain something, though not all, of the actions and characters which are the substance of the poem and, in a sense, in it. Nor, he says, does he question the poetic value, in a wide sense of "poetic" (he means aesthetic), of all this even when thought of apart from the poem. He compares it to "our recollections of the heroes of history or legend, who move about in our imagination, and are worth much to us, though we do not remember anything they said." Professor Gilbert Murray has somewhere pointed out that the reading of the Gospels, whether in Greek or English, or of Homer, even in a good translation, leaves in our minds something of aesthetic value, a picture of "the Homeric world" or of "the Kingdom," though we cannot quote a passage. As Bradley again puts it: "We may forget all the words and not profess to remember even the 'meaning,' but believe that we possess the 'spirit' of the poem. And what we possess may have an immense value, though the poem, of course, it is not." And again: "We may find analogues to the meaning of a poem outside it. The other arts, the best ideas of philosophy or religion, much that nature and life offer us or force upon us, are akin to it, though only akin."

In spite, then, of a deep-seated philosophic reluctance, I have been driven to ask whether after all there may not be something in a Hegelian distinction which, in the past, under the influence of Croce and to some extent of Bradley himself I have been apt to ridicule.[1] Hegel holds[2] that in a poem there are three distinguishable elements, each having aesthetic quality:

(1) The subject-matter (*Inhalt, Sache*), which must itself be poetical. This, I think, is Bradley's rejected "subject."
(2) The form or presentation (*Vorstellung*), equivalent I suppose to Bradley's "substance," which must be a poetical form.
(3) The verbal expression of this, which must be a poetical expression.

For instance, he says that the words

Als nun die dämmernde Eos mit Rosenfingern emporstieg

[1] *Theory of Beauty*, VII, §§ 11, 12.
[2] *Aesthetik*, III, pp. 227, 244–5, 270–7.

and the words

*'Ημος δ' ἠρεγένεια φάνη ῥοδοδάκτυλος 'Εώς.*

are different poetical expressions of the *same* poetical presentation; which is itself only one poetical presentation of a poetic content of which, I suppose,

The dawn in russet mantle clad

would be another.

I hesitate to accept this analysis as it stands. But it does seem as if we must make our account with at least two aesthetic elements fused in a poem but capable of aesthetic existence outside that fusion:

(1) An aesthetic "substance" not yet vocalized or visualized. The beauty of this may be slight.
(2) The sensible or imagined sounds by which such an idea may be indicated, referred to, or expressed. These sounds may have some beauty of their own.

In a poem these two separate beauties would be fused and produce one probably much greater than the sum of the two.

If we wished to justify Hegel's triple analysis which results in the conception of certain bare facts being "poetical" (or rather aesthetic) as distinguished from others which are not, I suppose we might say that human emotions are the poetic facts. Perhaps they alone and always are things capable of aesthetic contemplation. It is not the relative positions of a star and a planet, but an experience: promise, foreboding, or parting, which is dawn.

Of these three elements, ideography clearly could give us the first. It could focus our attention on the fact that men lose what they love or that Orpheus lost Eurydice. Would that in itself be beautiful? It could also give us the second—metaphor, simile, and such "figures." Would that be sufficient, or would it be necessary, for beauty? Part of the third it clearly could not give us—rhyme, rhythm, metre, assonance, alliteration, onomatopoeia. That it could give us part of the third (antithesis, repetition, parallelism, and several figures for which Greek rhetoricians invented queer names) is a fact I have neglected as obscuring the issue I want to raise: Can there be art without form?

# GOOD AND EVIL MORALITY

MICHAEL KAYE, M.A., PH.D.

THOUGH we should probably find it easier to detect immorality in its instances than to determine morality in its essence, we generally take it for granted that to be moral is to be good. On the assumption, I suppose, that morality and goodness are actually equivalent, some have even said that it is goodness alone that is good. And yet in the name of morality men have suppressed their vitality, stifled their generosity, surrendered their reason, and gone like sheep to the slaughter. In the name of morality men have distorted the truth and tormented the innocent. They have cut off heads in the past and they cut off heads in the present. It seems to me that alike with morality and without it, alike without it and with it, human behaviour may display brutality and insanity. Our human society may disintegrate and wither because of moral vacillation and paralysis. But it may be blighted the world over because struck by the lightning of moral frenzy.

That without morality achievement of good is unlikely, we may concede at once if we agree, as I think we should, that goodness is synonymous with comprehensiveness and stability. For where a man is everything by starts and nothing for long, his life is not a continually more expansive and more complicated whole, but rather a mere succession and at the most a collection. For the unification of his life in the way of excellence he needs a supreme purpose, such a purpose as will exact of him loyalty in all situations whatsoever, such a purpose as can permit him no holiday, such a purpose as will be vigilant without intermission. Possessing such a supreme purpose, and possessed by it, acknowledging its absolute authority and obedient to it utterly and unconditionally, a man will be moral. He will be moral to the degree that conformably with this purpose he fashions his way of life, the complex of his manners or mores. It is as the determinant of his final decision concerning not merely this and that, but precisely the entire scheme of his manners or mores, that a man's supreme purpose earns its title not merely to authority, but to moral authority.

In his early years a man has not to look very far for his supreme purpose. For he is but seldom alone. And those among whom he finds himself, because they want him or because he wants them, soon let him know that in the event of conflict between what he

wishes and what they wish, it is what they wish that he ought to do. This is why we are generally tempted to identify morality with social conformity or social service. An individual has now this master ambition, now another; but always he has society. People in some form or other he cannot escape; society is ubiquitous and omnipresent. And however much different people differ in their particular demands, they all seem to agree in this: that he should put others before self. Society X may tell him to hate society Y, and society Y may tell him to hate society X; but both societies, and all societies—parents, children, gang, school, village, State, church—suggest to him, and shout at him, that always he should obey society, that it is for society that he should live and die, that it is society that merits his complete self-dedication. Therefore it is not wonderful that for the generality of men it is society that obtains reverence as moral authority. It becomes their supreme purpose to progress in the style of life dictated by society.

But by which society in particular? For the societies to which an individual is variously attached, and still more the societies of which he has some knowledge, are perplexingly numerous, and their incompatibilities are frequently obstinate. How, then, is he to choose? How is he to resolve, first, the problem of conflicting solicitations, and then the problem of conflicting loyalties? It might be thought that as a free agent he would choose the society which is most to his advantage, or the society which is objectively the best. Yet how is an ordinary individual to achieve that extensive and complicated knowledge which is requisite for a choice founded on considerations such as these? And in actual practice the ordinary individual chooses not from knowledge, but from opinion. Should he indeed set out on a protracted research and reflection, he will probably fail in achievement because of doubt, hesitation, inconstancy, lack of the force which comes from conviction. But more probably he will conclude his deliberation very hurriedly, both because the state of suspended decision is painful, and because generally that society is the most persuasive which is the nearest, the most lavish in its promises and the most fearful in its threats, the most strident in exhortation and the most powerful in execution. Above all, there is the compulsion of propinquity. That society has the advantage which is the closest in space and in blood. We can scarcely do otherwise than prefer our country and our race. But we also incline to follow a fashion; closeness in time is not to be discounted, although some of us would rather be conservative, preferring the old to the upstart.

It remains for the society which has charmed or cowed the individual into obedience once, to insure the fixation of his allegiance. Wherefore in relation to competing societies it is tempted to adopt

the principle of either subjection or exclusion. We may even say that that society will probably win which is the most capable of applying this principle. And it is thus that in the contemporary world moral authority goes to the State. It is the State that is able to subject family, school, church, guild. It is the State that is able to exclude contradictory States. By its control of press, radio, cinema, theatre, school, church, by its employment of spies, police, and if necessary the war machine, the State has it in its power to institute an absolute moral protection, to prevent, as it would like to think, once and for all, the free circulation of moral ideas. The individual has now to discover his supreme purpose and its derivative morality, not in the service of some society more or less of his arbitrary choice, but in the service of the particular State into which he is born and whose imposition he can now scarcely escape save by death. Thereby is his life obviously restricted. But thereby also is it unified and invigorated, and to that extent at any rate set on the way to good.

The State has at least a threefold justification for its moral imposition. For the more there are far-reaching differences between its members in respect to their choice of a supreme purpose, the more is it in peril of destruction from without, and certainly the less is it capable of accomplishment from within. And this, defenders of the State would say, must certainly impoverish the life of the individual. For how, they would ask, can it be doubted that at least in the modern world it must be good for the individual to belong to a State which is sovereign, more especially when this sovereign State is consistently and effectively devoted to social service? For we see that in the modern world where sovereign exclusive States leave scarcely a space unclaimed, those who are Stateless may as well commit suicide; those who have failed to hang together do indubitably hang separately. In the modern world where sovereign exclusive States are of its essence, there can be no good life for an individual, because there can be for him no life at all, except as he is himself a member of a sovereign exclusive State. Has he not, then, in this alone sufficient reason for accepting political service as the supreme purpose of his life? Yet is it not evident further, that in a State where all are agreed on the things that matter most, there may be produced a material and spiritual culture in which each may obtain a share inconceivably more ennobling than anything of value that may be achieved in political isolation?

There is still, however, the third point, which is the one most relevant to the present essay. If amid the confusion of the world's moralities the individual is left to choose for himself, it is probable that in the end no morality will have chosen him. He will drift from one to another, not possessed by any. No faith will be his for

the moving of mountains. He will say that life is vain and empty when what is at fault is the superficiality and the irresolution of his own grasp. Seeking for reality from a multitude of starting points, retiring from any one path as soon as he meets with resistance, he will fail to assimilate what is good in the unified complexity of ever widening circumference. Political morality may not be the best that is conceivable, but it is better than none at all; and except as it grips the individual even against his will he will probably end as a moral degenerate.

I find much that is of force in this attempt to vindicate the moral authority of the State. Yet neither with the State nor with society is moral authority connected in its essence. It is chiefly, I think, because society is always with him that man so readily takes to social service as his supreme purpose, just as he is spontaneously concerned with self-preservation for the sufficient reason that his self is always with him. I should admit that when—as it does not do always—in the claim to his final devotion society obtains preference over his self, this may be best accounted for not merely by the superior obtrusiveness of society—since society is more numerous, more external or objective, more explicitly and persistently imperious than his self—but also by the superior capacity of society for the realization of what is good. And what I now say of society I would also say of the State, although, as I have tried to show, the State achieves its moral dominance not merely by its propinquity, its ubiquity, and its revelation of what it has of good, but also by its subjection or exclusion of competitors and by its power to obtain acknowledgment by coercion. The important point, however, is this. He who concedes the moral authority of the State because it both possesses good and can yield it, thereby indicates quite conclusively that in fact his moral authority is precisely the realization of what is good. Not service of society or State, but service of what is good—this is his supreme purpose in conformity with which he would determine his life from moment to moment.

Of course, there are other possibilities also. A man's supreme purpose may be devotion to art or science or his profession. He may follow these for themselves, without any explicit consideration of the good which they may none the less possess in fact. That these and other objects will probably solicit less effectively than society and the State, we have already admitted and have tried to account for. Yet there is nothing in morality in its essence which need disqualify them from determining its detail.

But is this not to suggest that morality may issue even from a supreme purpose which is evil? Is it not to allow that Satan who is consistently devoted to evil is as moral as Prometheus who is consistently devoted to good? Yet surely this does violence to the

facts? Surely we should not agree that every man of strong character is for that reason alone a man of moral character? Moral character must be strong character, but surely the converse is not true? In order that he may be moral, must not a man be devoted not just to a supreme purpose of any kind, but to a supreme purpose which is good?

This, however, represents dictation from the nature of good rather than from the nature of morality. In this respect fanatics for good seem to me not essentially different from fanatics for the State. As the latter would discredit the possibility of a morality other than their own, so would the former. But surely it is this that does violence to the facts. It seems to me evident that moralities may be very diverse, and that certainly they may be evil as well as good. Except as he displays a morality of some kind, except as he is sufficiently courageous and temperate and zealous to follow his chosen path to the end, I do not dispute that a man will probably be unable himself to attain what is substantially good: he will be unlikely to achieve much of good because in fact he will be unlikely to achieve much of anything. But precisely because his morality is of one kind rather than another, a man may head all the more swiftly and rigidly for evil. And it is thus that I would appreciate many gigantically strong men both of ancient and of nearer history. I would allow their morality. But I would dispute their goodness. As for utter devotion to the State, this is morality beyond all doubt. But there are other moralities also, and perhaps some of these are better.

For when we consider how a State indulges in exclusion and in destruction, in persecution and in war, in lies and in betrayals, in greed and in all uncharity, I do not see how we can pretend that though it is good to a degree, it is in all respects good enough. That is better which is the more comprehensive and stable. But too often political expediency proves the destroyer of individual security and human spaciousness. This is not to deny that men and women being as they are, more than beasts and less than gods, they may find in life in the State a way to good with which they can scarcely dispense if they are to achieve what is good at all substantially. Yet political beneficence is improbable if there is indeed no challenge to political morality. No State can endure except on the basis of courageous and unswerving loyalty. But no State can endure as a power for good except as this loyalty is imposed finally, not by itself, but precisely by the insight of its citizens into that which indeed is good. Their homage to Caesar requires permission from God.

Not necessarily, then, any existing society, and certainly not the society which has still to emerge, is what accounts for the moral duty, as it appears to some, that they should promote as far as in

them lies the society of all mankind. Rather is self-dedication to universal human fellowship enjoined by fidelity to what is good, as also by insight into the equivalence of goodness to comprehensiveness and stability. The world is better the more it is inclusive of variety, and its inclusiveness is greater the more each of its elements is itself inclusive, the more each of its elements, besides being itself, is also a mirror of the whole. Therefore the division of humanity into distinctive, relatively autonomous States would definitely seem to be good, as the encouragement by the State of distinctive, relatively autonomous individuals would likewise seem to be good. States deserve to be fostered not merely for the reason that men are less than gods, lacking as they do in the universality of divine sympathy and love, but because thereby, through their distinctive national cultures, men may contribute to the richness of the world. The world is better the more it includes good States, as the State is better the more it includes good individuals. But the individual himself will be better the more he is devoted to the good which can exist more greatly in the State than in himself; and likewise the State will be better as its ultimate concern is not just with the good that may be realized within itself, but with the good to which it may contribute in humanity and in the world. Therefore the individual who would above all be loyal to what is good may indeed serve the State, but only on condition that the State does itself serve what is good. Yet precisely through self-devotion to the good that may exist more greatly elsewhere than in itself, does a living being make its own life good; and this is as true of States as of individuals. Therefore an individual's allegiance to the good of the State should be regarded as all the more effective because it is his supreme purpose, as he would also for that reason make it the supreme purpose of the State, to serve the greatest good that is conceivable, the good that may be realized in all mankind and the good that may be possible in the world.

In this conception of the best we have a principle for solving the two most common of typical problems of conscience. Where a number of societies conflict though an individual would be loyal to them all, it should be his first aim to win them to tolerance and peace, since reality is the richer for its variety. Yet manifestly the world will be but the worse if the basis of any achieved harmony is simply the corruption of those who originally would have sought the good. Towards such societies as are obstinately committed to evil the individual should renounce his obedience and loyalty, though it is a further question, which we shall consider later, whether he should persist in seeking their conversion. But besides this problem of conflicting loyalties, there is the question which troubled Socrates. With no hesitation as to the particular society

meriting his undivided fidelity, an individual may yet have to choose between unquestioning obedience and the most effective service. The difficulty here should not, however, prove considerable if it is to this society that he would indeed allow supreme moral authority. For in this case it is surely obvious that he should do whatever society demands. If it does actually require of him to obey without question each of its particular commands, then certainly he should not be tardy in such obedience even though in a particular case he may consider it will jeopardize social welfare. Evidently, also, he should in this latter case disobey, if it is indeed its welfare, its stability, and expansion, that society bids him to pursue above all. Nor should he complain if for his well-intended disobedience which society has thus really commanded itself, even if only by implication, society should nevertheless punish him. For how else than by threatening and inflicting penalty for disobedience can society hope to discover and prevent it, when the motive thereto is simply selfishness? Those who would disobey for selfish reasons will probably be deterred by punishment. But by the performance of their social duty as they understand it at whatever cost to themselves, men do but make the perfection of their social devotion all the more manifest; wherefore it is not surprising that though society should suspect and vilify them before their punishment, it should acclaim them as prophets and heroes after it. Not, however, what society itself wants, but rather what is exacted by his conception of what is good, may be a man's conclusive reason for social disobedience. What seemed at the outset a question of incompatibility between social obedience and social service may later be interpreted as but a further instance of conflicting loyalties, a conflict which may now be resolved in favour of the supreme moral authority of what is good.

Where morality derives from social sovereignty, it is possible, but it is not necessary, that it should consist only in such social devotion as is completely disinterested. Evidently this is not necessary since society—as God also, according to certain theistic presentations—may explicitly reinforce moral command by a vast apparatus of sanctions. And such sanctions may be thought indispensable even when the social imperative has become the individual's conscience, notwithstanding that when the individual now requires of himself what so often he has heard society demand of him, social command and vigilance would seem almost omnipresent. Yet certainly the gain to society will be more considerable still if it can obtain from the individual a loyalty which, besides being in great measure self-imposed and self-criticized, is also utterly selfless—such a disinterestedness being especially important when the main requirement of society is that the individual should

indeed pursue its welfare, even through such disobedience as he may expect will be socially punished. Nor should we contest the possibility of disinterested social devotion. With society as his moral authority, a man may eschew immorality even though he should be capable of it with impunity, because his possession of the ring of Gyges renders him completely invisible to society. He may be moral whether seen or unseen by gods and men—and, as we have noticed, whether rewarded or punished for his fidelity. For he may be fascinated and hypnotized by society. And how can it be maintained that a man's final reason for social service is always selfish, when it is patent fact that he is ready to die for society? Such extremity of devotion may enrich society to the greater profit of those of its members who have still to live; yet how can it be considered as profiting himself? But if disinterestedness is thus a possible, though not a necessary, characteristic of the morality ultimately derivable from society, it is inseparable from the morality which is nothing else than fidelity to good. For to seek what is good is not to seek oneself; it is to seek the good which is resident in oneself to a degree, but which is understood to exist more greatly elsewhere. Thus disinterestedness is not essential to morality as such; a man's supreme purpose may be directly and explicitly self-culture; or it may be devotion to society as an indispensable means to his personal welfare. It is only when a man's supreme purpose is self-dedication to what is good that morality and disinterestedness are to be thought of as inseparable.

In all morality, however, there is duty or obligation. For manifestly there is obligation to whatsoever is required for the working out of one's supreme purpose. I should say that ethical obligation is essentially comparable to logical implication. Ethical obligation remains what it is independently of the individual's psychological reaction—whether what it evokes in the individual is inclination or aversion. Certainly it seems absurd to say that a man cannot be doing his duty when he is doing what he happens to like. But certainly, also, aversion to obligation does not become impossible simply for the reason that one's supreme purpose is selfish. In the pursuit, however selfish, of physical or mental culture, there may be much need for labour against the grain. Macbeth has to be admonished to screw up his courage notwithstanding the ignobility of his purpose. The fact that one has toiled when one would rather have frolicked, that one has done one's duty for all that it has been hard and fearful, is not sufficient confirmation of one's goodness. Because there can be no goodness without resolution, we should beware of praising every instance of resolution as good for that reason alone. We should recognize the devil for what he is.

If duty or obligation or what one ought to do derives from one's

supreme purpose, it is obvious that the latter gains acceptance simply by virtue of itself. A purpose achieves sovereignty because in the last resort it does indeed by itself irresistibly fascinate. A society may fascinate partly by its categorical imperative. Without doubt its imperative is more than hypothetical. Even its employment of sanctions is rather by way of an afterthought. We may regard it as saying "Be faithful to me without question. Serve me even though I slay you. Yet I will indeed reward the loyal, and will punish those who fail." Society commands allegiance not so much by its promises and threats, as by its superb self-confidence before which protestation and dubiety fall down abashed. The social categorical imperative, reiterated in a thousand different keys, becomes indeed hypnotic. Yet we can scarcely speak except by way of metaphor of a categorical imperative as coming from our conception of good. Certainly its solicitation is not apologetic; if either of these terms is relevant at all, it is categorical and not at all hypothetical. But, of course, it is only the personal that can command. That which is good though it is not a person, or a society of persons, radiates the charm of its quality rather than a compelling imperative. The moral authority of what is good is nothing other than absolute fascination.

That which we ought to do is right. To be moral is to do what is right—what is in line with the nature of one's supreme purpose. Thus again it is obvious that to do what is right is not necessarily to do what is good. Where it is indeed the good that determines the right, it would seem evidently better to will and do the right, than just to will it. Moral motive without achievement may count for a great deal with a personal or social moral authority concerned with the apportionment of praise and blame, of reward and punishment. But he who aims at good is but little compensated for his failure because others would not consider him culpable. Whether the failure results from lack of the necessary resolution and courage to translate will into action, or from misjudgment as to what is really and not merely apparently right, or from the frustration of will, however wise and courageous, by the superior forces of a stepmotherly Nature—in each case there may be equal regret from the standpoint of good, though a different degree of accusation by men. Respect for good demands not merely good will, but courage, wisdom, and power. Yet it is not at all evident that every 'ought' implies a 'can.' Doubtless it is either foolish or cruel to *command* an individual to do what he cannot. But if what a man ought to do is nothing other than what is required for the fulfilment of his supreme purpose, it is clearly possible that he should discover his duty to be beyond his power. As a man may fail to gain the woman he loves and seeks above all else, so he may find that what is good

is not the less elusive because it is fascinating. Yet what is right follows from what is good, or from some other supreme purpose; it is definitely independent of a man's power to achieve this supreme purpose. But if, as I have said, it is better both to will and to do what is right than just to will it, it is also better than just to do it. For he who does what is right in relation to good without knowing and willing it, is to that extent the less comprehensive of good. In any case, to do what is right without willing it is not to be moral; for it is evidently not to be respectful of one's supreme purpose. Yet I should think that to achieve the good without willing it is better than to will the good without achieving it. Grace may prove more bountiful of good than work. If morality does not necessarily derive from what is good, it also seems true that one's actual achievement of good may in certain cases be greater with a morality which does not thus derive than with one that does. But it is still true that best of all is not merely to achieve the good, but to have willed it also.

The State which would recognize no higher moral authority than itself is to-day exhibiting a fierce intolerance. It would annihilate fidelity to good not merely among its own members, but even on the part of other States. Nor is political self-assertion more surprising than individual self-assertion. The reality which is good because the most comprehensive and stable is easily forgotten as there is concentration on some lesser object. This feature of reality, that its elements should forsake the better for the worse, is indeed a challenge to any inclination to interpret reality as itself perfection. But it is a feature which lovers of good would be faithless to ignore, since a failure of true knowledge, of mental comprehension, is itself nothing other than a reduction of good.

Should an individual determine to resist his State in its seizing of moral domination, he need have little doubt as to what will result for himself. Most probably the State will destroy him immediately. But if it expels him instead, it is unlikely that he will be welcomed by any other, so that the postponement of his end will be but very brief. For all that he would take up his stand in the cathedral of what is good, there will be murder in the cathedral none the less. Nor may he suppose that the State will come to do him homage later. Rather it may be predicted that if his assassination is remembered at all, it will but contribute to the calendar of political rejoicing. If, then, he cannot escape as a fugitive, may it not be best that he should seek for safety as a hypocrite? Or should he not rather elect to declare his allegiance boldly, refusing to escape even if he could, so that he might seek the conversion of the arrogant State even till the last moment of his tortured life?

Those who would at once recommend the second alternative as

the only one truly compatible with goodness should consider whether in this respect they would give similar advice to the good State as to the good individual. For the State will generally have the greater opportunity for both possibilities alike—on the one hand, to seek shelter in isolation, and on the other hand, to dare to wrestle with its enemy. If it adopts the policy of above all caring for its self-preservation until the storm of madness has passed by—for if time itself should prove insufficient to cure the fever, it may be that the vicious will destroy one another—it may hope that thereby at least something will be left to ensure, when the time is ripe, the resurrection of good among mankind. But if it kindles a war in which indeed the evil States, yet none the less the good States also, will all perish together—how will it by a devotion to good such as this display an effectiveness equal to its indisputable heroism?

Nor should we commit the error of stating the individual's problem we are now considering as a case of conflict between goodness and selfishness. On the contrary, we have to assume that his undivided concern is for goodness alone, his problem being precisely how he can be good most effectively in a world of enemies more powerful than himself. We have to assume that should he decide on self-concealment, it is because he is primarily anxious not to save himself, but to save what is good. A devotion to good that is real and unswerving may find it needful, for no other reason than that of maximum effectiveness in the given circumstances, to disguise itself amid the intolerant artillery of madmen. The danger of such disguise, of course, is that a man may grow accustomed to it and come to wish for nothing else. Though he has adopted, with whatever repulsion, the semblance of disloyalty precisely because of his abundant loyalty, he has yet to be on his guard against dissimulation becoming reality; such a treachery to good as is at first merely apparent and simply for the sake of good, may yet degenerate into a real treachery for the sake of self. But after all, the possibilities here are essentially similar to what obtain in the case of social service through disobedience. A man in disobeying society may be primarily intending to serve himself, for all that he pretends and even to a degree believes that his main anxiety is to serve society. But also, as we have seen, it is social service itself that may call for disobedience. Certainly, however, when a man opposes society in the manner of Socrates it is quite impossible that he should dissimulate from fear of what may happen should he declare the reality of his purpose. And a man who seeks to serve what is truly good, as Christ sought to serve God, may similarly feel it incumbent that he should reveal his Master to every society whatsoever, thereby also serving it most truthfully, even though this should be contrary to its published will.

Not necessarily so, however. I think we should concede that a man whose supreme purpose is to realize what is good may conclude that in certain circumstances it is right that he should conceal his loyalty—or at least not thrust himself forward to declaim it. And in thus doing what seems to him right a man will be moral. For he is faithful to his supreme purpose, even though he misunderstands what it requires of him. But for all that, his morality may be ineffective. What he thinks to be right may not be really so. And clearly we cannot determine what is right in fact merely by such theoretical analysis as we have pursued it here.

# OTHER PEOPLE'S PLEASURES AND ONE'S OWN: AN ETHICAL DISCUSSION

Professor JOHN LAIRD

The opinion that I want to discuss in this essay is fairly commonly although not universally held among moralists. It is the opinion that there is never a moral duty to try to promote one's own pleasure for the sake of that pleasure although, contrariwise, there is often a moral duty to try to promote the pleasure of others for the sake of *that* pleasure. I cannot myself assent to the view, and I want to explain why I cannot; but I allow that the opposition I have to face is formidable. Indeed there are authors like Meinong who would make degree of self-sacrifice the standard of morality.

I may begin by making certain tedious but inescapable observations about the term employed, viz. "pleasure."

According to certain philosophers "pleasure" is the name for the common constituent in all that is called happiness, contentment, and enjoyment and some would go so far as to say that this common constituent, and it alone, is "good." In a similar way the common constituent of all discomfort and wretchedness, and of all acute or chronic suffering is said to be "pain," some philosophers going so far as to say that pain alone is evil.

Other philosophers take quite a different view. "Pleasure," they say, is just agreeable feeling. Happiness, contentment, and some other such term are the names for something much more solid and much less evanescent than mere agreeable feeling. We have every right to discriminate between solid happiness and fleeting pleasures, between the pursuit of happiness and mere pleasure-seeking, between Eudaemonists of the Aristotelian stamp and mere voluptuaries. A similar distinction, they say, should be drawn between misery, on the one hand, and disagreeable feeling, or pain, on the other hand.

Plainly the distinction affects the present argument. I do not, indeed, intend to discuss the extreme view that pleasure, in any intelligible sense, is the sole good and pain the sole evil, for I think there is no reasonable doubt, when the matter is closely examined, that pleasure is *not* the only good, and that pain is *not* the only evil. On the other hand, if it be held that pleasure is merely agreeable feeling and is a trivial good whoever has it, then the promotion of other people's pleasure would be the promotion of something trivial except in so far as its wide distribution might, by mere

arithmetic, reach proportions that exceeded triviality. If the pursuit of happiness, as distinguished from the pursuit of pleasure, were, in comparison, of vast importance, we should discuss the contrast between one's own happiness and that of others rather than the contrast between one's own pleasure and that of others, and should also have to consider the possible view that while a man had a moral duty to promote his own happiness, he had no moral duty to promote his own mere pleasure.

As I understand them, most of those who hold that there is a fundamental distinction between self and others in this affair do not want to make the issue turn upon some restricted sense of "pleasure," say evanescent agreeable feeling. They believe that the contrast runs very deep and extends to all that is common in such terms as happiness, pleasure, and felicity. Accordingly, for the purposes of this discussion, we should interpret the term "pleasure" in as catholic a sense as the term will bear or else employ some other word to describe this catholic sense and talk about *it* in a catholic way. Despite its possible ambiguities, I don't think that there is a more suitable word in common use than pleasure for this purpose, and so, for the most part, I shall talk in a catholic way about "pleasure," and similarly in a negative catholic way about "pain." In other words, I shall be talking about "happiness and/or pleasure" and about "unhappiness and/or pain" when I speak about "pleasure" or about "pain."

That being understood, my first remark would be that there must be something very peculiar about pleasure or happiness when compared with other goods if it really be true that one's own pleasure or happiness is not a moral end, although the pleasure or happiness of others is a moral end. Are there any other goods in whose case a like moral contrast is so much as plausible? In most other cases, at all events, the argument is quite the other way. What ought to be promoted in the case of others ought also to be promoted in one's own case. Thou shalt not kill—thyself or other men. Self-education and self-culture is a duty as well as the education or culture of others. There is a morality of self-respect as well as of respecting others, a duty to stand up for one's own rights, freedom, and independence as well as a duty to stand up for the rights and freedom and independence of others, a duty to keep oneself clean and fit and sober as well as a duty to scrub other people's children and rid them of lice and see to it that they have fresh air and milk and exercise. I know that some people would say that prudence, temperance, and some other such traditional moral virtues (the so-called "self-regarding" ones) are not moral at all, but simply neutral in an ethical way, but it seems to me that all such views are quite preposterous. There is a moral duty of self-culture, say,

as well as of other-culture. The contrary opinion, I think, rests on a very natural mistake. In the normal way and neglecting fancies about what might happen to a solitary in a desert island, it may be true that no one should live to himself alone and so that none of man's moral duties are *merely* self-regarding. That, however, is not the point. The point is not whether anyone who is not isolated has any moral duties towards himself in isolation. It is whether a partner in a community ought, morally speaking, to count himself out of the partnership in respect of culture, life, health, or happiness, but should count the others in regarding all such matters and indeed should expect and rightfully demand that all the others should count him in although he counts himself out. I submit that, if this be the truth regarding pleasure or happiness, there must be something very odd indeed about pleasure or happiness. It does not hold of health or life or freedom or culture or other ends commonly called "good," for in their case there *is* a moral duty towards oneself as well as towards the other partners in the moral community.

To be sure, odd things happen. Something may very well be true about one particular type of good thing, pleasure or happiness, that is not true about any other good thing. Something peculiar about pleasure or happiness may have the consequence that the pursuit of one's own pleasure or happiness is not a moral duty, although there is a moral duty to promote the pleasure or happiness of others; and that consequence may not follow in the case of any other good thing and may even be an absurdity in all the other cases. I don't deny the possibility, but I am curious about the grounds for it if it is an actuality. The grounds for such a singular consequence would have to be singular themselves. And what are they?

Let us first consider some general matters that seem to be pertinent.

(*a*) It may be said that *some* pleasures are not good at all, but evil. People often take pleasure in the wrong things and at wrong times. More generally, there are pleasures that are always wrong, vicious pleasures, cruel pleasures, perverted pleasures, disreputable pleasures. That might happen, too, in the case of some other ends that are generally but indiscriminately called goods. Anti-intellectualists, for instance, would say as much about what is often called high-brow self-culture. In the case of pleasure or happiness, all that would follow would be a certain amendment of the terms of the problem. The suggestion would now be that we ought to discuss, not the contrast between one's own and others' pleasure *simpliciter* but the contrast between one's own pleasure and the *innocent* pleasure of others. There cannot be a moral duty to promote anyone's vicious pleasure, but it might nevertheless be true that

there is no moral duty to promote one's own innocent pleasure, although there is (always or often) a moral duty to promote the innocent pleasure of others.

Since it is a tautology that vicious pleasures are morally taboo, and since it seems to me that there plainly are vicious pleasures, I am bound to accept this emendation of the terms of the problem. I confess, however, that I am not quite happy about the adequacy of the term "innocent" in this connection. If "vicious" means "morally unjustified," the qualification, as I have said, is a tautology. It is the statement that illicit pleasures cannot be licit. But "innocent" is hardly a sufficient description for "not-vicious," and the term seems to me to be rather too smug and rather too moralistic. It suggests something tepid and placid, without excitement or adventure, and all such suggestions would be inaccurate. Again the term "innocent" seems to me to be rather too moralistic unless it is interpreted in a wider sense than would be at all usual.

Let us consider sundry instances. Playing patience and solving cross-word puzzles would seem to be innocent pleasures, "innocent" in a fairly obvious sense, "pleasures" when they don't exasperate. But such employments if they become a business—I am not speaking about printers and the makers of the puzzles—may approach a vice of a sub-intellectual kind. It would be rather a nice point to try to say where "innocent" ceases and "vicious" begins, and it seems plain that any simple-minded dichotomy between "innocent" and "vicious" pleasures would be rather crude. Again, a pleasure that is "innocent" in its due degree (that degree varying very much) would not be "innocent" if it ousted something better. *Panis et circenses*, for instance, however innocent, are not proper substitutes for just treatment in more serious matters. There is a time for sops and a time when sops are not enough. Thus if "innocent" means "not plainly vicious in itself at all times and places" the qualifying word "innocent" is thoroughly misleading and inaccurate.

Accordingly, if we are to use the word "innocent" in this connection, we must interpret it rather widely, and almost as a technical term. I shall do so myself, for the future, using inverted commas to show that I remember what I am about. It is not quite plain, I think, what the technical term means in any positive way, or at any rate, in any positive way that is at all simple. In so far, however, as it is necessary to refrain from commending any pleasure (in a moral way) that, in any given case, is morally unjustifiable, it may be wiser to speak, *ex abundantia cautelae*, of "innocent" pleasures, and, for that matter, of "innocent" pains.

(*b*) In many cases it may be held that a man's moral duty in the self-regarding way is just an affair of means and not of ends. The man has a moral duty, it would be generally admitted, to preserve

life, and limb, and health, and, perhaps, a competence; but some would say that such moral duties are only means, not ends. That seems clear in the instance of obtaining a competence. A competence is only a means. I doubt, however, whether life and health are only means. The goods that men obtain belong to a good life, and I cannot see that the "life" in a good life is only a means to its good. The same would hold of such a measure of health as amounts to efficient living. Again, if life and health were what I think they are not, i.e. mere means, I don't think that many other personal goods such as freedom, a good character, intellectual insight, and aesthetic riches could possibly be regarded either as mere means or as things that are never good in their own right.

Thus although some of the goods that a man should seek for himself may be "good" wholly or chiefly as means, it cannot be true that all are of that order. The discussion, however, has shown that the important point to consider is what is good as an end, or what is good as an end *and* as a means, not something that is good as a means only. It is in this sense that we are debating the moral difference between one's own pleasure and some other man's. What is more, there is not likely to be much serious misunderstanding over the question. Some philosophers, it is true, have held that all pleasures are worthless, and many of them have held that what they call "mere" pleasure (and frequently oppose to happiness) is a very trivial good, however "innocent" it may be. But very few have held that *if* pleasures are good at all they are good simply as a means. If we ask why a man wants health or long life, the answer might conceivably be that he wants these things, not for their own sakes, but for the sake of something else. Rightly or wrongly many competent people have said so; but if a man asks why he should pursue what he hopes to enjoy he would, according to an opinion almost universal, be asking a preposterously silly question. Pleasure or happiness is the very paradigm of the sort of thing that is chosen for its own sake; and pain, similarly, is something self-evidently shunned and to be shunned. I do not say that pleasure can never be a means to anything else. The pleasures of amusement, I suppose, do us a bit of good as well as the rest and relaxation that is often bound up with them. We may all allow that part of the duty to be cheerful is the tonic effect of cheerfulness upon the cheerful man, part of it the bracing effect upon others together with the service of keeping *them* out of the dumps. In substance, however, we need not consider these subsidiary points and may keep to the intrinsic value of "innocent" pleasure or happiness itself.

Summing up the last few pages, then, we may say that we are dealing with "innocent" pleasures and pains (in a rather sophisticated sense of "innocent") and that we are arguing the question in terms

of pleasure or happiness as an end and not as a means. That being understood, we may raise an obvious question expecting an obvious answer, namely *why* there is a moral duty to try to promote the pleasure of others and to try to diminish their pain. The answer, I confess, seems to me to be just as obvious as the plainest noddle could expect. It is, quite simply, that "innocent" pleasure is good or worth pursuing for its own sake, and that "innocent" pain is bad. There may be certain minor explanations to be made, but the major matter is the simple statement I have just advanced. Pleasure or happiness need not be the chief good that can be sought, and I am confident that it is not the only good. But it is *a* good; and if it weren't, there would be no reason at all why anyone should suppose that it was a moral duty to try to promote the pleasure of others.

Suppose, then, that we accept the above simple statement. It follows that if there is no moral duty to try to promote one's own pleasure although that pleasure, if "innocent," would be good in itself, there must be some special reason, of very great strength, which prevents one's own pleasure from being a moral good despite the fact that it is worth pursuing for its own sake. That, to my mind, is so steep a paradox as to make me tremble when I climb in imagination to the precipice of such a theory. Still every theorist has to conquer occasional vertigo, and it is possible that there *might* be some reason strong enough to upset the *prima facie* inference that because one's own pleasure may be good in itself, therefore, when it is good in itself, one ought to try to promote it.

Let us examine some of the principal reasons that might be offered.

(1) An argument that is very commonly used, and that, still more commonly (I think), is assumed without being explicitly stated, is that it is quite absurd to speak of an action as being a moral duty when the action in question would be performed anyway. Consider for instance the "duty" of not committing suicide. If a man, being asked to produce evidence of high moral character, said that he must be a very moral person in one respect at least since he had not cut his throat and had never tried to do so, we should be inclined to smile at the evidence. There would be no need for the hypothesis of his morality, for we would briskly suggest that if no thought of duty had ever entered his head he still, in all probability, wouldn't have tried to cut his own throat.

Several distinct questions are wrapped up in any such argument.

In the first place there is a clear and indeed a vital distinction between saying that something or other need not be assumed to be present and saying that it must be absent. People who, up to the present, haven't done away with themselves may have had no moral motives or intentions in preserving their lives. It doesn't

follow that abstention from suicide is not a moral duty. On the contrary, most moralists would hold that abstention from suicide, almost always, *was* the moral thing to do. We should reach the opposite conclusion if, and only if, we held that in every instance in which a man did his duty he was opposing some stronger non-moral or immoral inclination. That would be to say that the good man never takes pleasure in the right things, or at any rate that he never takes so much pleasure in the right things as in wrong or morally neutral things. That opinion, I suggest, is contrary to all sound morality. It may often be our duty to do what we don't like, but it cannot be true that whenever we do our duty we must be acting in the teeth of inclination.

A more moderate contention would be that although duty and inclination need not always be opposed, there could be no duty that could not conceivably conflict with inclination. This milder opinion, like many others in ethics, would run into difficulties regarding determinism, and I may have expressed it rather loosely. Let us suppose, however, that it is not so loose as to be unintelligible.

In that case the argument seems to be narrowed down to rather a fine point regarding the interpretation of the term "moral duty." It is held in many quarters that moral duty or moral obligation implies the *possibility* of going astray, and so that a divine or sinless being would, strictly speaking, have no moral duties or moral obligations. Such a being, however, might plainly be capable of doing what was morally *right.* The consequence would be that although the implications of the term "duty" forbade us to say that there could be "duty" where transgression was out of the question, we still should say that it was *right* to do certain things even if it were inconceivable that the contrary could be done. It does not seem to be very important to make all this fuss about the special implications of the special term "duty." The more important question is about what is *right.*

In the general and, perhaps, in the rather loose sense in which we talk about the conceivability of doing anything that, in fact, we don't do, or (what is not the same thing) about a *possible* conflict between duty and inclination, it seems plain that *every* action with which human morality is concerned would be included in the class of actions to which the proviso applies. Determinists would say that every action is inevitable. If so, every dutiful action is inevitable, as well as every action that is contrary to duty. In that case inevitable duties would not cease to be duties because they were inevitable, and the argument from inevitability would fall. If the issue be, not inevitability, but the presence and operation of inclinations that might oppose duty and might be strong enough to prevail over it, we should have nothing to go upon except the presence and the possible

divergence between duty and inclination, a conceivable conflict thus being possible. There is no moral and no immoral action among men that, in this general sense, escapes the predicament of a conceivable conflict between duty and inclination.

Let us apply this result to the case of pleasure-for-self and pleasure-for-others. As regards pleasure-for-self, the argument now is either that every man inevitably seeks his own pleasure or that all his inclinations are for his own pleasure. On the first alternative the alleged conclusion is that what is inevitable cannot be a matter of duty. On the second alternative the alleged conclusion is that it can never be a moral duty to seek one's own pleasure because a duty must be capable of coming into conflict with inclination. That would be impossible if inclination were always towards one's own pleasure; for in that case the alleged duty of seeking one's own pleasure could not conflict with inclination.

What empirical grounds have we for holding either of these things about pleasure-for-self? If determinism be true, and if it also be true that some actions are generous, it follows that not every action is exclusively directed towards one's own pleasure. In other words, it is not inevitable that we should be pleasure-seekers. If, on the other hand, the argument be that no conflict is possible between pleasure-getting (for oneself) and any conceivable *duty* of pleasure-getting for oneself, the answer is that such a conflict is always conceivable if the conflict between duty and inclination is conceivable anywhere.

Suppose, to take an extreme view, that each man had as strong a craving for his own personal pleasure as he has a tendency to cling to life. It is not true, in fact, that there are no conceivable circumstances in which men are not tempted to relinquish life itself. People do commit suicide, and although some suicides may have defensible moral motives—to give one's friends a better chance by removing the obligations of comradeship, to avoid betrayal under torture, or the like—the commoner case is when a man through personal fear or weariness makes away with himself. In the latter class of instances we should say (or most of us would) that it is a moral duty to oppose the inclination to escape from pain by taking the extreme step of self-destruction. In that particular instance it would be true that the would-be suicide's fear of pain was greater than his fear of death, and that the duty of preserving life was in conflict with the inclination to do away with oneself. In other words, although our inclinations are *usually* on life's side, sometimes they are not; and *then* there is a moral conflict. I submit, however, that in general our distaste for personal suffering is not nearly as strong as our love of life Most men would far rather suffer a great deal than die by their own hands. Most of them act accordingly. Therefore it cannot be

true that the desire for pleasure for oneself is always an invincible motive, and the rest of what I have now to show is only that it is conceivable that our inclinations might be opposed to such pursuit of our own pleasure as is a moral duty.

This task, as it seems to me, presents no difficulties at all. I am talking, be it remembered, about "innocent" pleasures in a rather special sense of the word "innocent." In that sense, the sort of personal pleasure that it might be a man's duty to seek would exclude excess even of pleasures which in their due degree ought to be sought. Does anyone suppose that we do not have strong inclinations towards excessive and unwise pleasure-getting? Plainly we have such inclinations and have to fight against them. Therefore if there were a duty of promoting one's own pleasure in its due degree, the pursuit of *that* duty would involve much conflict, and often a very bitter conflict, with sundry strong inclinations. It is just nonsense to say that there could be no such conflict.

I suppose the reply would be that although there is a moral duty to restrain one's tendencies towards pleasure-getting for oneself, there is no positive moral duty to *get* the personal pleasure aforesaid. Such an answer would make us return to the points already discussed, viz. the supposed sufficiency of non-moral motives to secure this proper degree of personal pleasure. Without repeating these arguments, I would now say, rather broadly, that I can't see why a strong natural tendency to seek one's own pleasure should be supposed to annul the duty of seeking one's own pleasure unless it also be held, over the whole field, that the general conformity of human virtue to strong natural tendencies in human nature annuls human virtue. For the most part it may be unnecessary to preach the duty of pursuing one's own comfort and ease, and happiness and amusement; but to suppose that duty coincides with what has to be preached would seem to me to be a profound mistake in morals.

I should also maintain, however, that there is a genuine danger, from mistaken creeds of one kind or another, of paying too little attention to one's own legitimate pleasure, and indeed of wickedly killing our own joys. If duty did always need some preaching, the duty of avoiding self-starvation in this matter would have to be preached, and so, with apologies, I shall try to do a little relevant preaching.

Consider some of the types of pleasure or happiness that (by general agreement) we should try to secure for others. Then let us ask ourselves whether *we* also should not have a like security, whether if *we* should have a like security we should not attempt to get it, when we can, by our own efforts, and whether there may not be a moral duty so to do.

Others, we say, should have leisure to enjoy as well as leisure to

recuperate. Shouldn't we ourselves have the same as well as they? Is there no temptation to drive ourselves too hard, to pursue the dull round of drudgery for no better reason than that we have got into the way of drudging along, to be afraid of relaxation for the mistaken reason that the temptation to sloth is always greater than the danger of overworking? Others, we say, should have time to play, not only if they are children. Should we not, on the same grounds, cherish a time for play for ourselves, whether we ourselves are children or no? If others practise unnecessary austerities, is there no danger that we ourselves practise unnecessary austerities? Whoso advises another to burn his hair-shirt has surely the duty of burning his own. I need not multiply instances. If masochism (or a self-torturing propensity) seldom exists in a pure form, it does nevertheless exist. In a muddled form, often the legacy of muddled theory and of indefensible creeds and hearsay, it is very common. We drive ourselves harder than we would like to see any other man drive himself, and we have a moral duty not to make that particular mistake in our own case. What is the sense of saying that we should try to banish the gloom in a dismal company but, in solitude, have no similar duty to expel our own gloom if we can? And what is the sense of saying that there is never a duty to diminish the hump on our own back, and only a duty to diminish our neighbour's hump?

All of this appears to me to be so very clear that I suspect a fallacy in the arguments of the opposition. Having had the effrontery to say so much, I continue with the effrontery of trying to point out where I conceive the fallacy to lie. I think the fallacy is the discredited but persistent assumption (usually repudiated when definitely exposed) that to choose to do so-and-so is to do what one pleases, and that to do as one pleases is to pursue one's own pleasure. In any such argument the word "pleasure" is multivalent and therefore misleading. Suppose a conflict between duty and inclination. Then if a man chooses to oppose inclination he would, in terms of the argument, be opposing inclination "at his pleasure" and so would be acting for his own pleasure (or, in that sense, in accordance with inclination) in the very act of opposing inclination. There is no meaning to be extracted from such a would-be argument. Take, then, something less general and, in appearance, safer. I allow that many drudges may have reached a state in which, even if their harness galls them, they are happier, in a wan way, in harness than out of it. That admission, however, applies to others as well as to ourselves. Therefore, if we maintain that we should try to prevent others reaching such an undesirable condition, we imply that the condition is corrigible in their case. Is it not, then, corrigible in our own case and by our own efforts? And if the condition is undesirable and is corrigible by our own efforts in our own case, how can we deny that we ought to

make the effort or, in other words, that we have a moral duty to do so?

Before leaving this aspect of the question I should like to refer to another of its facets. The assumption I am disputing about one's own pleasure is that the choice of one's own pleasure is so strong and inveterate a propensity in any human breast that there is no need (or, in extreme forms of the theory, no room) for a duty of consulting one's own due degree of "innocent" pleasure. Regarding other men, the assumption is that our natural propensities towards benefiting others are so weak that they have constantly to be abetted by moral motives and intentions. I am ready to concede that few men, even the most generous, are, by nature (or by nature nurtured by extra-moral training), quite generous enough. This concession, if justified at all, has to be justified on empirical grounds, but let us suppose that the empirical grounds support it. Even in that case it should not be assumed that there can never be cases in which there is a temptation towards over-generosity, and it is quite plain on empirical grounds that there is plenty of unwise and of untimely generosity. It follows that the morality of this matter cannot be determined simply by the very general need for abetting our too ungenerous nature by moral motives and intentions whose sole office is to make us rather more generous than our submoral or amoral disposition would prompt us to be in the ordinary way. It is often a moral duty to resist certain generous impulses in the form in which they make their strongest immediate appeal.

(2) In his *Foundations of Ethics* Sir David Ross, who believes that one's own pleasure is morally "colourless" while the pleasure of others is a fitting moral end (and indeed finds these beliefs clear and even self-evident), has elaborated a series of distinctions conformable with his beliefs, but as he thinks independently true.

Roughly stated, his conclusions are that "good" (or some equivalent term) is used in several distinct senses, not all of which are even comparable, and that three of these senses are of special importance in ethics and for our present problem. These three senses are (*a*) that which is worthy of admiration as well as of satisfaction, (*b*) that which is worthy of satisfaction (and no more), and (*c*) the sense in which "we do consider the state of pleasure, when the pleasure is not a morally bad pleasure to be in some sense a better state of affairs than the state of pain." [Sir David is rather reticent about the third class, but it turns up in a sporadic way in his discussion, e.g. in the passage I have quoted from p. 275 of his book or, again, on p. 273, where he speaks about the duty to produce pleasure for others "just because it will be pleasure for them."]

It is admitted on all hands that "good," "value," and other such words are used in several senses. He who discerns more senses of

them than his opponents have been able to notice is therefore quite likely to be right. On the other hand, not every distinction amounts to a radically different sense of language. Personally I doubt whether Sir David Ross's distinctions do describe different *senses* of good (and he himself admits on p. 279 that his notion of "worthiness" is "not altogether clear"); but I don't mean to argue the point. I should oppose his views about pleasures-for-self *versus* pleasures-for-others even if "good" had these three distinct senses as well as many others.

Take first the sense of "admirable" or of "worthy to be admired." This sense, according to Sir David Ross, is the most important of all senses of good, for ethics and also outside ethics; and it implies that anything that ought to be admired is *itself* (i.e. is intrinsically) good. I don't want to dispute either of these statements, though the second at least would often be disputed. But what do they tell us in this matter? It may be possible to admire everything and to say that since nothing is common or unclean, everything is worthy of admiration. For the most part, however, when we speak of admiration and about what ought to be admired, we are talking about something that we take to be *outstanding*. In short, we are thinking about the highest and the finest goods. If, therefore, anyone were to hold (and I am not disputing the view) that pleasure, whether one's own or another's, is not a very high good, we should doubt the propriety of describing it as admirable. And that might be the entire outcome of the distinction. So much for the point about admiration. As regards "intrinsic" goodness, it should be noticed that even if the highest and most admirable goods are intrinsically good it does not follow, by any pretence at logic, that the goodness of quite lowly goods might not be intrinsic too. I have argued already that the goodness of pleasure *is* intrinsic to pleasure; and Sir David's "just because it is a pleasure" in the passage I quoted from his page 273 is obvious if unintended testimony to the same effect. In other words, there is only the loosest connection between "outstanding" and "intrinsic" goodness.

Take, secondly, the sense of being a "worthy object of satisfaction." I understand Sir David to mean that our satisfactions are relative to *us* and therefore that the satisfactoriness of anything is not intrinsic to *it*. This sense of good is therefore different from the former (where admiration, it was held, did imply an intrinsic property of the thing admired that made *it* worthy of admiration). With many misgivings I shall pass the point and try to fasten upon our special topic. I take Sir David to hold that the existence of "innocent" pleasure in others is a worthy object of satisfaction and that the promotion of their "innocent" pleasure is also a worthy object of satisfaction. This includes the statements that a morally good

man would take satisfaction in observing and in promoting the "innocent" pleasure of others, and that there is something "morally right" or "morally fitting" in his satisfaction. That holds when there is no *moral* goodness in the said pleasures—an obvious point since our philanthropist may be concerned chiefly with some "Help the Children" fund or with relieving suffering after an earthquake. A character-test would be irrelevant for all recipients. (The same point would arise if the happiness of domestic pets and the humane killing of bullocks were the "happiness of others" that was relevant. The bullocks needn't be supposed to be moral beings. They qualify as recipients in their capacity of potential sufferers.)

How does this affect our problem? It is plain on any theory that there may be a moral duty to confer benefit upon recipients who are either non-moral beings (like the bullocks) or whose moral character is irrelevant (as in the case of the Earthquake Fund). That should be common ground in all discussions of this matter, and I would merely remark in passing that it disposes of an illogical difficulty that some may believe they discern in the view that one's own due degree of pleasure is a moral end for each of us. There is no contradiction (and no difficulty even) in holding that the pleasure that we ought to give ourselves need not have anything moral about it (e.g. solving one cross-word puzzle, but not two, or drinking two glasses of beer but not three). In this respect, apart from mere idiosyncrasies, our two bottles of beer are precisely similar to the other man's two bottles of beer.

Accordingly we are left with the statements (*a*) that a morally good man will take a worthy (moral) satisfaction in the pleasure of others, but not in his own, and in promoting the pleasure of others but not in promoting his own, and (*b*) that there is a moral rightness or fittingness in this satisfaction about others but not about oneself.

In heaven's name, why? If it is the *existence* of pleasure that gives worthy satisfaction to a man (or that satisfies a worthy man) why on earth or in heaven should he exempt his own pleasure? If a good man is distressed, and should be distressed, at the prevalence of pain in the world, why should he refuse to include his own suffering? If, on the other hand, it is the attempt to *promote* pleasure that is the important matter, on what grounds are we to draw this remarkable distinction between ourselves and others? I have examined some of them at earlier stages in this paper. Are there any more?

When Sir David Ross says that we should produce pleasure in others "just because it will be pleasure for them," his proper meaning surely is that *the pleasure* is good, and so that *they* will have something good. How then, if we can have any sort of success at getting pleasure for ourselves, can *we* avoid getting something good if we get the pleasure? I can see only two arguments that would establish the

point if they were sound. The first would be that the conscious pursuit of happiness always destroys its own aim in one's own case, although it can be achieved in the case of others (who may be quite unself-conscious in their enjoyment). This view, I think, is false in the large, although it states an empirical difficulty that often attaches to practice. It is simply not the truth that a music-lover, say, will enjoy a concert if somebody else gives him a ticket for it, but cannot enjoy any concert in which he deliberately purchases his own ticket. The other argument would be that pleasure is so low an end that a man who chooses it for himself is prostituting his higher nature. I cannot believe that "innocent" pleasures are so low in the scale and I would point out that, if they were, the promotion of the pleasures of others would be condemned by the same argument unless the others were so low in the scale that mere pleasure was one of the highest goods they could get. That may be true about babies and other domestic pets; but it is not true of most that we call philanthropy.

In saying these things I have anticipated most of what I want to say about Sir David Ross's third "sense" of "good." The second "sense" will lead us to the third. Why is it right or fitting that a good man should find satisfaction in the pleasure of others ? The answer (I submit) is just that pleasure *is* good, whether it be a lowly good or a high one. There is no mystic, self-sufficient, ultimate "fittingness" in the case. There is a reason for it, as is surely plain when we consider the negative side, that is, the good man's proper abhorrence of unnecessary "innocent" pain. The intrinsic goodness of innocent pleasure and the intrinsic badness of innocent pain is what is right-making in this matter, i.e. the second "sense" rests upon the third. I have argued that there *is* intrinsic goodness in "innocent" pleasure whether or not "innocent" pleasure is a "high" or "admirable" intrinsic good. If the (third) sense of "good" in which an unadmirable pleasure is intrinsically good is different from the sense of "good" in which admirable moral virtue is intrinsically good, I can see no reason for dismay. Let the senses be different. The question then is whether any of the senses is ethically irrelevant. I assert that none is. There is no moral reason for promoting "innocent" pleasure in anyone except the intrinsic goodness of "innocent" pleasure. That and that alone makes it right to approve and to promote "innocent" pleasure.

I might put the matter in other terms. Sir David Ross draws his distinctions in terms of "worthiness," a term that is either impregnated with moralism (as when we think of a "worthy" man, say, an elder of the Kirk) or at any rate is seasoned with that flavour. There is another and still more fundamental term, viz. worth. I don't say and I don't think that there need be any "worthiness"

about quite a number of "innocent" pleasures, say a cat's pleasure in the cream it hasn't stolen. I say that every "innocent" pleasure has a certain *worth* of its own. If it hadn't it wouldn't be better than an "innocent" pain. I say further that it is the worth of pleasure, low or high, that makes the promotion of pleasure *anywhere* a worthy object of a worthy man's endeavour.

As I said at the beginning of this paper the subject is controversial, but now, perhaps, I may be allowed to add that although I could not avoid controversy I had hoped to be able to avoid polemics. I am sorry if I have not succeeded in this aim as well as I had hoped, and in any case I regret that so much of my argument has been defensive, that is to say, has been engaged in attempting to withstand actual or presumptive attacks. In my view the *onus probandi* lies upon those who maintain that one's own pleasure is *not* a moral end, although the pleasure of others *is* a moral end; but I am prepared to admit that talk about the *onus probandi* has much less justification in philosophy than it has, say, in law. Let me affirm, then, that the general presumption in all ethics is that good should be promoted just because it is good, this proposition being easily conciliable with the obvious corollary that a greater good should be preferred to a lesser, and with the rider (already sufficiently argued) that the good that a moral man ought to try to promote (e.g. another's comfort) need not itself be a moral good. (It may only be a good at which we should aim if we are moral.) I have been maintaining, in short, that there is no sufficient reason for saying that although "innocent" pleasure or happiness is good in itself (and for that reason should be promoted in the case of others), it should nevertheless (in spite of its intrinsic goodness) *not* be a moral end for a moral man in his own case. I have shown, I think, that this opinion, if it were true, would imply that there was something quite exceptional about the goodness of "innocent" pleasure. In the case of most other goods, say intellectual or aesthetic culture, self-culture is a moral duty as well as other-culture. Similarly a man has a moral duty as well as a moral right to demand fair treatment for himself as well as for others, a right as well as a duty not to be too self-effacing regarding his own interests; and so on. I am quite unable to see, and I am asking my readers whether *they* can see, that the case of pleasure, if a good however humble, is significantly different; and I am confident that "innocent" pleasure or happiness *is* and *is intrinsically* a good.

It seems to me to be very important to insist upon the point, if for no other reason, in order to counteract a prevalent and, I believe, mistaken application of ethics. Selfishness may not be the root of all evil. I think in fact that it isn't. It is, however, the root of much and perhaps of most moral evil both grave and slight. It is much more prevalent than its opposite defect, and although foolish and mis-

directed generosity is common enough, and none the better because it is common, there is still too little anti-selfish generosity and far too much anti-generous selfishness in the world.

Therefore it is intelligible, and to some extent pardonable, for moralists to be hazy about the boundaries between preaching and moral theory, and so to train all their guns against the selfish front. If, however, they go on to say that there is no place in ethics for a due regard to one's own interests they are saying, I believe, what is profoundly false. To say so is to misunderstand the meaning of selfishness. A man is selfish if he either neglects the interests of others more than he should or actively prefers his own interest to the greater detriment of others. A due regard for one's own interest isn't selfishness in either of these senses. It is paying due regard to one's own place in a moral partnership and is a requirement of elementary justice. To deny it, or to deny its morality, is to misinterpret the situation.

That is a general point which seems to me to be of great importance. More generally still, there is a tendency among many moralists to be (theoretically) desperately hard upon ourselves and rather lenient towards others. These are the tactics of a preaching moralism. Their aim is to counteract the prevalent tendency to make excuses for ourselves and to be rigorous towards others (unless, perhaps, the "others" happen to be our friends or social equals, a refinement of the question which I have deliberately refrained from discussing in these pages). The advice may be sound in most cases, but it is *ex parte* advice in an inverted way. It is not an accurate description of the moral situation.

The ethics of pleasure is rather circumscribed. Its prominence in modern discussions is, very largely, a legacy from the exaggerated place that hedonism had in traditional ethics. If we admit, as we should, that pleasure or happiness is not the only good (and not the only intrinsic good), problems about pleasure-getting, whether in one's own case or in the case of some other, are very much narrower than problems about self-interest in comparison with other people's interest. And pleasure and pain as we have seen may be interpreted so narrowly as to be of rather small account in the case of beings who, like every man, have higher interests than mere agreeable feelings or sharp and nasty pains.

The more you restrict the meaning of "pleasure" the more you diminish the importance of the ethical discussion of pleasure. As I have said, I believe that most of the moralists who assert the ethical neutrality of pleasure-getting for oneself tend to interpret "pleasure" rather widely for the purposes of that particular discussion. They are talking about pleasure or happiness and are saying that there is no moral duty to promote "pleasure or happi-

ness" in one's own case, although there is an important moral duty to promote it in the case of others.

If so, they may have to walk more delicately than they dream. They would have to hold, for instance, that although self-culture is a duty, all vestiges of pleasure must be expunged before the slate is clear for an accurate moral reckoning. Other people should be encouraged to cultivate aesthetic taste and artistic skill both for the fun it will give them and for the "admirable" character of the pursuit. In our own case we should write off the fun of the affair (from a moral standpoint though not from any other).

That might be an awkward complication, but it would be consistent and it might, perhaps, be done. Consequently it does not destroy the theory. As I have said, however, I think the theory is ripe for destruction on other grounds.

# THE METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY[1]

Professor JARED S. MOORE

Philosophy is commonly referred to as a "spirit" of inquiry, a general attitude toward things, rather than a body of conclusions; but as every spirit in this world must *have* a body, so philosophy must have a *method*. The expression, "philosophical method," is used with somewhat varying meanings, but it is the question of how philosophical conclusions are attained that we have in mind in the present article.

## THE METHODS OF PHILOSOPHY

As we study the writings of the great philosophers we find that we can classify the methods which they have used in attaining their conclusions under three heads: (1) rationalistic, mathematical, or deductive; (2) scientific, empirical, or inductive; and (3) romantic, mystical, or intuitive. We shall now consider each of these three methods, pointing out the values and defects of each, and attempting as we proceed to discover what the best method for philosophy may be.

1. *The Rationalistic or Deductive Method* consists in starting out with a few fundamental ideas which are supposed to be self-evident, or which may be taken for granted, and then attempting by a long and laborious process of exact reasoning to infer the conclusions which follow necessarily from these original premises. This is the method which we commonly associate with mathematics, and it has been a favourite method among philosophers from the earliest times. Since the Renaissance the men whom we may take as especially representative of it are René Descartes (1596–1650) at the outset of the modern period, and his immediate successor, Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677). It was Spinoza who carried out the ideal of this method most thoroughly in his greatest work, *Ethics Demonstrated after the Method of Geometry*.

[1] This article is designed to bring to a close the series of elementary, introductory papers on the general nature of philosophy which have appeared in two previous issues of this journal, viz. "An Approach to Philosophy," Vol. X, No. 37, January 1935; and "The Relations of Philosophy," Vol. XIII, No. 51, July 1938. Citations in this paper of "our preceding article," etc., have reference to the second of these.

This would seem in many ways the ideal method for philosophy. How splendid it would be, we might think, if the philosopher could solve his problems as accurately and as certainly as does the mathematician! And, as Descartes himself said, if mathematics has been so successful in its use of this method, why should not philosophy also? But at least three difficulties confront us, and show this method, essential as it is to the mathematician, to be quite inappropriate for the philosopher. In the first place (*a*) is the *difficulty of finding absolutely certain premises*, or propositions to start out with; and following this, (*b*) the *difficulty of drawing certainly correct inferences*. If one premise which seems to be self-evident really is not so (and it is easy to be deceived in this matter), or if one error is made in the process of inference (which is also, of course, very likely to occur), every succeeding step in the argument becomes doubtful. And then, in the third place, (*c*) this method suffers under the serious defect that it completely *ignores* the entire vast *field of experience*: in other words, it is a method for developing truths already known, or assumptions made for the specific purpose of seeing what they would imply *if* true, and is distinctly *not* a method for discovering new truths. This last field, so neglected by the rationalistic method, is on the contrary the special concern of the next method to be considered.

2. *The Scientific or Inductive Method* is the one most commonly favoured by philosophers to-day, but it too has notable shortcomings. Instead of starting with assumed general principles, it starts with the facts of experience (hence is often called the "empirical" method), and infers general principles from them. This is the method employed by the so-called "positive sciences," "the sciences" in the ordinary sense as discussed in our immediately preceding article, which have to do with the facts and laws of nature and of the human mind. Francis Bacon (1561–1626), one of the founders of modern scientific method, may be taken as representative of the attempt to use the same method in philosophy also.

The "scientific method" in its completeness has many parts—observation, experimentation, classification, analysis, the formulation of causal laws, etc.; and as it happens there are two important contemporary schools of philosophy which have adopted as their own two special aspects of this method. These two groups of philosophers are (*a*) the *Pragmatists*, led by the late William James (1842–1910) and the eminent contemporary, John Dewey (1859– ); and (*b*) the *Neo-Realists*, represented by a large number of living philosophers, both in England and in America.

The *pragmatists* emphasize the *experimental* method which is so characteristic of modern science, and attempt to arrive at philoso-

phical truth by testing the various ideas that occur to them, particularly with reference to their practical consequences in meeting the problems of life. Those ideas which are successful in meeting those difficulties are accepted as true, and the others rejected.

The *neo-realists* emphasize *analysis*, and attempt to explain things by analysing them into their elements, or by analysing propositions about them into *their* elements. This reliance on the analytical method of science has been defended especially by two members of the school—Bertrand Lord Russell in England, and Professor Edward Gleason Spaulding of Princeton University. So convinced is Lord Russell of the pre-eminence and self-sufficiency of this method for philosophy that he now calls his own system "Logical Atomism," to stress his belief that all philosophical truth is to be attained by analysing logical propositions into their so-called "atomic constituents," as physical science similarly analyses material things.[1] Professor Spaulding is also named in this connection because it is he who wrote the chapter in defence of analysis in the co-operative volume which launched the neo-realistic movement in the United States—*The New Realism*.[2] The bi-monthly journal called *Analysis* is devoted entirely to the working out of this method.

Pragmatists and neo-realists alike, then, plead for an identification of philosophical method with that of science, though each emphasizes a different part of that method. What are we to say about this? The notion is inadequate, I think, on two counts—one directed against the method as a whole, and the other against the analytic method specifically. As to the first and more general objection: if philosophy is concerned with the meanings and purposes of things, and if our account of the distinction between philosophy and the sciences in the last previous article in this series is correct, (*a*) *scientific method* is totally inadequate for philosophy because science is concerned entirely with facts as facts, and *ignores* the *purposes and meanings* of those facts. More specifically, (*b*) *analysis* is an inadequate method for philosophy because it *ignores* what are now often called the "*holistic*" *properties* of things—that is to say, those properties which are possessed by "wholes" over and above those possessed by the various parts. This last point calls for somewhat more extended attention.

We often say that "the whole is equal to the sum of its parts"; but this is true only within the very limited field of the arithmetic of finite numbers. $11 = 7 + 4 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1$, and a heap of eleven stones is merely a collection of eleven stones; but a football team is certainly more than the sum of

[1] See his article with that title in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, First Series (The Macmillan Co., 1924), pp. 359 ff.

[2] The Macmillan Co., 1912. The chapter cited is to be found on pages 155 ff.

its 7 + 4 = 11 members! And so it is with any other organized unit worthy of being called a "whole," as distinguished from that which is merely a *collection* of units: the former is an "integration" of interrelated parts, the latter but an "aggregation" of separate things. Any chemical compound, such as water, for example, is more than a simple combination of its elements, a certain number of atoms of oxygen *plus* twice as many atoms of hydrogen; and possesses properties quite different from those possessed by its constituent elements—such as, in the case of water, liquidity, as distinguished from the gaseous nature of ordinary hydrogen and oxygen. So, a living organism is a unit, not merely a collection of organs; and "life" is a property which the organism possesses only so long as it *remains* an integrated unit, and until it is *dis*integrated by death. So again, the human mind or personality is more than a collection of ideas, feelings, "drives," reflexes, etc.: it is a unit, a whole, a "self," and would cease to be so could it be dissected into its elements.

The distinctive properties of wholes are called "holistic" after the Greek word for "whole"—ὅλος; and the new word was first introduced to English-speaking readers in its substantive form, "Holism," by the South African statesman and philosopher, General Jan Christiaan Smuts. The noun was coined originally to denote a certain theory regarding evolution, but our present concern is solely with the adjective.

The objection to the analytical method with which we are now dealing may be better understood in the light of this explanation. That objection is, we recall, to the effect that when a whole is analysed into its constituent elements its distinctive holistic properties are lost. Water analysed chemically is no longer water, dissection destroys both the life and the beauty of a flower, a football "eleven" which is merely eleven men and which completely lacks "teamwork" is hardly a football "team." But philosophy, we have seen, is fundamentally interested in *wholes*: hence, analysis can never be an adequate method for philosophers.

The purport of our discussion of the scientific or inductive method is by no means or in the slightest degree a condemnation or criticism of that method *in its place*. It is the distinctive method of science and sufficient thereto, and it is indispensable to philosophy also; but it is merely a *part* of the philosophical method, as we shall see later, and, for the reasons given, quite inadequate for philosophy if taken alone.

3. *The Romantic or Intuitive Method* is based on the idea that there is a direct way of knowing reality through a special faculty called "intuition," which transcends in its insight into truth both reason and the senses, and is allied more to the emotional than to the

intellectual side of man's nature. Emphasis on this method is a phase of a general movement which appears from time to time in the history of philosophy in revolt against a too great reliance on intellectual processes in the attainment of fundamental truths—a movement consequently known as "anti-intellectualism"; and the pragmatism referred to in the previous section, particularly as it appeared in the work of William James, is another expression of the same tendency.

"Intuition" is a much-abused word, and hardly any two philosophers or psychologists agree as to exactly what it means. Popular writers think of it rather ridiculously as an infallible source of knowledge, an easy way to certain truth, and often as a special possession of the feminine half of mankind! In general the term refers to any direct or immediate way of getting at truth, as contrasted with the step by step or "discursive" processes of reasoning, and even sense-perception is in this sense an intuitive process; but no thought of infallibility is attached by any reputable thinker to this or any other human method of knowing. As to the *nature* of intuition in its relation to the other so-called "faculties" of the human mind, and what it actually accomplishes in the way of enlightenment about the nature of things, philosophers who talk about intuition at all differ tremendously. The leading contemporary advocate of the intuitive method as the sole true method of philosophy is the outstanding French thinker, Henri Bergson (1859– ).

The most notable exponents of intuitionism, however, have ever been that great band of religious leaders known as "*mystics.*" So important are they that the method is often simply called "the mystical method," but it is better rather to think of mysticism as a special form of intuitionism—the most important variety of it, perhaps, since mysticism is and always has been a prominent phenomenon of all religions and religious philosophies. Briefly, a mystic is one who feels that he has had a special, indescribable, and absolutely convincing experience of intimate union with God, the Central Reality of the universe. For him this experience so far surpasses any other possible experience in interest and value as to render these quite worthless in comparison; but by the very nature of things the non-mystical philosopher, who has never had such an experience, is quite unfitted to estimate its value or to make use of it in formulating his own philosophy.

The *emotional* character of intuitionism, because of which the name "romanticism" is often given to it, appears best in the writings of such philosophers as the seventeenth-century Frenchman, Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), one of the early disciples of Descartes; who, in opposition to the pure rationalism of his master, uttered the famous saying, "the heart has its reasons of which reason itself knows

nothing." By this he meant, making use of that double meaning of the word "reason" (*raison*) which is as characteristic of the French as of the English language, that there are emotional insights into truth which it is impossible to attain through the discursive processes of the intellect. Since the time of Pascal this emphasis upon the emotions has been made by many other philosophers, German as well as French.

What are we to say of this method as a way of attaining philosophical truth? Three things, I think. In the first place, (*a*) it is a *purely individual method*, and so hardly adapted to lead the way to common agreements on any philosophical problems. We may reason together; and we may observe, analyse, and experiment on things together; but each of us has his own "intuitions," his own emotional reactions, which can never be described, communicated to others, or compared with those of others—hence the great diversity and incompatibility of intuitional philosophies. Our emotions, far more than our thoughts, are peculiarly our own; and however convincing the reasons of my heart and my mystical ecstacies may be to *me*, I have no right to hope that they will appeal with equal force to others.

What all this implies is (*b*) that, as we saw in the preceding article, intuition is the *method of religion, fine art, and ordinary life*, rather than of philosophy and science; and for the philosopher to rely on the romantic or intuitive method is to abandon his distinctive task, the interpretation of experience in purely intellectual terms. The religionist, the artist, and the plain man are the "seers"; but the philosopher is not so much a "man of vision" as what Rodin called him in his famous statue, "the Thinker."

On the other hand, (*c*) to say this by way of criticism of intuition as an instrument of philosophical knowledge is not to deny the *importance of the intuitional and emotional life*; and the philosophical romanticists, pragmatists, and "instrumentalists" are to be commended for laying stress on these phases of our mental make-up. In any complete study of human nature, the feelings and instincts of man must be taken very seriously into account, for no man is merely an intellectual machine; but the function of feeling and intuition, whatever else it may be, is not that of opening the way to the solution of philosophical problems.

Having now considered each of the traditional philosophical methods and found none of them quite satisfactory, let us next inquire what may be the *true* one. In view of the many disadvantages under which each of the traditional methods suffers, the true one cannot be any of these; nor, I think, is it an entirely different method, but rather a *combination* of all the others, in which the *synoptic aim*

that distinguishes philosophy is kept constantly in view—that is to say, the endeavour to "see all things together," to view things in their wholeness. It is this synoptic *aim* which most characteristically distinguishes philosophy from the sciences, rather than any great difference in method. The philosopher makes use of all possible ways of approach to or insight into truth, critically inspecting each of them, and bringing them all into a synthetic unity. Hence we may call it, if we like, "*the Synoptic Method*"; provided we remember that synopsis, for the philosopher, always presupposes analysis and critical reflection. This was notably the ideal which Plato sought in all his philosophizing; and in recent years the late Professor William R. Sorley of Cambridge (1855–1935) wrote much in defence of the same ideal.

One of the most serious errors of philosophical romanticism consists in its endeavour to attain a synoptic view of things *without* first undertaking the laborious process of careful observation, thorough analysis, and reflective criticism. This was the error of the "nature philosophers" of a century ago, notably Schelling and Hegel, of whom we wrote in the preceding article. Often in the course of history philosophers *have* attained remarkable insights into truth without any such preparatory efforts, and have anticipated, centuries before, the results of modern science—most familiar as instances of this are the theory of evolution, foreseen by the earliest Greek philosophers; and the atomic theory of matter, first formulated in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. by Leucippus and Democritus. But such brilliant "intuitions" cannot be relied upon or expected, and for the best results observation and analysis are necessary preliminaries to synopsis; and the complete philosophical method combines these. Even such results, procured after much toilsome effort, lack the absolute certainty of mathematics, and so fall short of the promise of the rationalistic method; but this is after all the best of which man is capable.

Let us close this section on method with a tabulated summary:

TABLE I

METHODS OF PHILOSOPHY

| | |
|---|---|
| 1. Rationalistic or Deductive (Descartes, Spinoza) | |
| 2. Scientific or Inductive (Bacon) | |
| *a.* Experimental (Pragmatists: James, Dewey) | *The Synoptic Method* (Plato, Sorley) |
| *b.* Analytic (Neo-Realists: Russell, Spaulding) | |
| 3. Romantic or Intuitive (Mystics, Bergson) | |

## THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

It is customary to speak of the "branches" of philosophy, or the "philosophical disciplines," in the sense of subordinate groups of problems within the total field. These should never be thought of as "divisions," for there is a close interrelation among them and a considerable overlapping of their various problems; but there is sufficient justification for distinguishing them as at least separable (in thought) groups of problems, having matters in common which mark each off from the other groups. Various ways of classifying and correlating these branches have been employed, but we shall find it convenient to consider four main groups, each covering one or more "branches": (I) General Philosophy, (II) Axiology, (III) Applied Philosophy, and (IV) History of Philosophy.

*General Philosophy* is concerned with the two most fundamental of all problems—that of the ultimate nature of *reality*,[1] and that of the nature of our *knowledge* of reality. The former of these problems constitutes (A) the subject-matter of what is known as *Metaphysics*, or "theory of reality"; and the latter (B) that of *Epistemology*, or "theory of knowledge." As we survey the past we find that the *ancient* philosophers concerned themselves almost entirely (at least, within the limits of "general philosophy") with *metaphysical* questions; but in *modern* times *epistemology* has come into greater prominence, and is now usually regarded (though not by all philosophers) as necessarily preliminary to any thorough metaphysics. Under the head of epistemology are included such problems as whether knowledge is possible at all, how far valid knowledge extends, how knowledge is attained, how our knowledge of things is related to the things themselves, etc. But more than such a brief summary as this needs to be said concerning the field of metaphysics.

The *name "Metaphysics"* seems to have had a purely accidental origin. Among the various writings of Aristotle were a large work entitled *Physics*, and a number of shorter ones dealing with a field referred to by their author simply as "the First Philosophy"—i.e. with the first or most general problems of philosophy. When, two centuries later, one of Aristotle's numerous important commentators, Andronicus of Rhodes (first century B.C.), came to draw up an edition of the great master's works, he brought together these shorter pieces and placed them *after the "Physics"*: hence they were called, in the Greek equivalent of that expression, *τά μετά τά φυσικά* (*ta meta ta physica*), later condensed into the term "metaphysics."

The most general *problem* of metaphysics is the problem of what it

[1] The word "reality" is here used simply as a general name for anything we may call "real" as distinguished from what is "unreal."

*means* to be "real," how we are to distinguish between the "real" and the "unreal," or what the relation is between things as they "appear" and as they "really are"—the famous "problem of appearance and reality." Along with this is the problem of enumerating and classifying the various *kinds* of reality or real things in their relation to one another. Now the ordinary experiences of mankind seem to reveal three great types of reality: *Nature* (the physical world or material universe), the *Soul* or mind of man, and *God.* Hence, four interrelated sets of metaphysical problems arise, each of which may be said to constitute a "branch" of metaphysics, as metaphysics itself is a branch of philosophy.

These *branches of metaphysics* are: (1) *Ontology,* or (as the etymology of the word indicates) the "theory of being,"[1] concerned with the most general problems as enumerated in the last paragraph; (2) *Cosmology,* concerned with the nature of the physical world—matter, time and space, life, etc.; (3) metaphysical *Psychology,* or "Philosophy of Mind," concerned with the nature of the human mind, soul, or "self"—the nature of human personality; and (4) metaphysical *Theology,* concerned with questions as to the existence and nature of God. It is important to remember that these are not in any sense separate "divisions" of metaphysics—any more than metaphysics, epistemology, and the rest are separate divisions of philosophy—but merely names for groups of problems which belong together. To insure that this is not forgotten, perhaps it would be better merely to speak of "cosmological problems," "ontological problems," etc.; but it is often more convenient to use the substantive form of the words. As can easily be seen, there are many metaphysical problems which quite overrun the boundaries between the various branches—as, for example, the problem of the relation between the mind and the body, which brings together psychology and cosmology; or that of the relation between God and the world, which is a theo-cosmological problem. But this interrelation is also found in the scientific field in such compound sciences as biochemistry, mathematical physics, etc.

We saw in our previous article that there is a close interrelation between philosophy in general and the sciences. Similarly now we may note that every special *branch* of philosophy, with the exception of ontology, has a special relation to some specific science or group of sciences. Thus Cosmology is intimately related to the various "natural sciences" or sciences of the material world—physics, biology, geology, and the rest; metaphysical Psychology with the science of that name, and metaphysical Theology with the "dogmatic" theologies of the various religious systems. In each case the science in question is concerned with the experienced *facts* in its own limited

[1] That is to say, of "all that in any sense 'is.'"

field, and the corresponding metaphysical study with the *significance* of those facts in relation to the whole realm of "what is," and with the ultimate nature of the objects studied.

*Axiology.* Three of the most important of all philosophical disciplines are Logic, Ethics, and Aesthetics. Logical and ethical problems have been the concern of philosophers almost since the beginning, but aesthetics is distinctly a modern study, and only within the present century has the underlying *unity* of these three disciplines come to full recognition. To indicate this basic unity underlying the distinctive problems of logic, ethics, and aesthetics a new word has been introduced into the philosophical vocabulary at the suggestion of Professor Wilbur M. Urban of Yale University—Axiology, or the "theory of values."

Axiology in its most general sense has to do with the nature of *values*, of what "*ought* to be"; as distinguished from metaphysics, which is concerned with reality or "what is"; and one of the most important problems of philosophy overlaps these two fields—the problem, namely, of the *relation* between value and existence, the ideal and the real, what is and what ought to be. Of the various things which men "value," three stand especially high; and as man alone is capable of "appreciating" and seeking these values, they have come to be known as "*spiritual*"[1] values, to distinguish them from those "lower" values which animals as well as man may enjoy—food, pleasure, "the useful," etc. These three great ideals or spiritual values, each of which is the subject-matter of one of the special axiological disciplines mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph, are: (A) *Truth*, the subject-matter of *Logic*;[2] (B) *Goodness* (or "the Good"), the subject-matter of *Ethics*; and (C) *Beauty*, the subject-matter of *Aesthetics*.

Instead of thinking of these subjects, however, as purely philosophical studies having special sciences corresponding to them, we must rather consider them as subjects which may be studied *either* as branches of philosophy *or* as distinct sciences, according to the point of view or the methods employed. As branches of *philosophy* they inquire into the *ultimate nature* of their respective ideals, regarded as *ends* to be sought by man—What *is* truth? What *is* beauty? What is the proper goal of moral behaviour? As *sciences*, on the other hand, they are concerned more with the *means* or

[1] The much used but very difficult-to-define term "spiritual" may best be understood here to refer to whatever is of distinctly *personal* concern, whatever man alone (or some superior personal being, such as God or an angel) is capable of appreciating and seeking.

[2] So closely related are the ideas of "truth" and of "knowledge" that philosophical logic may also conveniently be considered in a sense a branch of epistemology.

*methods* by which these ends are to be attained; and on this side they have long been grouped together as "*normative* sciences," because concerned with the "norms" or standards of human life in its three main fields. So, whereas *Logic* as a philosophical discipline has to do with the ultimate nature of truth as the goal of the reasoning process, logic as a *science* is concerned with the *standards of reasoning*, and the principles which must govern the reasoning process if it is to attain the truth which it seeks. Similarly, *Ethics* as a science is concerned with standards of *conduct*, and the principles which should guide man in the attainment of goodness and the development of character, and with the history of man's varying ideas as to what is right and what is wrong; and *Aesthetics* as a science with the standards of what we commonly call "good *taste*," the nature of man's experience of the beautiful, and the expression and development of that experience in the fine arts. And yet in each case there is, of course, a close *interrelation* between the scientific and the philosophical studies, so that they are really not distinct studies, but rather different aspects of one study; and any *complete* study of the beautiful, the good, and the true must necessarily treat its subject *philosophically*.

*Applied Philosophy*. In addition to such well-marked branches of philosophy as epistemology, metaphysics, logic, ethics, and aesthetics, there are a number of more or less *miscellaneous* disciplines, which have to do largely with *applications* of the more general principles of philosophy in various *special fields*, and so may conveniently be grouped under the general head of "Applied Philosophy." These include especially (A) Philosophy of Religion, (B) Philosophy of Science, (C) Philosophy of History, (D) Social and (E) Political Philosophy, and (F) Philosophy of Education.

*Philosophy of Religion* gives philosophical consideration to the problems of religion, and inquires into the reasonableness of the ideas and practices of the various historic and contemporary religions: it has its closest relations within the philosophical world itself to metaphysical theology, and on the scientific side to the "science of religions," including the history of religions and the psychology of religious experience. *Philosophy of Science*, as we saw in our previous article, has the threefold task of unifying the results of the various sciences, investigating the methods common to all the sciences, and critically analysing the fundamental concepts of the sciences: it naturally, therefore, has especially close relations with logic in its study of scientific method, with philosophical cosmology, and with the various natural sciences themselves. *Philosophy of History* is a reflective study of the history of man as a whole, with the intent of discovering whether it manifests any continuous plan and real

progress towards a definite goal, and if so what that plan and goal may be—the *meaning* of "progress," "civilization," "culture," etc.: the philosopher of history is naturally, therefore, dependent on the historian himself for a knowledge of the facts concerning the activities of man throughout the past. *Social Philosophy* is a philosophical investigation into the ultimate nature of society and of man as a social being, and *Political Philosophy* ("Politics," in the original sense of that term as employed by Aristotle in his pioneer work of that name) of the nature of the state and the various types of government: the close relations between these and scientific sociology in the former case and political science or the science of government in the latter are obvious, and so intimately are they both related to ethics that these three studies are often grouped together under the general name of "Practical Philosophy." Finally, the *Philosophy of Education* is concerned with the meaning of education, its purpose and value for man, and the respective functions of the various studies in the curriculum in the furtherance of that general aim; and is related, clearly enough, most intimately to the process of education itself, and to the psychology and history of education.

Finally, the *History of Philosophy* considers the systems of the great philosophers of the past in more or less chronological order, tracing the various problems down through the ages. Every philosopher aspires towards a synoptic view of reality, but no one individual can ever hope actually to attain more than a glimpse or single phase of the infinite truth: hence the *value* of a study of the great philosophical systems of the past consists in the fact that by analysing and comparing these we are able to obtain a *broader* view than that of any single philosopher, however great he may be, even though it be a far less profound one.

Note that "history of philosophy" is itself a *branch* of philosophy not merely an adjunct thereto. The history of science is largely a study of now discarded ideas, though no reputable scientist to-day would deny that even such a study has value; but in philosophy the newer ideas do not necessarily supplant the older, as newer scientific ideas do. In this the history of philosophy is more like the history of art or of literature: just as to-day we still read and admire the masterpieces of Homer, Dante, and Shakespeare, so to-day we still read and reflect upon the philosophies of Plato, St. Thomas, and Spinoza; and in each case the inspiration for to-day is as great as it was in days of old.

The following table is inserted at this point in the hope that it may be helpful in co-ordinating the matters discussed in this section:

TABLE II

THE BRANCHES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

| | *Corresponding Sciences* |
|---|---|
| I. *General Philosophy* | |
| A. *Epistemology:* Theory of Knowledge | |
| B. *Metaphysics:* Theory of Reality | |
| 1. Ontology (general nature of reality) | |
| 2. Cosmology (physical universe, matter) | Natural Sciences |
| 3. Psychology (soul, mind, self) | Psychology |
| 4. Theology (God) | Dogmatic Theology |
| II. *Axiology:* Theory of Values | Normative Sciences |
| A. *Logic* (Truth) | Logic (reasoning) |
| B. *Ethics* (Goodness) | Ethics (conduct) |
| C. *Aesthetics* (Beauty) | Aesthetics ("taste") |
| III. *Applied Philosophy* | |
| A. *Philosophy of Religion* (cf. Theology) | Science of Religions |
| B. *Philosophy of Science* (cf. Logic, etc.) | Natural Sciences |
| C. *Philosophy of History* | Historical Science |
| D. *Social Philosophy* (cf. Ethics) | Sociology |
| E. *Political Philosophy* (cf. Ethics) | Political Science |
| F. *Philosophy of Education* | Education |
| IV. *History of Philosophy* | |

## HOW PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS ARISE

The problems of philosophy do not come about as the result of any artificial set effort to find something to argue about, but always spring in the most natural manner out of the difficulties inherent in ordinary experience. If experience presented no difficulties there would be no problems, and so no philosophy. The "plain man" or "man in the street," as we sometimes call the ordinary person who has never reflected upon his experiences, is quite unconscious of its difficulties, and so has no *conscious* theory of the world. And yet even the plainest of plain men takes a certain rather definite *attitude* toward things, and the philosopher is able to detect behind this attitude an at least *incipient* theory—or, better, *"view"*—of the world which we may call the *"naïve,"* "uncritical," or "common-sense" view.[1] Reflection soon reveals many difficulties in this view, and from these difficulties the *problems* of philosophy arise; and the various *theories* of philosophers are attempts to surmount these difficulties. These we call, in contrast to the earlier "naïve view," *"critical* theories"; but unfortunately that useful adjective "critical,"

[1] Or, as the Germans say, *Weltanschauung.*

which *should* mean *any* theory that is the result of critical reflection, is often employed in a more restricted technical sense for certain specific theories—notably what Kant called (for excellent reasons of his own) "the critical theory of knowledge," and the contemporary school known as "critical realism."

Philosophy, then, we see, "grows out of ordinary experience, as a supplementation or correction of it."[1] In other words, philosophers do not go around looking for trouble: they find it close at hand.

The plain man's or *commonsense view of the world* has been favoured with a technical name of its own, and is now often denominated naïve or *Natural Realism.* It will be helpful at this point, I think, if we sum up the position of this natural realism in a series of propositions, and then observe how critical reflection obliges us to reject these propositions one by one. Six propositions will suffice, the first three representing the *metaphysical* assumptions of the plain man, and the last three his *epistemological* assumptions. "Assumptions," we call them, since these original ideas of the plain man are in no sense the result of any consideration on his part, but are taken for granted quite unconsciously, and continue to be taken for granted until reflection shows reasons for giving them up. These six

## PROPOSITIONS OF NATURAL REALISM

are:

1. *That things are* REALLY *just what they* APPEAR *to be,* no distinction being drawn between appearance and reality.
2. *That things are* INDEPENDENT, *both as to their existence and as to all their properties, of any perceiving mind.* So important is this proposition that it is often called "The Principle of Independence," and is taken as the distinctive mark of that philosophical doctrine known as "Realism."
3. *That things are the* SAME *to all observers*—the chair or star that *you* see, for example, is the same chair or star that *I* see.

The above propositions represent, then, the *metaphysical* assumptions of the plain man—his belief in what we may call the (1) *Reality,* (2) *Independence,* and (3) *Sameness* of *things* as known. Now let us continue with the *epistemological* assumptions of naïve realism:

4. *That* SENSE-PERCEPTION *is the sole source of our knowledge of physical things.* This proposition represents the doctrine known by philosophers as "Sensationalism," which is well symbolized by the popular saying, "Seeing is believing."

[1] Roy W. Sellars, *The Principles and Problems of Philosophy* (The Macmillan Co., 1926), p. 38.

5. *That sense-perception brings the mind into* DIRECT CONTACT *with the real things outside us.*
6. *That in perception the* OBJECT ACTS *upon the mind, the* MIND *itself being* PASSIVE.

These last three propositions indicate the plain man's belief in what we may call the (4) *Sensoriness*, (5) *Directness*, and (6) *Passiveness* of *knowledge*. Let us now see what *difficulties* are involved in these six assumptions.

*Critique of Natural Realism.* Immediately upon reflection a host of difficulties appear in the position of natural realism which lead to the complete breakdown of the plain man's view, so that in the end not a single one of these six propositions remains. All *critical theories* in philosophy are attempts to overcome these difficulties which are inherent in the naïve view, and to build up a more stable position which may stand firm in the face of opposition.

Perhaps it should be recognized frankly before we proceed that few intelligent persons, even those who are not professional philosophers, would be willing to stand by all the above assumptions if they should be challenged. There are all degrees of intellectual "plainness," and only the very *plainest* of plain men believes all the things we have said about him. But that is just the point. Every normal-minded person who has attained years of reflection has found many of his childish assumptions untenable, has thrown them aside, and has formulated for himself, however crudely, ideas more in keeping with the stage of intellectual development that he has attained. Such a person, we say, has reached the level of "*enlightened* commonsense." It is our purpose in this "critique of natural realism" to follow this same course of reflection, but to carry it farther than one would expect the intelligent non-philosopher to do.

It is in three different fields, I think, that light is thrown on our problem: (1) the field of *ordinary experience*, unguided by any specific scientific knowledge; and two scientific fields, (2) that of *psychology*, and (3) that of the *physical sciences* (i.e. physics and chemistry).

*Ordinary Experience* soon makes it evident to the intelligent plain man that his original *metaphysical* beliefs are untenable. One of the most striking evidences of experience is that the "*same thing*," as we call it, often *appears* quite *different* to the senses *under different conditions*. Examples of this are so numerous that it would be impossible to relate them all, but we may select some of the outstanding ones. First, there are the differences in the *colour* of a hill, let us say, which looks blue when seen at a distance but green when viewed from near at hand; differences in *size*, such as the enormous

appearance of the moon as it rises or sets on the horizon, as contrasted with its apparent smallness when we view it high in the heavens; differences in *shape*, as when a "really" straight stick is partially submerged in water, and "seems" to be bent at the surface of the liquid.[1] Differences in size and shape are also noted as we *move* toward, around, and away from an object: as we approach a distant tower it may look at first round and short, but as we get nearer to it we see it to be "really" square and high, as we pass around its four sides its shape appears different at each point, and as we move rapidly away from it in our motor car we can actually "*see*" it shrink into miniature proportions again as we look back upon it. In the above cases we have been concerned solely with how things *look* under different conditions, but the differences are still more striking when we *compare* the experiences of *different senses*: sight and touch, we soon discover, estimate the sizes and shapes of things quite differently, and this is true even of different parts of the body in touching things—note how large a cavity from which a tooth has been drawn seems to the tongue, how much smaller it feels to the finger, and how pathetically insignificant it looks to the eye as the heartless dentist thrusts his little mirror into our hands to look at it!

Now let us see what the *consequences* of these commonplace observations may be—nothing less, indeed, than to *destroy* completely for "*enlightened* commonsense" all three of the *metaphysical assumptions* of the plain man. The phenomena show (*a*) that a *distinction* must be made between *appearance* and *reality*, and our original proposition No. 1 is gone; (*b*) that we can*not* know things as they are *independently* of the knower, involving the rejection of Proposition No. 2; and (*c*) that things are *not* always the *same* to all observers, as Proposition No. 3 asserts that they are. And if we pass beyond ordinary experience into the realm of *scientific* observation, we find it necessary to cast aside our *epistemological* assumptions also. In this we have agreed to consider successively the contributions of psychology and of physical science to our problem.

*Psychology* is of importance to us here especially in its *analysis* of the process of *sense-perception*, which analysis shows that process to depend on *conditions in the observer* as well as in the object. Two sets of these conditions may be distinguished—physiological and psychological. *Physiologically*, sense-perception involves a sequence of neural processes—first in some sense-organ or receptor, secondly in the appropriate afferent nerve, and finally in the proper cortical centre; and if any of these stages is lacking, or the necessary nervous apparatus defective or injured in any of its parts, perception of *any*

[1] This particular example, by the way, is one of the first to be noted and commented upon by philosophers.

object is impossible. *Psychological* conditions include the specific interest of the individual observer, his previous experience or training, and his mental attitude at the moment. If we take for illustration the familiar "duck-rabbit figure" which is found in so many psychological textbooks,[1] we shall find that one who is fond of duck-shooting, or has been brought up on a duck farm, or has just been enjoying a Christmas dinner of duck and apple-sauce, is most likely to interpret that figure in terms of this fowl; and the opposite interpretation takes place if the conditions named are in favour of the four-footed animal instead.

It can be seen at once that this analysis of the perceptual process renders the three *epistemological assumptions* of the plain man quite *indefensible*. There are, we see, (*a*) *intermediaries* between an object perceived and my perception of it which *prevent* the *direct contact* of mind with object assumed by Proposition No. 5; (*b*) perception is *not* a *passive* affair, as Proposition No. 6 affirms, but a *mental reaction* to the materials contributed by the senses; hence, (*c*) the *senses* can*not* be the *sole source* of our knowledge, as asserted by Proposition No. 4. And now *none* of our original six propositions remains!

Finally, *Physical Science*, in its *analysis* of what we call "*matter*," the stuff out of which things are made, completely alters the common-sense view in many ways. Especially striking are these two results of scientific investigation: (*a*) the *reduction* of such *diverse phenomena* of nature as light, colour, heat, sound, etc., to forms of *energy*, *vibrations* in the air or "ether," or even to the status of *mathematical formulae* (!); and (*b*) the *analysis* of what seems to be a *continuous* substance into *discontinuous atoms*, "quanta," and other particles. Certainly colours, X-rays, and radio waves *seem* to be totally different phenomena, and yet physicists tell us that they are all "really" but waves, differing only in length; and certainly nothing could seem more solid and "continuous" than this table on which I lean and write, and yet science again tells me that I am wrong, that it is "really" composed of separate atoms, and that the spaces between the atoms and between the sub-particles of which each atom itself is composed are far greater than the space occupied by the atoms themselves! Now whether science is right in supposing that *its* view of the world is the "real" one, and that the very different "appearance" of things to the senses is more or less illusory, is just one of the problems which philosophy must consider; but the scientists' observations and inferences clearly *do* indicate that there is *some* kind of a distinction between reality and appearance, that the way we react to things *does* make a difference in our knowledge of them, that the senses

[1] A figure so drawn that it does not represent very well *either* a duck or a rabbit, and yet looks enough like *both* for us to *interpret* it as first one and then the other. The problem discussed in the text is, *which* shall we "see" it as first?

are *not* the only organs of knowledge, and consequently that natural realism has not a leg to stand on!

This, then, is the upshot of our study from three points of view of the position of natural realism—that it can no longer in any particular hold our allegiance, but is dead beyond any possibility of resuscitation. A thorough investigation, therefore, into the question of the nature and even the possibility of knowledge seems imperatively to be called for, epistemology thus naturally preceding metaphysics. But with this conclusion, which has brought us to the threshold of an actual consideration of the problems of philsophy, it behoves us to bring the present series of articles to a close.

# NEW BOOKS

*An Essay on Metaphysics.* By R. G. Collingwood. (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford. 1940. Pp. x + 354. Price 18s.)

Professor Collingwood states that we must distinguish between what people do and what they think they are doing. The point is the more easily granted that often the former is of greater significance than the latter. In his new book, for instance, the author's intention is carefully stated but far from being fulfilled; and on the other hand what is achieved is the forcible statement of a problem vital to the whole of Western life.

He meant it to be a contribution to Metaphysics, and that it certainly is not; but one of the three parts it contains, the second, contains an historical and critical contribution which was sorely needed. Under the title of Anti-Metaphysics, Professor Collingwood proceeds there to a healthy criticism of what is truly the most pernicious heresy of modern times. He exposes what is often an unconscious tendency to (and sometimes a malignant propaganda on behalf of) irrationalism which, even where it is inspired by nihilism or anarchism, or simply by sheer "cussedness" in argument, strikes at the roots of individual freedom, the deepest foundations of which appear in consequence shaken everywhere. Such may not be and in fact is not the intention of the vast majority of the people who are instrumental in bringing about the landslide which threatens to leave man, the individual, unprotected under the towering weight of the pseudo-concept of "mass." But, whether flippantly facetious or blindly mystical, they greatly contribute to undermine every one of the historical institutions which, though almost reduced to scrap, are nevertheless all that still stands in the way of the legislators and architects who are out to build what they call a new "order." The very word is a term correlative of rational thought and life; and what is most ominous about this so-called new order is that for its adepts truth means the actually useful, so that the individual has in consequence become again a value purely relative, and mostly purely relative to the State.

It is regrettable that the author should not have given the time and energy which he has dedicated to the academically useful work of Parts I and III to a study of the part played in Germany most unwittingly but effectively by the Augenblick school of sociology in clearing the way for the Totalitarian régime and doctrine; and to that played by literary and artistic Surrealism as well as by the trend of thought vaguely identified as la Philosophie du Discontinu in the process of disintegration which, without causing it, has certainly conditioned the political and military collapse of France. As an historian, whose literary and artistic gifts are conspicuous in all his writings, Professor Collingwood was the one man for the task of which he gives us a bare fragment, and which he might have undertaken in full were it not for the parish-pumpish and anti-parish-pumpish sentiments against which methinks he has protested too much; for they mar and mark his work in more ways than one. The worst is, however, manifest in this arbitrary reduction of a European problem to the scope of what remains, in spite of the attention he devotes to Professor Alexander and a few other excursions extra muros, an Oxford-Cambridge affair. Academical and anti-academical complexes are not eliminated by a change of terminology; and the fact is

evinced in that whilst what he writes is not inferior to what should go under the title of Metaphysics, it certainly is something else, and would style itself as such were it not for the academical preoccupations which have dictated that title.

The vehemence of the attack he directs against irrationalism and the way in which it is thought and written arouse familiar echoes. Bacon and Montaigne, the Pascal of the scientific letter to Father Noël and of the *Provinciales*, Rousseau and Voltaire, have written in that vein when moved against rationalism with the selfsame passion which moves Professor Collingwood, myself and others against irrationalism. Published by themselves these chapters would have been one of these books, small in size and bulk, which are still of great moment in the history of the West, because they have been thought and written at the right time and in the right way.

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The rest of the work is by no means without merit. It merely pales in contrast with this historical and critical onslaught on the many-headed hydra which threatens our humanism in its essential basis, the trinity of Metaphysics-Christianity-Freedom. Indeed it remains valuable academical reading in that it raises issues which have been shirked for many years.

Metaphysics is defined as the history of the general presuppositions which have played or do play an essential part in the scientific thought of a given period; and the first thing to be noted is that the presuppositions are not to be understood as they would were the inquiry strictly metaphysical, that is, as the all-inclusive set of preconditions, physical and historical, which provide the context in relation to which a given question does arise. This, which is true of both practical and theoretical questions, as well as of every physical event, is excluded by Definition 2. "To say that a question 'does not arise' means that it involves a presupposition which is not in fact *being made*"[1] for the last words limit the term to explicitly or implicitly formulated questions. Of these some are relative in that each of them is related to one question as its presupposition and to another as its answer; and some are absolute in that none of them ever stands as an answer to a question. The latter are therefore incapable of verification, incapable of being true or false, incapable of being a proposition. The scientist's business "is . . . only to presuppose them;" and the metaphysician's is exclusively "to propound the proposition that this or that one of them is presupposed" (p. 33). The example given is: "that every event which happens has a cause."

If the activity so described is that of an historian the inference to be drawn is that Professor Collingwood has reverted to the view of history common to realism and to the nineteenth-century positivism which he so vigorously opposes. If the absolute presuppositions must exist and be used, or have been used before the metaphysician can set himself to work, we are brought back to the logic of the universals and therefore to the philosophical outlook pivoted on the conception of reality as substance which was the basis of the "classical physics." According to Whitehead (quoted p. 266), this basis rested "on the presupposition of an absolute distinction between what things are and what they do or what happens to them." With the conception of reality as *process* formulated by Gentile and Whitehead some twenty years ago, and with that which more recently has come to be found in the scientific writings of J. S. Haldane, for instance, in the reprint of his paper from the *British Medical Journal*, December 23, 1933, on "Vision of Brightness and Colour," this view of history has become philosophically untenable. It is the more curious to find it sponsored by Professor Colling-

[1] Italics mine.—A. L.

wood in that it clashes with the dialectical conception of causality which he has renamed the method of question and answer in his *Autobiography*. There is in that work an ambiguity which has led readers as intellectually distinguished as Professor Needham—see a letter of his in a number of the *New Statesman* at the beginning of the year—to hold that the author was an adept of dialectic materialism and his book a proof that the Marxist world outlook is the only approach to a satisfactory philosophy of history. It is not exclusively a matter of style, but in his new book that ambiguity is dispelled as far as historical life is concerned, for he writes (p. 98) that "man's historical activities were conditioned not by nature itself but by what he was able to make of nature." And whether we concur or not with it, the statement shows him an adept of the idealist historical outlook which characterizes all his writings. On the other hand, between his usual conception of history and that which is betrayed by his curious definition of metaphysical activity the contradiction is patent. As a mere surmise it may be suggested that this is due partly to his treatment of the problem of causality responsible for it, and partly to the works of sociology from which comes the term "constellation," which is freely used in the book and not without peril.

We are reminded (pp. 49, 59) that in Newtonian physics some events take place owing to a cause and others according to a law, that with nineteenth-century scientists all events have a cause, whilst in Kantian physics all causes operate according to a law. We are told, on the other hand, that in modern physics the notion of cause has disappeared because everything happens according to laws. But are not scientifically conceived laws both arrived at and formulated in the process of applying a notion of continuous and uniform causality? To conclude from the relativity of the various formulae of a theory that they contain nothing traceable in all of them is simply to ignore history and biology. Even the functional theory of causality, which runs through what Earl Russell has written on the subject, is an instrument of thought wrought by philosophy and used by science to find out either *to what* a given phenomenon *is due* or *how* it occurs. Absolute presuppositions do not change in the sense that they succeed each other; and for that reason the historian of philosophy has not fulfilled his function when he has distinguished from each other the various forms successively assumed, for instance, by the theory of causality. Insisting exclusively on the differences between them, he would fail to perceive what is common to them all; thus, not seeing the wood for the trees, he would inevitably conclude that there are no eternal problems. And in fact we are told that this is the case, a conclusion which has to be rejected, since in any work of thought, be it in this book itself, or in the most recently published works of science, such as *Embryos and Ancestors* by B. G. R. Beer (Oxford, 1940), what we meet with is a causal synthetic or causal analytic study of historical or physical processes.

It is because the unity and identity of the problem of causality maintains itself through all its successive formulae that the work of the metaphysician is neither exclusively to record and to describe them nor exclusively to conceive them. This mutual conditioning is perhaps in intellectual life the most living illustration of the view arrived at by modern biology as to the mutual conditioning of the physical universe and the living cell. There are eternal problems; and there are philosophical propositions which may be completed but remain, as far as Western thought is concerned, essential elements of subsequent developments; for instance, there is Plato's definition of knowledge as *λόγον διδόναι*, and that of Aristotle which completes it

with his distinction between axiomatic and apodeictic sciences. Again, there is within a single work and within the two thousand years' process of Western science and philosophy perfect instances of this dual function of metaphysics. In the *Republic*, e.g., we have the first form of dialectic which Professor Collingwood, for anti-parish-pumpish reasons no doubt, chooses to identify as *the* dialectic, and which indeed does consist, as he maintains, in a process of introduction and rejection of what I must call propositions, although he calls them presuppositions; but we have later in the dialogue another form of dialectic, so markedly superior to the first which it supersedes that the Oxford commentators have singled it out as *the* dialectic, even as Professor Collingwood has the first. There is, however, this difference: that it is usual when studying an author to take as his theory either the highest form which he gives to it, and that is what the Oxford scholars have done, or the analysis of the successive forms which he gives it in the work in question, as the Cambridge commentator Adam has done. For Professor Collingwood wrongs him in giving us the impression that the latter identifies the elementary dialectic in which hypotheses are merely removed as the doctrine of the *Republic*. A few pages before the sentence he quotes (vol. ii, p. 176), Adam writes that "the result is a number of true and irrefragable *ἀρχαί*" . . . that "the supreme Idea . . . is itself, when we have climbed to the summit, *no longer* a *ὑπόθεσις*." And he had (p. 174) already stated that the lower variety is expressly excluded from the stricter dialectic of Book VI, 510B–511B. Now what Professor Collingwood objects to in the Oxonian interpretation is precisely this view that the process of dialectic consists not in continuing to suppose them (the hypotheses) or asking others to suppose them, but in showing reasons why they should be true (pp. 159, 160). The Oxford translation of *ἀναιρεῖν* by confirming is a verbal mistranslation too obvious to require comment. On the other hand, it is a philosophical misrepresentation to single out as Plato's doctrine what is merely a step towards it, the step through which Plato illustrates the two functions of metaphysics in the act of fulfilling them. (*a*) He unfurls, in the act of applying it, the dialectical method of his contemporaries and predecessors. (*b*) He transforms the method in the very process of having his own thought transformed by it, and the result is his contribution to metaphysics.

As we pass from the reading of a single work to the study of Western thought the doctrine of dialectic as a form of argument and the word "cause" as the equivalent of "motive" are seen at first to occupy on the map of knowledge space that they still hold there to-day, although, to use Professor Collingwood's own metaphor, the blanks they left are being gradually filled up. The process through which they are so shows, for instance, that Aristotle has laid the foundations and wrought the instruments of thought on which and with which science was to proceed in the next fifteen centuries, and that Hegel has contributed the modern doctrine of dialectical causality of which nineteenth-century scientists have made the most profitable use and which contains all that Plato's dialectic and Aristotle's theory of causality with its distinction between actual and potential forms of being contributed towards what was to them inconceivable, that is, the conception of processual reality. The doctrine of the process of individuation is strictly metaphysical; and, as it obviously owes something to contemporary science, it no less obviously could not have affected subsequent science as it has done and is still doing if it had not been arrived at as it has according to the discipline and technique proper to metaphysics. In the case of Hegel the problem is more complex precisely because his doctrine of dialectical causality heralds the dawn of an historical age and does not, like Aristotle's, serve as the prelude to a long

but finally prodigious stage of embryonic scientific activity. Obviously again it owes something to the work of contemporary and immediately previous historians; but the fact remains that the conception of history as a dynamic reality is due to Hegel's dialectic and not vice versa. As a very good instance nearer to us, and illustrating this criticism of Professor Collingwood's thesis by something to which he himself appeals in support of it, we may take the theory of relativity.

Between 1907 and 1917 the conception of time and space had been so recast by Gentile as to involve the conception of the four-dimensional continuum as a corollary of the new conception of the centre of reference of human experience and thought. This required the criticism of all previous conceptions of causality which he gave, coming very much to the same conclusions now reached by Collingwood, without displaying on that point the constructive quality displayed in his treatment of time and space, which postulated the relativity of every object of thought to the act of thinking (*Atto Puro*, Laterza, Bari, 1917). Not as a matter of knowledge, but exclusively of surmise, it may be added that the main features of this work must have reached Einstein before the last war, be it anonymously, through the woolly yet most fecundating talk characteristic of the intellectual Germany in which he lived and worked. At any rate it must be added that in Europe *metaphysicians* did not, as Professor Collingwood says they did, refuse to acknowledge the soundness of the theory of relativity. If they erred, it was in offending the bigoted zeal of its neo-adepts by taking it as a matter of course corollary of the conception of processual reality.[1]

The view that the object of metaphysics is exclusively to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or group of persons, on this or that occasion, in the course of this or that piece of thinking, is bound to be rejected. Aristotle and Hegel, Gentile and Whitehead, are mere instances of the way in which philosophers have for the benefit of subsequent practical and scientific progress shaped or reshaped the intellectual framework of Western life, cast or recast instruments of thought which are at play even in all the non-scientific yet disciplined forms of experience which evince either technical rules or the force of precedent. That Descartes, Newton, and more recently Einstein and J. S. Haldane. have done more than people engaged in the teaching of philosophy towards this equipment of science merely means that they happened to be metaphysicians as well as scientists.

"Metaphysics" is not a word coined by Aristotle, but for many centuries it seems to have meant what Kant misnamed, before he reached a truly critical and synthetic point of view, "*a priori* knowledge." A suggestion may be ventured that it should be renamed either "Metaphysics and Metahistory" or more simply "Metaphenomena," for it may be based either on science or on history, or again on both; but it can be stated as fact that it is neither the one nor the other, whilst it has a definite part to play in both.

ALINE LION.

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*Knowledge and Character*. By MAXWELL GARNETT, C.B.E., Sc.D. (London: Cambridge University Press. 1939. Pp. xii + 358. Price 18s. net.)

After serving for eight years as Principal of the Manchester College of Technology (that was twenty years ago), Dr. Maxwell Garnett published a large and noteworthy book called *Education and World Citizenship*. Sub-

[1] The ground of my contention on this last point is personal experience with the conversations and contacts it involved more than published works,

sequently, as Secretary of the League of Nations Union, he enlarged his experience of education as well as of world citizenship; for the Union made, under his direction, a few fruitful excursions into the realm of education. His new book, *Knowledge and Character*, deals with the same two topics in much the same way as before, but with its teachings confirmed by the author's wider experience and buttressed by the results of the psychological and educational researches of the last twenty years. The new book is shorter than its predecessor, is couched in somewhat less technical language, and is likely to appeal to a wider public. And although it is not a political treatise, its conclusions have a special significance in view of the distressed state of Europe to-day.

Dr. Garnett's outlook is scientific. He points out that science is a body of organized knowledge expressed in a few propositions which are consistent with all known facts—known up to the present. These propositions go under the name of principles or 'laws.' He goes on to say: "The phenomena are explained as particular examples of the working of general 'laws.' But a scientific law is not a part of nature. It is only a way of comprehending nature, a hypothesis consistent with up-to-date experience. It can never be proved to be right. It can only be shown to be plausible. And it is not immutable, for it may have to be altered in the light of experience still to come." This attitude towards science and human experience should be borne in mind when considering what the author has to say about religion.

It should also be borne in mind when considering what he has to say about psychology. Psychology bulks large in his book because he bases his educational theory upon a form of it which he tries to make as scientific as possible. And he contends that a psychology that is expressed in terms of the brain and the nervous system satisfies the requirements of rigid scientific method better than one that is expressed in terms of the mind and the soul. Physiological psychology, in fact, suits his purpose better than introspective psychology. In other words, he is, in his method, a behaviourist. In his philosophic creed, however, he is far from being a behaviourist. He is far from regarding the body as the only reality and the soul a doubtful hypothesis. He accepts the common-sense view that the body and the soul are equally real and that they act and react upon each other. Indeed, the first of the five laws of thought which he formulates is labelled psychoneural parallelism. This is not to be confused with psycho-physical parallelism, for it merely states that "Excitement in one or more sensory regions of the brain accompanies every mental process"; or, in Huxley's words, "To every psychosis there corresponds a neurosis." The other theory (a theory that Dr. Garnett rejects) is that "the psychoses and the neuroses form two series that run parallel to one another but never meet or interact."

Instead, therefore, of talking about the mind and its dispositions, as do introspective psychologists, Dr. Garnett prefers talking about the brain and its neurograms; neurograms being low-resistance paths along which neural excitement flows, whether among the neurones of the brain or among those of other parts of the nervous system. Some of these paths are congenital, others are worn by the experiences of life. Making use of neurograms, not necessarily as ultimate facts, but as providing a provisional and clearly intelligible working concept, he elaborates a system of psychology which does not contradict the accepted theories of to-day, and at the same time enables the author to formulate the five laws of thought referred to above, and the reader to view mental phenomena from an unaccustomed angle. The fourth and fifth laws are important as they indicate an obvious relationship between knowledge and character. The fourth law asserts that "will can reinforce the

excitement in any active neurogram"; which is the same as saying that we are not the puppets of destiny, nor yet the helpless victims of heredity and environment. The fifth law lays it down that "action is the natural end of every train of thought."

The question: what is a perfect character? comes under discussion. The answer determines the aim of education, which, according to the author, is "to develop in each person a single wide interest that shall fit him for some particular walk in life, and for realizing his own best self in this way of serving God." He rejects the Herbartian term 'many-sided interest,' as it fails to suggest that interests should be organized so as to form a hierarchy, or, as he prefers to call it, an 'endarchy,' the whole system coming under the control of one supreme purpose. This dominant purpose touches one's philosophy of life with deep emotion and transforms that philosophy into a religion—not necessarily a good religion.

In his attempt to define the good life and the perfect character Dr. Garnett does not rely on any secular system of ethics. He is content to accept the Christian point of view. To him the good life is the Christian life. It fits in with his theory of the nature of the universe and of the way in which a person may gain a knowledge of reality, and may best promote his own highest interests and those of his fellow creatures. In the section headed 'The Christian Hypothesis' he contends that the Christian religion, in its simple fundamentals, stands on much the same footing as a 'law' of physical science. It is an hypothesis which is in constant process of being verified by the collective experience of mankind. The proper way to deal with an hypothesis is to accept it provisionally; to act as though it were true and note the consequences. It thus verifies or refutes itself. Hence the emphasis placed by the Christian on *faith* as an active virtue. "The faith that is the first step towards knowing God is no passive acceptance of unverified dogma but *action* on a hypothesis —the Christian hypothesis—with a view to verifying it." This fresh interpretation of faith may be paralleled by Dr. Garnett's interpretation of other virtues, both Christian and pagan.

Among other facts which are illumined by Dr. Garnett's theories there is one which has rarely been noticed by the psychologists of the past. Professor Graham Wallas was one of the first to call attention to it. It is the fact that the solution of a difficult problem, whatever its nature, generally takes place in three distinct stages. Dr. Garnett calls them the first period of conscious work, the period of unconscious work, and the second period of conscious work. After vainly concentrating our efforts on the solution of a difficult problem, it is well to drop the whole matter for a while and turn our attention to something quite different. When we later on take up the old problem again we find that it is in a different state from what it was when we left it; if it is not already solved, it is at any rate appreciably nearer a solution. Illumination has come while the mind was engaged on something else. How can this be explained? By his theory of neurograms Dr. Garnett renders the process at least intelligible.

It will be seen that the book treats of topics which are of vital interest to those concerned with the upbringing of the young. Indeed, the last section deals with the practice of education and the extent to which the principles expounded have been embodied in school work and have been advocated in so recent and so authoritative a document as the Spens Report. The book thus takes its place among those which aim at applying psychology to education. In achieving this aim Maxwell Garnett is no unworthy successor to James Sully, Lloyd Morgan, and William James.

P. B. Ballard.

*Philosophical and Literary Pieces.* By SAMUEL ALEXANDER, O.M., Edited with a Memoir by his Literary Executor. (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1939. Pp. viii + 390. Price 15s. net.)

The Literary Executor is Professor Laird, who tells us that he and Alexander, the latter showing "preferences and hesitancies and a very discerning modesty," discussed the character of the present volume. The memoir, with the exception of a short biographical account by Alexander himself, is written by Professor Laird; it portrays in a charming way a lovable and almost angelic character known (to use Professor Laird's own terminology) to the "aristocrats" and to the "middle class," higher and lower, alike of the philosophical world, and recognized even in the great industrial city in which he spent so large a part of his life; but it would be a mistake to conclude from such an account, based on the relations of those friendly disposed, that even angelic natures in this world have no enemies. On the philosophical side the memoir is useful and interesting because of the clues it provides regarding Alexander's philosophical interests, his method of working, and his development culminating in his masterpiece *Space, Time, and Deity* in 1920, and later aesthetically in the work *Beauty and Other Forms of Value* in 1933. Among those interests at one time was Psychology, to which he was anxious to see more attention devoted; among them was not what may be called philosophical scholarship, generally of a literary or linguistic nature, although in spite of his own tendency to disclaim ability in this connection he could no doubt have excelled in it if he had been so inclined; but his dominant bias, at any rate later, was towards philosophical speculation, something distinct from a literary preoccupation and something to which he devoted himself intensely. The supreme fact for him was that somehow things are one, or in modern terms are organically connected, though he admitted that so far no one had completely bound experience into its desired unity (p. 303). Philosophy is fundamentally a *discovery* of the ultimate constitution of nature; the idea of *discovery* is primary in Alexander's thought; it is emphasized in his aesthetic theory, for even though he speaks of *construction* and *expression* artistic experience is interpreted by him not so much in terms of invention as of discovery (p. 228); hence philosophy does not seem to him to be concerned with a justification of the world, for such justification, as in idealism, springs from a passion for seeing in the world the fulfilment of man's practical, aesthetic, or religious ends, as well as perhaps from a failure to know what, when, and how questions should be posed; it is this idea of philosophy as a discovery that also leads him to rebut the usual charges against *naturalism.* He believed that philosophy had unity and kinship with science, and he himself endeavoured to renew and maintain this ancient broken bond; yet in contending for this and in asserting that philosophy takes all knowledge for its province he did not allow it the right of arrogating any special claims over science, but urged it to work in the spirit of criticism and comprehension, to organize knowledge and to find a comprehensive view of the whole.

This standpoint puts Alexander on the side of realism; how he develops that realism and how he differs from other realists, such as G. E. Moore for instance, are matters for a detailed study of his main works helped by his various essays. The present volume contains fourteen of these, all previously published and all, with the exception of *The Mind of a Dog* dated 1906, coming after 1920, when *Space, Time, and Deity* was published. The publication of essays was, according to his Literary Executor, a part of Alexander's working technique, a preliminary designed to elicit discussion of certain questions and to secure clarification of views before putting them into final

form in a book. In the present case the essays show that after the publication of *Space, Time, and Deity* Alexander was more than ever concerned with the problem of Value, particularly in relation to Art, a problem which because it touches the category of Quality is critical for a metaphysical theory elaborated on the basis of the notion of Space-Time. His conception of Value is also at least one point where his divergence from other forms of realism such as that of G. E. Moore can be effectively observed. Alexander's theory is not easy to understand, and essays such as the present are extremely helpful because they show him feeling his way towards his solutions, and thus they facilitate an understanding of these when presented in a more complete and final form. Those on Dr. Johnson, Jane Austen, Molière, and Pascal (where incidentally Alexander is made to refer (p. 198) to a German word *Ditcher* as meaning any imaginative writer), though they might seem just casual literary discussions, prompted by an interest in literature secondary to philosophy (he admits that outside the circle of philosophers Johnson and Molière were his two greatest intimates) are really a philosophical analysis designed to reveal the relation between technique and art In the two essays *Art and the Material* and *Art and Instinct* he analyses the nature of artistic experience, seeks to show the psychological factors in that experience and formulates his own interpretation of art as expression. The succeeding essays lead on to more metaphysical issues and end in two on Spinoza which provide a good historical starting-point for the interpretation and appreciation of Alexander's philosophy. Modern science in its very beginnings discovered the important part played by space and time in any explanatory account of phenomena; and yet nothing is more astonishing than the way in which philosophers dealt with time in contrast to space. It is just probable that what conduced to the peculiar attitude of the philosophers towards time was the traditional notion of substance with its implied property of permanence. Alexander introduces "a gloss" upon Spinoza which consists in a consideration of the difficulties in Spinoza's theory and of how they can be overcome. He substitutes Time for Thought in the theory, but in doing so he does not so much re-model as radically change the theory, for he destroys the Spinozistic conception of substance and of God; and not merely Spinoza's conception but a great deal of religious doctrine must be surrendered once the traditional notion of substance and attributes is undermined by acknowledging Time as a fundamental property of the metaphysically real. This consequence is seen in Alexander's rejection of pantheism and traditional theism alike, with the notions of immanence and transcendence in their traditional forms, and in his acceptance of both immanence and transcendence combined in a new notion of Deity as something actual only for the future, in a notion of the universe straining towards Deity. His notion of Deity has been regarded as funny; it has called forth in some quarters something like ridicule; it is certainly not one easy to grasp; but it does represent an attempt to find a place for religion and for a traditional notion or term within the framework discovered by modern science. If the ultimate reality is Space-Time, it cannot be the object of worship and cannot be identified with the God of religion. Nor is Thought an ultimate real attribute, but only an empirical character of certain complexes of Space-Time, and is not therefore to be regarded as a property of God. God is not conceived by Alexander as the ultimate reality; what provides the clue to his conception is the idea of Deity, which in turn has to be conceived in terms of Alexander's doctrine of Quality. For this purpose the notion of a "nisus" is important, for though an obscure notion and a substitute for Spinoza's "conatus" to it are traceable different levels of existence with their distinctive quality. Whether this "nisus" is a principle

additional to Space-Time or is to be regarded as somehow a property of Time which introduces into Space-Time a "restlessness" is not very clear; by means of it Alexander adjusts his notion of Space-Time to the idea of evolution; and in place of Spinoza's idea of an infinite number of attributes he substitutes the idea of an endless hierarchy of qualities among finite things which it is the business of science to observe and record. According to him Deity is the quality that is next due for emergence, but apparently once the quality has emerged it is no longer Deity. It is a moot point whether Deity should be interpreted in this way by reference to the concept of Quality or whether it should not, in view of what Alexander says about the "nisus," be identified with the latter.

B. M. Laing.

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*Philosophy and Living.* By Olaf Stapledon, Ph.D. (Harmondsworth, Mddx. Penguin Books, Ltd. 1939. Two Vols. Pp. 464. Price 6d. each.)

You will probably expect vague speculations about Life or yet another trite introduction to philosophy; worse, you may happen to know that Dr. Stapledon is an amateur. Such doubts must be dispelled briskly. The present work is indeed an introduction to philosophy, but it is not trite; and Dr. Stapledon is—or modestly says he is—an amateur, but many professionals might envy him his insight, clarity of thought, ease of conveying it, breadth of reading in the field of philosophy, skill in criticism, and lack of pedantry. He must pardon what is almost an epitaph; but, if he calls himself an amateur, it is advisable for the reader to know that he does not set out to solve all the problems of philosophy by "common sense" despite lack of training, but that he is self-trained. A couple of examples will show his simplicity and penetration. Discussing the evolution-view of ethics he remarks: " 'Good' is not good *because* it is the goal of evolution; rather evolution is good (*if* it really is good) because its goal is something which we recognize as good" (p. 183). He has little space to discuss aesthetics, but he observes: "Aesthetic theory is so confused that no adequate brief discussion of it is possible. I will say only that, in my view, art is to be explained in terms of symbolic satisfactions—personal, social, and perhaps mystical; that there is no need to introduce a unique kind of aesthetic value, to be called 'beauty' or 'significant form' " (p. 209). What work on this subject is so much to the point?

Anyone that wishes to know what philosophy is about will get a good idea of it from this work—of how many introductions can this be said? Many professionals will be able to read it with pleasure and even profit. Simply as things are put for the most part—there are inevitable exceptions—their essence is not lost in the process of simplification: that is to say, the work is not made easy by omitting difficulties. The arrangement is good: the brief survey of historical philosophies is placed in the second volume and the first is devoted to problems.

But does the author throw any light on Living? He sincerely believes that philosophy can bear on the living of life, and that we need to-day not less but more philosophy. He has made a real effort to distil from the great speculative ideas the cash-value of their significance for living, but he does not seem to have scored a point. His final summary of the practical upshot does not seem to be connected with the discussion of pure philosophy. Possibly the point is that political philosophy can influence practical affairs and that metaphysics has an indirect effect, in so far as it is the basis of political philosophy. Even so, this would seem to put the cart before the horse: surely political philosophy is the *result* of an attitude, the intellectual form of a

policy, but not itself the *cause* of change. We may, however, admit that it can *reinforce* change in the sense of reconciling numbers of people to what they cannot prevent. Thus revolution is caused not by left-wing intellectuals but by left-wing practicals. All this amounts to little more than a criticism of the title, for the bulk of the work forms a discourse on philosophy, not living.

A criticism must be made about matter that falls outside the more philosophical part of the work: the treatment of psycho-analysis. Some of the author's remarks in this connection are contrary to the facts. Thus he mentions that there are three schools of psycho-analysis, whereas, of course, there is only one. Consequently, when Dr. Stapledon purports to criticize this science, it is difficult to know whether he is criticizing it or some forms of psychotherapy that are confused with it. It is a peculiar and interesting fact that many—for the author is far from being alone in this—that show the utmost logical discretion and understanding of or insight into philosophy or other intellectual matters lose these powers where they enter upon discussions of psycho-analysis.

J. O. Wisdom.

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*Ideals of Religion.* By A. C. Bradley (Gifford Lectures, 1907). (London: Macmillan & Co. 1940. Pp. viii + 286. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

To delay the publication of Gifford Lectures until a generation after their delivery is to subject them and their author to a very searching and perhaps an unfair test. Only signal originality in thought or in expression or in both could prevent them seeming to some extent an out-of-date echo from the past. The late Dr. A. C. Bradley was a great and creative interpreter of literature, but metaphysically he would probably never have claimed to be other than a representative of the school of Absolute Idealism of which his brother was at that time (1907) the acknowledged leader as well as being the most influential philosopher in this country then writing. This book is in fact written in the shadow of Appearance and Reality, and most of what it contains is a presentation in a limpid and unpretentious style of the interpretation of religion to be derived from that classic work, though it may be added that sometimes the independent influence of Green and others is to be noted. I do not detect anywhere in it that "timeless" quality to which the publisher's "blurb" calls attention. Many readers will, on the contrary, find some passages profoundly unsatisfying. To say, for instance (p. 199), that "the difference between Plato and Aristotle, between Spinoza and Leibnitz, between Hegel and Lotze as to the nature of the Absolute, though they are metaphysically considerable, are of scarcely any consequence for religious purposes" is to talk nonsense, of which F. H. Bradley could never have been guilty. And to imply (p. 262) that the fundamental desire of the religious consciousness is "to be God" is surely to impose an interpretation of religious experience which no theist would admit for a moment.

We have to remember that in 1907 the philosophical climate was as different from that of to-day as the political scene was. Bergson was virtually unknown in England, Freud a comparatively obscure neurologist; Moore's *Refutation of Idealism* was only four years old; the new physics was only beginning its astonishing twentieth-century transformation, and the reaction against Absolutist metaphysics had hardly begun at all; the philosophical systems of Whitehead and Alexander, neo-Scholasticism, neo-Calvinism and neo-paganism were all beyond the horizon. It is no criticism of A. C. Bradley that he did not, in discussing this or that aspect of his theme, anticipate the arguments

or approach which a later writer would have at least been bound to take note of. But the absence of all reference to the issues which the next thirty years of speculation were to bring into prominence perhaps enables one to realize why it was that the author during his lifetime did not think it worth while to publish these lectures. I cannot indeed suppose that had this book been published to-day under another and less eminent name it would be regarded as of great importance.

JOHN W. HARVEY.

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*History and Science. A Study of the Relation of Historical and Theoretical Knowledge.* By HUGH MILLER. (U.S.A.: University of California Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1939. Pp. x + 201. Price 12s.)

This is an interesting and original book, but on account of the wide range of subjects referred to in a comparatively short work and the consequent frequent compression of the thought, it is not always easy to follow the argument. The criticisms one is inclined to make may be partly due to the need for further elaboration of the meaning.

The fundamental thesis as stated in the Introduction is that the modern scientific method has not been completed and requires completion by the fullest carrying out of the evolutionary method or "articulation of nature." This involves that there are no "absolute constants, or fixed structures." The relatively fixed characters we find must be attributed only to some one phase. Instead of admitting this, theoretical science magnifies its pretensions and "a conflict arises between an exaggerated respect for theory and a radical repudiation of theory." To resolve this it is necessary "to understand the true relation between historical form and structure in nature—and therefore of historical to theoretical natural knowledge." In all provinces Professor Miller's aim is to undermine the position of "rationalism" and the belief in fixed forms and categories of thought. Thus the essential issue is not, as the title might suggest, the often debated question whether scientific method can be applied to human history, but whether an historical treatment of the various departments of "natural knowledge" in which human history seems to be included, is not essential to the theoretic understanding of the objects or structures of knowledge universally. Our explanations will not be sufficient so long as we are satisfied "to understand reality by analysing a momentary cross-section of it," and do not as in evolutionary thinking "admit the signlficance of a longitudinal or temporal dimension in nature" (Chapter XI).

Theory and history are "equally selective—and both are moving from smaller particulars to larger conceptions by means of hypotheses," the theorist by similarities, the historian by contiguities. In so far as Professor Miller is in principle here opposing the too facile contrast by which the Neo-Hegelian idealists were wont to dismiss all questionings as to the bearing of origin and development on validity, his contention seems to me right and still needed. But he appears to throw over too lightly the deeply intrenched logical distinction between relations by similarity and by contiguity. He does not recognize the fact that historical knowledge, though in an important sense highly selective, selects on principles *toto genere* different from those of selection in theoretic knowledge, not to constitute types which recur again and again, but to constitute an event or a whole of events which is once for all in its individuality. It seems to me a mistake to speak of the uniqueness of history as a natural fact and not an historical necessity. The ancients,

according to Mr. Miller, acknowledge in their cyclical view of history that there is no necessity in the uniqueness. But in the logic of history the once for all and unrepeatable character of the event *is* necessary, since the temporal process is irreversible, the event cannot be the same in any other order of time. If it is said: It is the same order in reality, and only repeated in an apparent endless cycle—this is to abandon history with time to unreality, and the whole problem of the relation of history to theory vanishes. Mr. Miller's position is, however, qualified by a later statement that "nature in its historical pattern is everywhere individual and unique, but certain aspects can be repeated elsewhere, and it is these repeatable characters that constitute the structure defined by theoretical analysis." The distinction which is not clearly brought out is, I think, that between repetition of fact as process or event, and of fact as object. The elements of the process as such do not recur. But when contemplated as objects, they lose their vanishing quality and become something that can be at any time apprehended, as if static. In Mr. Miller's view the theoretic object also is transient, though relatively constant. He does not, I think, acknowledge the ultimate source of the difference of order which he is analysing. This lies in the fact that the idea of history originates in subjective experience. The historical form is transferred by human interpretation to all other provinces of nature. But the subject cannot transfer the subjective starting-point. Thus natural history is objective, and also human history as an organized body of knowledge. In the evolution of organic life objectively viewed it is possible to see a series of phases which are in principle capable of endless repetition, and thus form a basis for the generalizations of theoretic knowledge. Whilst then it does not seem true that history as such is "just particular fact writ large," this may be asserted of biological history. What must, however, be questioned is the transference of the biological idea of evolution to all other provinces. Professor Miller is, of course, not the first to do this. The synthesis of historic and theoretic principles has, he admits, only been carried out so far in biology and geology. But can it be maintained that the peculiar features of biological evolution appear in geology or in any other province? In biology alone we find as its main form that persistent, continuous development which can be termed progress in a significant sense. It is curious that, although Darwin is the only evolutionary thinker to whom Mr. Miller constantly refers as responsible for the modern scientific development in general, he does not consider in detail Darwin's special method. In his universal application of the idea of evolution he seems nearer to Herbert Spencer. But he does not, I think, share Spencer's barren conception that increase of complexity means *ipso facto* increase of value. In his searching criticism of dialectic materialism as attributing the whole sociological development of man to his biological nature without admission of any new factors, Mr. Miller himself would explain this development as entirely due to the environment. But there must be some principle in the individual responsive to the stimulus of the environment. This is the more obvious when the environment is taken to embrace "the pattern of earth, sky, ocean and the constellation of the heavens." How is it that these influences lead to all manifestations of value in art, religion, political form, etc.? Mr. Miller must either admit the interpretation of the human mind, or pass into another order of thought for which the environment is the manifestation of mind universal. But this is quite foreign to his position and repudiation of all philosophy, except as the historic stepping-stone to understanding of the historico-scientific method.

Space does not permit of examination of the survey of the history of philosophy in which there is much that calls for question, such as the

assumption that the Greeks all shared the same standpoint, and the estimate of logic as "properly a division of sociological science."

As regards Professor Miller's speculations on the relations of movements of thought to political forms and progress (Chapters XI and XII), it must be observed that whilst these are not without interest, and come like a fresh wind blowing from the west, there would be greater unity in the book as a study of scientific method if the links between the interpretation of science and the (final) appeal for action were more fully revealed.

H. D. Oakeley.

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*Johannis Scoti Annotationes in Marcianum.* Edited by Cora E. Lutz. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Mediaeval Academy of America. 1939. Pp. xxx + 244. Price $3.50.)

Over forty years ago, at the instigation of the late Professor Robinson Ellis, I examined two MSS. in the Bodleian Library containing early glosses upon Martianus Capella which, he thought, might be edited and published in the series of *Anecdota Oxoniensia*. But (as Dr. Johnson observes in his *Prayers and Meditations* of "the Study of Philosophy as an Instrument of Living") "this study was not pursued;" and, on looking at one of these manuscripts again (Canonici misc., 18), I have assured myself that, as she is probably aware, it at any rate does not contain the commentary now edited by Dr. Cora Lutz, who indeed tells us that the only known MS. thereof is preserved in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris (*fonds lat.* 12960).

Martianus Capella, though interesting on account of the influence which his allegory *de Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* exerted on the scholars of the Middle Ages, is a tedious and unattractive writer, and the notes thereon attributed to an author much more important than himself, John the Scot "Eriugena," is more remarkable for its mistranslations of Greek and other misunderstandings than for any light which it throws upon his text. It does not, however, follow from this that the attribution of these notes is mistaken. It was not as a philologist but as a philosopher that John the Scot is indisputably eminent; and in this work there is little to interest readers of *Philosophy*. I make no pretence of having followed up the numerous questions which it might suggest to an editor of Martianus Capella or to an historian of learning in the Dark Ages; but a cursory inspection suggests that the edition before us, which contains the text with a full *apparatus criticus* and some references to sources, is a careful and scholarly piece of work which one would be glad to see made still more valuable by the addition of a more extensive investigation of the origin of many statements the significance of which, as they stand, is extremely doubtful.

I will add, in case they may be made of use in the event of such an undertaking, a few stray notes, the result of a very superficial perusal.

P. xi. Remigius's reference to Macrobius is to *Sat.* i. 23 (ed. Eyssenhardt, pp. 123, 124 *seqq.*).

P. xviii. The "enthusiastic repudiation of the idea of physical rewards or punishment after death" is only of a hell or purgatory *intra ambitum huius mundi in planetarum circutis.*

P. xix, l. 24. Nom *l.* Non.

P. xxiii, n. 3. Parte *l.* partem. The passage of Pliny which "eludes discovery" is surely only *Hist. Nat.* iii. 12, 17, § 106, where Pliny shows (*ostendit*) the meaning of *supernas* and *infernas* by his use of them in reference to the Caretini.

P. 10, 19. Chalcidius does not attribute the use of *entelechia*, as John says he does, to Plato, but only to Aristotle.

P. 13, 18. *inquirunt*: should we not read *inquirant*?

P. 29, 34. The full-stop after *crederetur* should be omitted; the following word *allubescere* is the nominative to it.

P. 74, 22. The note of John on an allusion by Martianus Capella to the recitation on the occasion of the marriage celebrated by his poem of the *Papia Poppaeaque lex* for encouraging matrimony is a conspicuous instance of his readiness to give information when he was wholly ignorant. *Papius e Poppaeus*, says he, *duo iudices a Roma missi ad Ticinam, id est ad Hispaniam, ibi Romanas scripserunt leges*. It might be curious, if not very profitable, to attempt to discover what confused memory of some irrelevant piece of knowledge is concealed here.

P. 78, 12. The comma should be after *Augustinum*, not after *vero*.

C. C. J. Webb.

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*Oberland Dialogues*. By Douglas Fawcett. (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1939. Pp. xxv + 396. Price 18s. net.)

A more vigorous speculative mind than Mr. Fawcett's could nowhere, I am sure, be found. Not content with his five hundred pages of *Zermatt Dialogues*, he now adds a further four hundred, devoted, as need scarcely be said, to the further elaboration of his imaginal variant of philosophical idealism. Somewhat less than one-half is required for the re-establishment of his general position, the rest being concerned with "the standing and prospects of the human 'soul'." Two of the original participants are absent, and in their place we find an exceedingly tame Nazi Herr Professor. The (to my mind pointless) Ellery Queen-like device of semi-anonymity as to the recorder, and author of notes, is maintained in the person of Anderton, "an ex-Hegelian Oxford don." There are also many fine aerial alpine photographs by the (real not imaginal) author. These, and the occasional aerial flights constitute, presumably, "rest pauses" in Mr. Fawcett's act of creation, and in the reader's attention. For my part I like books of philosophy and books about the Alps, but I would rather take them neat than mixed in this queer fashion. Perhaps, however, Mr. Fawcett better judges the taste of the majority of potential readers. His dialogic technique leads him into a good deal of repetition which I (again perhaps alone) find wearisome. Given spacious days of leisure, this expansive divagatory manner might wholly please.

Mr. Fawcett goes with such as Bosanquet and Hegel in their spiritualism, but whereas these see in reason the innermost essence of things, he holds imagination to be the basic activity in, by and through which all that is, subsists. Bradley's final resort to feeling from reason he takes as support for his own similar aversion from an ultimate rationalism, but he finds feeling at once too vague and too thin to describe the richest and fullest reality. His affiliations are many, while his skill in extracting even from hostile witnesses just those admissions required for his case is pleasant to behold. His closest sympathy would seem to be with Blake, from whom he takes the phrases "Nature is imagination" and "The world of imagination is the world of eternity." On its systematic side his philosophy takes first the undeveloped suggestion of Kant that imagination may be the "fundamental power" underlying the multiplicity of mental powers. "But note," the author adds, "that Kant's suggestion was made in connexion with the problem of the finite individual . . . it was not a contribution to a positive metaphysics of

cosmic range" (p. 43). Mr. Fawcett does not hesitate to apply it to this widest of all possible worlds.

Reasoning, on this account, is a mode of *reflective* imagination, a species of the genus to which the name *consciring* is given. Everything whatsoever is either or both *consciring* or *conscita*. "All phases of reality dance on the jets of consciring" (p. 233—a remarkably Bergsonian phrase). The "choir of heaven and furniture of earth" is constituted primordially as divine conscita. At certain points the conscired itself conscires. It "glows by its own light." This "glow" (like Leibniz' "petites perceptions") reaches far down into what we normally regard as the inanimate.

Our own human nature, as Mr. Fawcett describes it, is very much more complex than has been supposed. We have, for example, at least three bodies, "the physical, the subtle" (ectoplasmic) "and the permanent Augoeides or radiant body that travels from terrene birth to birth" (p. 235). To these several bodies several souls are related in characteristic fashions, the most important being the "permanent soul" which is as lasting as the "world-system"—a phase of divine imagining—to which it belongs, and which travels with the "radiant body" from birth to birth. For all of this Mr. Fawcett offers scarcely any *evidence* whatsoever, being content to assign to the undoubted fact of genius the status of evidence to this effect; but he compiles an impressive weight of *authority* from Plato through McTaggart to Lutoslavski, the apostle of Polish Messianism, to say nothing of eastern authorities on the subject. At bottom the whole is a speculative construction built about what he takes to be "intuitions" of pre-existence which he shares with Lutoslavski. These "furnish a foundation of certainty. . . ." There are several dark references to "psychical adventures of a remarkable sort" and to the experiences of "a man still living and in the best of health"; but what justification, in sum, can these adventures and experiences be for all this elaborate speculation? Granting many obscure psychical phenomena, is it not plain that their obscurity and privacy precludes their utilization as *evidence* for anything in particular. Even an imaginist, surely, must admit a certain proportion between evidence and conclusion.

At many points Mr. Fawcett seems to be in accord with personalistic theism, but from this he shies away. In repudiating personality of a God to whom he allows agency, plans, imagination—in sum the maximum of consciousness—Mr. Fawcett seems to share Bosanquet's unduly narrow and legalistic definition of the term "person." But in its ordinary sense it expresses not a mere legal entity but that more than organic unity and fruition of spiritual powers in the individual which in man is not *given* but must be *made*. As the fruition of spiritual activity, it might properly be regarded as achieving its maximum in God. Squabbles about a word are unprofitable, but in any so-called super-personality there seems more than a hint of the infra-personal.

Space forbids further reference to the ingenious detail of this book. I can only conclude by saying that, notwithstanding—or perhaps because of—its many challenges to arms, Mr. Fawcett by his latest book places philosophers under a considerable debt best repaid by readings, and by efforts either to improve upon or to refute, him.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

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*Civilization in East and West: An Introduction to the Study of Human Progress.* By H. N. SPALDING. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. xv + 334. Price 15s. net.)

The idea of "Human Progress" has recently been subjected to such severe criticism that its inclusion in the sub-title is, I think, of unusual significance,

since Mr. Crossman's parallel between "belief in progress," and "that in transubstantiation," as being alike superstitions,[1] would be widely endorsed. The specific aim of the present volume, on the contrary, "is to survey the marvellous progress during the last few thousand years," in which "the graph shows as a whole a prodigious and rapid ascent." This implies, however, no "inevitability of evolution; dissolution is a possibility." But even so, "if our world crashes, new Augustines will arise"; while the still deeper ground for this optimism, outmoded though so many take it to be, is that "reason cannot rest in misery; sooner or later she must once again lift her heart and head"; it is, indeed, reason as a "moral and spiritual principle" that will ensure "a supernatural civilization, a 'Kingdom of God.' "

At the same time I find it extremely difficult, if not in fact impossible, to reconcile this insistence on reason with Mr. Spalding's explicit description of man as "an animal," even though he is "a political animal"; for "primitive man is just an animal writ large." It is quite unquestionable, of course, that human nature presents permanent and ineradicable animal characteristics; but these, I believe, are wholly insufficient to justify our identifying even "primitive man" with the animal in any proper sense of this term; his very brain structure in itself, quite apart from its psychic functions, is sufficiently distinctive to constitute a thoroughgoing disjunction which is, indeed, abundantly emphasized by the author himself throughout his treatment of man as "a spirit inhabiting a body."[2]

Closely allied with all this is his application of strictly biological categories to society, justifiable within limits though these admittedly are. But once again the question is as to how far they should be pursued. "All human societies," to take one example, "are biological organisms"; "primitive societies," again, "are biological, and their customs and religion are biological too." But if this holds true, why is it that only "uncivilized society is interpretable biologically"? Nor, still further, can adaptation be safely appealed to, since the "well-adapted creature," as such, does not invariably "spread over the world"; on the contrary, many excellently adapted species enjoy, for that very reason, an extremely limited range.

A further inconsistency seems to me to arise from the goal assigned, in the first instance, to progress, since this is "towards happiness"; "the result is happiness." This obviously involves all the issues of Hedonism, with which it is plainly impossible to deal; it must suffice to ask if happiness is actually identical with "everlasting felicity, the blessedness of God Himself"; or, on the other hand, are we committed here to another disjunction as radical as that already indicated between animal and man?

I would suggest, then, that in all these important instances a dangerous confusion of categories has resulted from too marked a tendency to oversimplify the actual complexities of human nature and social reactions; and the failure of faculty psychology should warn us against any intrusion of faculty sociology. Almost equally misleading is the popular, but wholly groundless, antithesis between "experience" on the one hand, and "mind" or "reason" on the other; for while the latter demands unity the former contributes diversity. Despite the apparent authority of Kant in this respect, it is surely obvious that "reason" is itself one of the highest and most deeply characteristic modes of our "experience," while its unity is sustained by an intellectual diversity that is absolutely indispensable.[3] The problem is, there-

[1] *Government and the Governed*, p. 204.

[2] Cf. "Man is not an animal. . . . Human life is never mere physical existence." Niebuhr, *Beyond Tragedy*, pp. 43, 51.

[3] Cf. "Experience is not to be defined as the opposite of reason." Bowman, *A Sacramental Universe*, p. 217.

fore, not to harmonize their supposedly conflicting functions, but rather to trace the advancing rationalization of all experience; and this, in its own turn, is simply one aspect of the transformation of animal into man.

Mr. Spalding describes the successive phases of social organization as "States," in the widest sense of the term, which ascend from the Materialist, through the Moral and the Moral-Spiritual, to the purely Spiritual; each merges insensibly into the others according as they are oriented towards man, man and God, or God alone. Highly controversial though this classification must remain, especially as regards the assignment of the highest status to Hinduism, Buddhism, and Russia, the author very ably substantiates his contentions by many significant parallels between ancient and modern conditions in China, Europe, and India, between the United States and ancient Greece, and the dictatorial features common to Calvinism and the Jesuits. Equally impressive are the resemblances indicated between Nordics and the Chinese; the real Nordic norm, however, is Scandinavian and British, while "Germans are inferior in political sagacity"—another most debatable delineation in view of Mr. Crossman's description of the Englishman as "an unpolitical creature."[1] Space limits, unfortunately, forbid the fuller elaboration of these contentious issues, and I should like to conclude by outlining the still more fundamental basis of the author's optimistic attitude.

Dictatorship, he maintains, is inherently irrational and, for that reason, "contrary to human nature," its contemporary eruptions being merely "temporary flurries on the stream of democracy"; even Russian culture retains its essentials despite its camouflage of Bolshevik red paint. Equally out of date, nonetheless, is the Sovereign Nation State. For Man will more and more strenuously reject a degrading standardization, even though this repudiation involves the perilous misuse of an ever expanding liberty; but "nations are to be judged by the dream in their heart."

Although I have discussed points of difference rather than of agreement, this work seems to me to be one of definitely high promise, original in its standpoint and independent in its treatment of a large group of themes all most pertinent to current crucial problems in psychology, philosophy, and sociology. I hope that it preludes further volumes of similar value and interest.

J. E. Turner.

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*The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages. Outlines of a* Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi. By Raymond Klibansky. (London: The Warburg Institute. 1939. Pp. 58. 5 plates.)

These few pages which, few as they are, are yet as full of learning "as an egg is full of meat," are also full of promise for the undertaking to which it is intended to serve as an introductory essay, the *Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi*, to be published under the auspices of the British Academy and of the Union Académique Internationale with the assistance of the Warburg Institute. The editor, as he points out in his preface, has already, in his editions of Nicholas of Cusa's treatise *de docta Ignorantia* and *Apologia pro docta Ignorantia*, published at Leipzig in 1932, indicated the continuity between the Platonism of the twelfth-century school of Chartres, which has been commonly supposed to have been completely submerged by the Aristotelianism of the succeeding age, and that of the fifteenth-century cardinal who in so remarkable a manner anticipated certain lines of thought in the philosophy and science of the

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 77.

Renaissance and of later centuries which are strikingly different from those characteristic of the medieval schools from the thirteenth century onwards.

Mr. Raymond Klibansky—on whose accession to the ranks of British scholarship this country may congratulate itself as a welcome consequence of unhappy events elsewhere—sketches in these "outlines" the main facts concerning the tradition of Platonic study and speculation, Byzantine, Arabic, and Latin, which linked the days when the original Academy was still in possession of its old home at Athens with those in which a new Academy was opened at Florence by Cosimo de' Medici. Much information is also given respecting medieval translations of Plato into Latin, and the history of the MSS. of these; and the conclusions drawn by the editor from the evidence which he has collected are briefly stated. A programme of the projected *Corpus*, an index of MSS. and another of persons mentioned in the essay, and five excellent photographs of works of art illustrating the medieval conception of Plato complete a work which deserves the careful study of all who are interested in the history of thought in general and of Platonism in particular.

C. C. J. Webb.

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*The Arts and the Art of Criticism.* By Theodore Meyer Greene. (Princeton University Press. 1940. Price $4.)

Professor Greene explains in his introduction that he does not mean to traverse the whole field of aesthetic experience, which would include the subjective processes of artistic creation and recreation as well as the man-made objects and natural phenomena which constitute the objective side of this branch of experience. He narrows down his terms of reference to "the analysis of the medium, form, and content of art in the six major media, and of man's critical apprehension and evaluation," thus pruning away from the aesthetic object the whole paraphernalia of nature and all the products of applied art.

He bases his study of the six major arts upon three fundamental concepts or "categories"; the material "medium" in which the artist works, the "form" and the "expressed content" with which he endows the finished product. He then proceeds to show how these categories are combined to shape every genuine work of art. The four essential ingredients of the combination are "the primary and secondary raw materials" of the artist, and his "primary and secondary artistic medium." The primary raw material of art is plain physical substance, prior to its development and organization into the technical equipment of a major art; when thus organized it becomes transformed into a primary artistic medium. The secondary raw material of art is the potential subject-matter from which the artist must choose whatever subject is suitable to and available for a specific medium; the actual subject when thus chosen is his secondary raw material.

Let me give one example. The primary raw material of pure instrumental music is sound and silence as such, the proper object of the science of acoustics; its primary medium is sound organized in a system of mathematically related tones, known as a scale, which constitutes the language proper to the composer. The secondary raw material of this art is all the emotional and conative states which might conceivably find expression in music, its secondary medium consists of those that are actually selected as suitable to different instruments and combinations of instruments.

The most valuable and original feature of this book is the application of

these concepts to the elucidation of music, literature, architecture, sculpture, painting, and the dance, and the accompanying analysis of specific examples of these arts. In these chapters Professor Greene benefited from the collaboration of his colleagues in the Departments of English, of Music, and of Art and Archaeology at Princeton University, a method of combining the detailed research of the art specialist with the broad theoretical synthesis of the philosopher that might well be followed in this country. Here is a mine of information about the anatomy of the major arts. But it is strange that some of their most distinct and attractive forms, such as tragedy and comedy, should have been ignored.

The concluding chapters on the principles of criticism are rather disappointing, probably because the author has little more than a nodding acquaintance with the logical and psychological aspects of aesthetics. He refers to the norms that should determine the judgment of aesthetic value as formal excellence, artistic truth, and artistic greatness. But his account of critical standards, and his description of the aesthetic judgment, would have benefited from more insight into the subjective side of aesthetic experience. It is a pity that writers like Külpe, Lipps, Volkelt, and Dessoir seem to be unknown, save occasionally by repute, on the other side of the Atlantic.

The important philosophical conclusions drawn by the author from his study of the arts are debatable, but cannot be debated in a brief review. I have emphasized what seemed to me a valuable contribution to scientific knowledge about the major arts.

LISTOWEL.

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*Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. xxiv, 1938. (London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1939. Pp. xii + 422, Price 30s. net.)

Several things in this elegantly bound volume are of interest to philosophers. Three of the obituary notices—those on the Most Rev. C. F. D'Arcy, Professor Alexander, and Professor Joachim—will make a wide appeal in their own respective ways; they are all written appreciatively and charmingly; they differ in the extent to which they touch upon the philosophical theories of their subjects; that on Alexander does not give any account of his views, nor attempt to appraise their value, that on D'Arcy makes only very general comments, that on Joachim by H. W. B. Joseph gives a very clear summary of his problem and solution. As regards the lectures delivered to the Academy, that on the *Theology of Shelley* by A. M. D. Hughes will attract those who want to see how philosophy has contacts with other studies—in this case literature. The long essay on *Gautama the Buddha*, by Sir S. Radhakrishnan, a thinker and writer of distinction, is a clear and understandable presentation of the thought of the Buddha, enlarging on the philosophical issue whether the Buddha is a sceptic, agnostic, atheist, or believer in an absolute spiritual reality. But the most strictly philosophical lecture, as philosophy tends at present to be understood, is that by Professor Field on *Some Problems of the Philosophy of History*. The latter phrase at first suggests an attempt to show that history falls into a pattern, or reveals a plan; but Professor Field is not concerned with this issue. He deals with an epistemological question, which has been generally neglected in connection with the study of history. Historical propositions are propositions about the past; this characteristic of being in the past is the one we ascribe to all historical events; it cannot be reduced to anything else; nor is it open to direct observation. Hence present available evidence is not evidence of a *past* event unless we assume a past. This assump-

tion, expressed in the proposition that something really happened in the past, underlies the thinking of the historian, and yet it is difficult if not impossible to justify it. In developing and defending his thesis, Professor Field is led to discuss critically the relevant views of Mr. M. Oakeshott, Mr. Ayer, and Professor Lewis. The issue raised is an interesting and an important one; but does it arise, as Professor Field seems to think, only in connection with the study of history and not with the physical sciences, and need it be regarded as incapable of farther analysis?

B. M. Laing.

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*Plato.* By Philip Leon, M.A. (London: T. Nelson & Sons, Ltd. 1939. Pp. 147. Price 2s. 6d.)

The author has set himself a difficult task in compressing within some 130 pages an account of Plato's life and philosophy, together with a chapter on his predecessors; but though much is necessarily omitted he has a sure eye for essentials, and except perhaps for one or two passages in the account of the pre-Socratics, compression has not involved obscurity. Mr. Leon's chief aim is to bring out the eternal significance of Platonism and its bearing upon the political and moral issues of our own time; emphasis is accordingly laid on Plato's ethical teaching, and relatively little consideration is given to his treatment of the problems of logic, epistemology, and metaphysics: hence the third chapter ('Metaphysic-Ethic') is the least satisfactory (incidentally, the rendering of *εἶδος* or *ἰδέα* by 'spirit' is not wholly commendable). The first chapter deals admirably with the Sicilian adventure, which the author sets in its right perspective; the account of the 'degenerate' States in Chapter IV contains some apt interpretations, such as that of the 'Timocratic man' who 'bears a remarkable resemblance to what we in this country think the Nazi is or would have himself be, just as his State bears a remarkable resemblance to our picture of the Nazi regime' (p. 95). The last chapter ('Plato and Christ') is a thoughtful study of the limitations and defects of Plato's idealism, and deserves the attention of the *κομψότεροι* as well as of the *ἀμύητοι* for whom the book is chiefly intended.

R. Hackforth.

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*Psychology and Pastoral Work.* By Eric S. Waterhouse, D.D. (London University Press, Hodder & Stoughton. 1939. Pp. 293. Price 7s. 6d.)

This is one of the volumes included in the London Theological Library, of which the author is the Editor. Its main object is to give practical guidance, based on experience as well as study, to young pastors in the discharge of the often difficult and always responsible "cure of souls" which has been entrusted to them with such aid as psychology can offer. The author, while recognizing adequately the value of psychology for pastoral work, does not exaggerate its importance as is the fashion to-day. He fully recognizes the contribution that personal qualities, experience and practice, moral and religious discernment, interest and sympathy, can and do make. Most of the chapters, though written by a psychologist, contain few, if any, explicit references to psychology, while applying some of its principles. The whole range of a Christian minister's work—preaching and worship as well as pastoral care—is included. The counsel given is eminently sensible and practical, is given simply, frankly, shrewdly, and brightly, and I find myself

in cordial agreement with it. For most of the readers of *Philosophy* probably the explicitly psychological chapters will be of greater interest, and this section might with advantage have received fuller treatment, as that might have awakened greater interest to pursue the study of the subject. To those unfamiliar with psychology, some sentences will sound cryptic, e.g. "To Behaviourism, thought is implicit speech, and consists of incipient laryngeal movements" (p. 8). McDougall and Freud receive more attention than any other writers, and the second is most adversely criticized. A whole section is devoted to the Ministry of Healing, and psychoanalysis is, in my judgment, reduced to its proper proportions as a remedy for mental disorders. Very wisely the author warns young ministers that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, and that without the full equipment of knowledge they should not attempt to practise psychoanalysis, but call in and work in co-operation with medical and psychological experts. In Chapter XV the author records "case histories" of the "sick mind" which he has himself dealt with. I can heartily commend the book as a valuable contribution to its subject.

A. E. Garvie.

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*Men and Ideas.* By Graham Wallas. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1940. Pp. 221. Price 8s. 6d.)

To those who never knew Graham Wallas it has sometimes been difficult to reconcile the great impression he seems to have made upon those with whom he was in immediate contact and the actual quality and content of his published work. His friends and his pupils appear to have been impressed primarily by the freshness and freedom of his thought; Gilbert Murray in the brief but interesting biographical introduction to this volume says, "I never knew anyone so completely free from fixed orthodoxies, prejudices, and partisan feelings." But in his published work this freedom and freshness appears often as a kind of erraticism and lack of centrality. It was almost as if what was a great moral virtue in him became an intellectual defect. His admirable readiness to learn from every occasion was reproduced in an unfortunate anecdotal method of argument; his constant alertness of mind seemed to impose upon his thought a miscellaneous character. Being without the temptation to over-organize his ideas and observations (a neat theory having no inherent attraction for him), he lacked at the same time the urge and the power to pass beyond a mere empiricism.

This is a collection of some of his essays and addresses, selected and edited by his daughter, and covering a period of about thirty years, 1901 to 1930. It includes biographical essays on Robert Owen, Ruskin, William Johnson Fox, and his favourite and greatly admired Bentham, essays on political and social subjects (Socialism and the Fabian Society, the British Civil Service, etc.), and essays on the theory and practice of secondary and higher education. These essays illustrate both the wide-ranging and the essentially suggestive character of his thought. His observation is always acute, his advice wise, and his inspiration clear. But this, like Graham Wallas's other books, leaves the impression that future generations will require not only his published work, but also a biography in order to appreciate the full quality of the man.

Michael Oakeshott.

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*The Renaissance and English Humanism.* By DOUGLAS BUSH. (Canada: University of Toronto Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. 139. Price 7s. net.)

Professor Whitehead says somewhere that the men of the Renaissance never seem able to decide whether they should sacrifice a cock or celebrate the Mass, so they compromise by doing both. Professor Bush's lectures leave us with the impression that perhaps the most significant thing about them was that they felt no fundamental conflict in such a combination. He confirms our suspicion that the view of the Renaissance as mainly representing a revolt of the "modern spirit" against the shackles of mediaevalism is as mythical as are most simplifications of historical periods in terms of "isms." In some ways the Renaissance is much more like the end than the beginning of a period; the real break with tradition, if break there was, came with the science of the seventeenth century rather than in the sixteenth century. The Middle Ages had its independent spirits; the humanists of the Renaissance saw classical culture as leading to an orderly Christian Platonic world rather than to a new paganism; while the Reformers appealed not to reason and conscience so much as to primitive Apostolic tradition and Scripture. As to facile generalizations contrasting mediaeval other worldly asceticism and the *joi de vivre* of the Renaissance, Professor Bush aptly remarks that "at least we should acknowledge that Jean de Meung and Chaucer wore their cowls with a difference, even if they did not enjoy life like Savonarola and Calvin."

I have often wondered how people as vital as the Elizabethans could find their moral enlightenment in the maxims of Cicero and Seneca. Professor Bush throws light on this by showing how for the Renaissance humanists apparent ethical platitudes could be living realities. Perhaps now that all that lies behind the old Christian and classical phrases about "justice," "order," "natural law" is being violently attacked we are better able to appreciate this feeling. The Shakespeare who wrote,

> "The heavens themselves, the planets and this centre,
> Observe degree, priority and place,
> Insisture, course, proportion, season, form,
> Office and custom, in all line of order . . .
> Take but degree away, untune that string,
> And, hark, what discord follows! each thing meets
> In mere oppugnancy. . . ."

was as much the child of the English Renaissance as was the creator of Falstaff and Lear.

DOROTHY M. EMMET.

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*Karl Marx: His Life and Environment.* By I. BERLIN. (London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd. 1939. Pp. 256. Price 2s. 6d.)

This welcome addition to the Home University Library is naturally not written for philosophers; but it is written by a philosopher, and for that reason, as well as for its subject, it cannot fail to be of interest to them. It is not, of course, confined to the thought of Marx. There is a sufficient outline of his life, many interesting incidental remarks about his character and personality, and full discussions of his work as an agitator and of his relations to the various revolutionary movements of his time. Indeed, the subtitle of the book makes no mention of his thought, referring only to his life and environment; and it was presumably of the necessity for dealing with other things that Mr. Berlin was thinking when he confessed, in his Prefatory Note,

that his subject was "wholly outside the scope of his proper studies." The confession, however, is unnecessarily modest; and in any case his achievement in absorbing so much information about such matters, and in presenting it so effectively within so short a compass, is a very remarkable one. All the same, the chief interest of the book is undoubtedly in its treatment of the ideas of Marx and of those who influenced him; and Mr. Berlin is at his best when the ideas in question are most philosophical or most require a philosopher to expound them. Especially admirable is his chapter on "The Philosophy of the Spirit," which could hardly be bettered as a summary statement, for the general reader, of the contrast between Hegel's attitude to history and that of his rationalistic and Utopian predecessors. Remarkable too is the chapter on Historical Materialism, which expounds that doctrine with great force and clarity and in such a way as to show how, in spite of the fact that Marx himself never expounded it on its own merits and probably did not regard it as a piece of philosophy, it has all (or nearly all) the virtues which a piece of philosophy should have. Even in the more strictly historical places Mr. Berlin writes as a philosopher might be expected to do; and for many readers the most valuable and suggestive parts of the book are likely to be his descriptions of the climate of opinion in Europe at the times when Marx was growing up and writing.

It must be admitted that the book shows traces of hasty composition and revision. There are a few misprints, and a number of irritatingly long and complicated sentences; and in other ways the writing is at times not adequate to the merits of the book. Moreover, Mr. Berlin does not permit himself any criticism of his author's ideas; and he makes less use than might have been expected, as an aid to his exposition, of the obvious and often fallacious criticisms that have so frequently been brought against them by others. But these omissions are no doubt deliberate; without them it would certainly have been impossible, even for Mr. Berlin, to compress so much useful information into so small a space.

O. DE SELINCOURT.

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*The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge. A Critical Study of some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics.* By S. C. CHATTERJEE, M.A., Ph.D., Premchand Roychand Scholar (Cal.), Lecturer in Philosophy, Calcutta University (Published by the University of Calcutta. 1939. Pp. xix+421.)

Nobody can have a more than superficial knowledge of Indian philosophy who has not acquainted himself to some extent with the logical and dialectical technicalities of the system called Nyāya or, in its later, syncretistic form, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It is for this reason that Luigi Suali's excellent comprehensive work on this system, published in 1912, could be given by its author the sole title *Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia Indiana.* This Italian work is of lasting value, and one cannot help regretting, therefore, that it has apparently remained unknown to the author of the book before us, except through Prof. Keith's not very liberal references to it in his small work *Indian Logic and Atomism* (Oxford, 1921). But Dr. Chatterjee's book is as scholarly as Suali's, and it has the novel feature of being the first "systematic critical and comparative treatment of the Nyāya epistemology." "It is a study of the Nyāya theory of knowledge in comparison with the rival theories of other systems, Indian and Western, and a critical estimation of its worth" (p. xvi). The reviewer confesses having learnt a great deal from it and wishes it many readers.

F. O. SCHRADER.

*The Philosophy of Advaita* with special reference to Bhāratītīrtha-Vidyaranya. By T. M. P. Mahadevan, M.A., Ph.D. With a Foreword by Sir S. Radhakrishnan. (London: Luzac & Co. 1938. Pp. xvi+284. Price 7s. 6d.)

This is a systematic account of the idealistic Vedānta as expounded in the 14th century by Bhāratītīrtha from the point of view of the so-called Vivaraṇa school. The position, however, of this philosopher in the history of Advaita has been so elaborately circumscribed that the general title of the book appears to be justified. The main sources used are Bhāratītīrtha's scholarly *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha* and his popular *Pañcadaśī*. The English translation of the former by Thibaut (in *Indian Thought*, vols. i–iii) and of the latter by Venis (in the *Pandit* N.S., vols. v, vi, and viii), though apparently not used by the author, might yet have been called attention to for the benefit of the reader. The latter will be thankful for the glossary of Vedāntic terms, pp. 271–278. The book is characterized by clearness of thought and fluency of language and certainly deserves the praise bestowed on it by Sir S. Radhakrishnan.

F. O. Schrader.

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*Two Bookes of Constancie*, written in Latine by Justus Lipsius, Englished by Sir John Stradling, Edited with an introduction by Rudolf Kirk, Notes by Clayton Morris Hall. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 1939. Pp. ix+223. Price $4.50.)

The revival of letters in the sixteenth century included a considerable attachment to the moral Stoicism of Epictetus and Seneca. Among the more celebrated expressions of this vogue was the *De Constantia* of Lipsius which was published in 1584. It was translated into English by Sir John Stradling and exerted an influence upon the prose style, as well as upon the sentiments, of writers in the seventeenth century. Lipsius' purpose in composing the work was to recommend to Christian readers the Stoic conception of imperturbability in the face of public and private misfortunes. He was thus obliged to repudiate the Stoic notions of Fate, natural cause, and determination. After discussing these errors he discourses at length, with a volume of classical allusions, on the value of Stoic moral precepts. He finds the basis of Constancy in Right Reason, distinguishes False Goods and False Evils, and argues that calamities are beneficial or not so dismal as to bring despair to a reasonable man. He writes under the stress of the wars which were desolating his native Netherlands. The argument on occasion touches nobility, but Lipsius easily escapes from the difficulties he raises by referring them to the secret judgments of God. The book is valuable as a source of much of the Stoicism of the period, and for this reason is worth reprinting.

Two American scholars have produced an elaborate edition of Lipsius' work in the translation by Stradling. The introduction comprises a life of Lipsius, an analysis of the argument of the book, and a useful history of the writings by which Stoic ideas were introduced into England.

M. H. Carré.

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*Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages*. By Etienne Gilson. (London: C. Scribner's Sons, Ltd. 1939. Pp. 114. Price 6s.)

This book contains three lectures delivered in the United States and is divided into chapters entitled "The Primacy of Faith," "The Primacy of

Reason," and "The Harmony of Reason and Revelation." The first pair are skilfully worked out, sympathy and insight blending perfectly. There is a delightful account of a little-known thinker, John of Jaudun, who anticipated Hume in pointing out the irrationality of Christian dogma, and carefully added that it is none the less to be believed on the authority of Holy Writ and miracles. "I do believe that that is true; but I cannot prove it. Good luck to those who can!" Or again, "I say that God can do that, but how I don't know; God knows." The notion of creation is philosophically absurd, but we should believe it, as "Creation very seldom happens; there has never been but one and that was a very long time ago." The last chapter is a little disappointing for the harmony is not set forth, only the conditions of the real problem and in the last sentence we are referred to that unfailing source of Roman Catholic philosophy of religion, Thomas Aquinas. Moreover, to say that "The problem of Revelation requires that there is some divinely inspired statement to which we must bow" seems, in a philosophical sense at least, to beg the issue. Such criticism, however, is rather regarding what Professor Gilson has not given us than in respect to what he has given. This little book has a charm of its own. In 99 pages of text reference is made to no less than 66 writers, and yet some of these thumb-nail sketches are almost perfect miniatures. Only a deep and intimate knowledge of the subject could have achieved such marvels of compression.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

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*The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Dín—Ibnul' Arabí.* By A. E. AFFIFI. (London: Cambridge University Press. 1939. Pp. xxi + 213. Price 12s. 6d.)

Ibnul 'Arabí was a Sufi mystic, born in Spain in 1164. Method and mysticism do not usually partner each other, and though Mr. Affifi claims that, unlike most mystics, Ibnul 'Arabi had a dialectic method and definite pantheistic doctrine, he admits that his system is never systematically expressed in his works, manifold though they are. But the author has been at great pains to collect the scraps from all quarters of his works and to present them as coherently as possible. The result is a scholarly monograph which does credit to the patience and industry of the author. One is indebted to the trustees of the E. J. W. Gibb Memorial and the publishers for making possible the issue of a book which, although it will appeal only to a very few, that is to say those interested in Islamic Mysticism, none the less forms a distinct contribution to learning. The book is divided into four parts, dealing with Metaphysics, the Logos doctrine, Psychology and Mysticism, and Ethics and Aesthetics. One curious feature of this mystic was his pains to try to bring his altogether unorthodox views beneath the wing of orthodox Islam. In so doing he turns the Quran into a Neoplatonic textbook or into any other kind of philosophy he needs. Possibly the unintelligibility of the mystic's utterances persuaded the authorities of Islam that he was orthodox. One congratulates Mr. Affifi on his courage in tackling so abstruse and be-ravelled a topic, and if not getting system, at least getting sense out of it.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

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*The Foundations of Living Faiths: An Introduction to Comparative Religion.* By HARIDAS BHATTACHARYYA. (University of Calcutta. 1938. Vol. 1. Pp. xiii + 526.)

In this volume, Mr. Bhattacharyya, "a fairly orthodox Brahmin," after a preliminary survey of the faiths, prophets, and revelations, deals with

Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Zoroastrianism. The tone and the temper of the approach are unbiassed, and the book is in general accurate, though it is evident that the author confuses the Immaculate Conception with the Virgin Birth. It is unfortunate that his own tongue and English are the only languages which the author can read, and that he has had all his education in the small college, now university, of Dacca. This necessarily makes the authorities available to him somewhat narrow. For example, Reinach is hardly the best source for information regarding the origins of Christianity, and if one compares the accepted with the apocryphal gospels, the suggestion that those accepted were so chosen because they supported, or were made to support, contemporary ideas, is somewhat gratuitous. In the whole of apocryphal literature, there is not a single document which would be morally, spiritually, or intellectually, an addition of value to the books of the New Testament. Naturally, the best section of the book is that dealing with Hinduism. But in this, as in the rest, the author tries sincerely to be impartial, and is in a large measure successful in the attempt. The chief value of the book is not in the material. There are many books on the Comparative Study of Religions. It lies in the fact that Mr. Bhattacharyya approaches the subject from the Indian, not the Western standpoint, and regards the non-Christian faiths from an angle that even the most sympathetic Christian student can scarcely attain, because of the Western and Christian civilization in which he has been brought up. For this reason one thinks that Mr. Bhattacharyya merits attention, and that this courteous and appreciative examination of other faiths has fully justified the author's aim in writing it. E. S. WATERHOUSE.

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*Types of Philosophy*. By WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING. Revised edition. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1939. Pp. xix + 520. Price $2.80.)

This book, originally published in 1929, is, for reasons stated by the author in a new preface, given to the public in a revised form. Its treatment is a combination of historical and systematic method; the topics of discussion are arranged under the various philosophical *isms* or philosophical types. It is not easy to define a type so as to satisfy everyone, and it is far less easy to bring actual philosophical theories formulated by philosophers under a specific type. The author, however, forestalls criticism on this point by admitting apparent shortcomings; he even emphasizes the element of incompleteness, for he wishes to give opportunities to the teacher who uses the book for initiating beginners in philosophy. To those who like to use this method of teaching the book, if employed with critical power and discretion, can be helpful. But it covers a large amount of ground, and consequently its judgments on philosophical theories do not appear to reflect always any very deep analysis, nor to convey very adequately the results of much recent philosophical scholarship.

B. M. LAING.

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*A Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Religion*. By SADHU ŚANTINATHA. (Amalner, India. Protap Seth. 1938. 2 vols. Pp. 1110.)

Here are two paper-backed volumes, printed in India, and incidentally poorly printed, with many errors that the most casual proof-reader should have seen. From a purely "rational" standpoint they pour out criticisms upon the religious philosophy of Indian religions, though, as the author tells us, they are equally applicable to Western ideas. "There can be," he proudly claims, "no

plausible conclusion in Philosophy and Religion which has been left absolutely untouched in this book." But we are to understand he is no mere sceptic, for like Sextus Empiricus he sees that the criteria by means of which scepticism criticizes faith can recoil against scepticism itself. He is "a sincere and earnest truth seeker, and an unbiased and uncompromising rational critic." We follow, as far as we can bear, the 1110 pages of "rational" criticism, which is purely negative without the glimmer of any positive suggestion throughout. When the exhausted reader gets to page 1110, he is allowed the result of this arid journey through the wilderness—"The only rational and justifiable attitude appears to be this, that the mystery about the ultimate problems of our knowledge and life must remain a mystery and be recognized as the mystery." The last sentence says that, after further and further research, "the mysery (*sic*) is insoluble." If all that is to be said about the matter is what the Sadhu tells us, his conclusion is highly probable, but why 1110 pages to reach it?

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

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*An Introductory Course in Philosophy.* By J. A. NICHOLSON. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1939. Pp. xii + 508. Price 12s.)

This is a textbook presumably designed for the unwieldy first classes in philosophy with which North American universities are burdened. More than one half of the volume is devoted to readings from Plato, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Berkeley, Compte and Royce. Thirty pages are given to exercises, leaving some two hundred in which to expound and comment upon the field of philosophy from ethics, through esthetics to theory of knowledge and metaphysics. Mr. Nicholson's "potting" is highly competent; but the method seems open to the gravest objections. Yet if a first class in philosophy *must* travel so far, it is likely in Mr. Nicholson's company to get as good an idea of the country as could be reasonably expected. It is not so likely to realize (with the author) that philosophy is "an activity in which to participate" and not something to be "memorized."

R. E. STEDMAN.

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*Philosophic Abstracts.* Editor: DAGOBERT D. RUNES. Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter, 1939–40. Published at 884 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y. Annual subscription: 4 dollars; 2 years, 7 dollars. Foreign postage 1 dollar per annum additional.

This publication consists both of précis and short descriptions of books dealing with topics coming within the scope of philosophy. The first number gives useful information concerning recent works which have appeared in the United States, Great Britain, France and Belgium, Germany (including German writers living abroad), Italy, Holland, Scandinavia, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Hungary. In addition to supplying abstracts of the main arguments of theses expounded in books, particulars are given of articles appearing in periodicals published in Australia, China, the United States of America, Latin America, and England.

We congratulate the Editor on the painstaking work which has been put into the making of this first number of *Philosophical Abstracts*. For students of philosophy who wish to keep themselves acquainted with modern writers on philosophical topics, in many different languages, the publication will no doubt prove very helpful.

*Philosophical Abstracts* is well printed and conveniently arranged for reference purposes. The list of contributing editors is impressive.

SYDNEY E. HOOPER.

*In Praise of Comedy: A Study in its Theory and Practice.* By JAMES FEIBLEMAN. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1939. Pp. 284. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

This book covers much ground, to wit the history, ancient and recent theories, a critique, and illustrations of comedy. It is industrious and instructive, but dull. Mr. Feibleman has, in anticipation, defended himself from this charge. "The analysis of comedy," he writes, "can no more be funny than the analysis of water can be wet" (p. 168). Its dullness is in part due to a thesis-like re-hashing of other people's work, and for the rest to a heavy, clotted style of which the following is an example taken more or less at random.

"Philosophers both large and small," Mr. Feibleman writes, "thinkers profound and superficial, adherents of every stripe and interest, from theology to the theatre and from psychology to metaphysics, *betray a very enormous measure of agreement about* the nature of comedy" (p. 118, *my italics*).

The lesson to be drawn from this horrific sentence—or rather from the substantial agreement of otherwise divergent minds—is that comedy is itself of a substance so simple and clear that difference of opinion can scarcely touch its essence. Even the subjectivists who would turn the *comic* into the *laughter provoking* are driven in one way or another to concede its objectivity and its rational quality. Comedy, the author repeats, is "primarily an affair of logic." "There is only one kind of comedy, namely, that which we have said consists in the indirect affirmation of the ideal logical order by means of the derogation of the limited orders of actuality" (p. 203). Mr. Feibleman's logic, however, is of a comprehensive kind, for "Comedy is in the fullest sense a moral principle, an ethical force" (p. 214).

The author's view of comedy is embedded in an aesthetic, and this in a metaphysic which is dealt with all too briefly (pp. 172–7) for the reviewer to be quite sure what it is, or what it implies. What emerges concerning comedy, namely, that it is—in a general way—a criticism of the actual, seems difficult to dispute; yet some of us may wonder how far some of the larger claims are justified.

The concluding illustrations, ranging from Gertrude Stein and the surrealists (who do not realize that they are comic) to the Marx Brothers (who do), and the author's comments upon them constitute, naturally enough, the best reading in the book. There is an adequate index.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

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*Pueblo Indian Religion.* By ELSIE CLEWS PARSONS. (U.S.A.: University of Chicago Press. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1939. 2 vols. Pp. xiv + 1275. Price 35s. the set.)

This is a book that deserves extended notice, but partly because it deals with the Comparative Study of Religions, not with philosophy, and partly because it is a record of facts, not of theories, a much shorter notice than its merits claim must be given to it. It is an encyclopaedia, not a book, for a more complete and detailed account could hardly have been afforded. The reviewer finds himself wondering whether he could have given so full an account even of the religion he personally professes! Dr. Parsons' thoroughness and insatiable appetite for detail are amazing. Nothing is haphazard. Bibliographical details and index alone occupy 109 pages, and the references in the index must run to four figures. The Pueblo Indians number just over 15,000. For 400 years these people have had contact with Roman Catholic Christianity, and they

observe the feasts and fasts of the Church, and with them an astoundingly full and varied ritual of their own original faith. The Indians are gathered in a dozen or more small towns, and each town has its own intricate rites and customs which cover every detail of individual and communal life. All these Dr. Parsons describes carefully, taking town by town. As a contribution to the study of religion, this storehouse of carefully observed facts will prove of true value. It is essentially a book for the library, and one that will afford research students a vast amount of material. The particular interest of these people for the purposes of the study of religion is that they afford an example, rare if not unparalleled, of original Indian tradition thinly veneered with Roman Catholic rites.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

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*The Fate of Modern Culture.* By J. V. L. CASSERLEY. Pp. 112. *God the Living and the True.* By D. M. MACKINNON. Pp. 89. *Man: His Origin and Destiny.* By E. L. MASCALL. Pp. 102. ("Signposts" series. London: Dacre Press. 1940. Price 1s. each.)

## MODERN THOUGHT AND CATHOLIC TRADITION

These three small books belong to a series of twelve, appearing monthly, under the general title of "Signposts," written by young theologians and philosophers of the Church of England. (The biographical notes on the jacket show that the oldest is thirty-five and the youngest twenty-seven.) They share "the common conviction that only the authentic Christian tradition has the answer to the problems which beset the present age, and that only by a return to that tradition can disaster be avoided." That "authentic tradition" includes philosophy (that of Thomas Aquinas) as well as theology as represented by this Anglo-Catholic group. The first volume[1] offers a diagnosis of the disease of the world to-day. The triumph of modern science, practical as well as theoretical, true and useful as science in its own sphere may be, has had a perverting influence in philosophy. It has turned from objective reality apprehended by reason, to the subjective process of knowing (from ontology to epistemology) and has ended in scepticism, positivism, and pragmatism. Positivism has lost the capacity to offer an authoritative standard for "the good life." Man has become the victim of the machine; society has lapsed into anarchy or tyranny. "The cause of beauty is as much embarrassed and endangered by the modern abandonment of our religious and intellectual tradition as the cause of justice" (p. 97). Ruin can be avoided and recovery ensured only by a return to "the three orthodox beliefs—belief in God, belief in man, and belief in reason" (p. 111). True as in many respects the diagnosis is, it is one-sided and over-stated. Modern philosophy is not quite so bankrupt as it is here represented as being. The reviewer holds that Christian faith need not go back to Thomas Aquinas, but can find more support in reason, as present in modern thinking.

The second volume[2] is quite inadequate to its title. It is an argument for the need and the fact of divine revelation. It is Barthias in style as well as content. God reveals Himself in judgment on the world in the Cross of Christ. Legitimate as is the emphasis on the Cross, it is too exclusive: the divine revelation is much richer and wider. There is the same depreciation of human religion as a rival of divine revelation as in Barth. It is only the author's adhesion to the Catholic tradition that leads him to side with Brunner against

[1] *The Fate of Modern Culture*, by J. V. Langmead Casserley, Dacre Press, 1s., 1940.
[2] *God the Living and the True*, by D. M. MacKinnon.

Barth in recognizing man's capacity to respond to the divine revelation, but he goes beyond Brunner in insisting that man is capable of sufficient understanding of the context of the revelation to make the decision for response intelligent. While insisting that "faith is not contrary to reason," he shares Brunner's voluntarist attitude in insisting that revelation is primarily God's action in human history.

The third volume[1] reproduces more fully and closely the Catholic tradition, and while it is contended that the modern scientific knowledge of man is not contradicted by that tradition, the writer seems to have failed to effect a satisfactory reconciliation. The reviewer is more than twice the age of the oldest of these writers; he has during more than half a century been engaged in the study of philosophy and theology, and sought for such a solution of the problem of their relation

> "That mind and soul, according well,
> May make one music as before."

But, having more appreciation of the values of modern thought than these writers display, and a more progressive attitude to the Catholic tradition, as needing more adaptation to these values than that to which they have committed themselves, he regrets that he cannot unreservedly commend them as "theologians and philosophers." A. E. Garvie.

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*Life and Living.* By Frederic Wood Jones, D.Sc., F.R.C.S., F.R.S. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd., 1939. Pp. ix + 268. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

This book consists of nine lectures delivered before various learned bodies in Australia between the years 1923 and 1937. The lectures deal with a variety of topics, including the history of anatomy and surgery, recent discoveries in the biological sciences, university education, etc. The titles of the lectures are as follows: Mechanism or Vitalism; Life and Growth; The Spirit of Adventure; Disease and Individuality; The Master Surgeon; Anatomy and a Life Principle; Universities and Life; The Changing Point of View; The Mammalian Toilet and its Biological Implications. There is also an index.

J. H. Woodger.

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*Proof of an External World.* Annual Philosophical Lecture, Henriette Hertz Trust, British Academy, 1939. By G. E. Moore, Fellow of the Academy. From the Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XXV. (London: Humphrey Milford. 1940. Pp. 30. Price 2s. net.)

The publication of a lecture by Professor G. E. Moore is a rare and exciting event. Many philosophers of many different schools, all over the English-speaking world and beyond it, regard Professor Moore as their master. Moreover, the subject of this particular lecture is one to which Professor Moore has devoted more thought, perhaps, than any other living man. I therefore propose to begin by giving a fairly detailed summary of his paper.

Professor Moore takes as his starting-point a remark of Kant's in the

[1] *Man: His Origin and Destiny*, by E. L. Mascall.

Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (B xxxix, note). "It still remains a scandal to philosophy . . . that the existence of things outside of us . . . must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof." Kant did, of course, attempt to provide a proof, in the section called "Refutation of Idealism" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 274–279). Professor Moore does not discuss Kant's proof, though he doubts whether it is satisfactory. Instead, he first enquires what exactly it is that Kant is trying to prove, and this enquiry occupies about three-quarters of his lecture; then, in the remaining quarter, he offers a new proof of his own.

What, then, do we mean by "things outside of us" or "external objects"? According to Kant, we do not mean "things-in-themselves"; we mean "things to be met with in space." Professor Moore provisionally agrees that we do mean this. He points out, however, that this phrase "things to be met with in space" covers more than material objects; for instance, it covers shadows, which would not normally be called material objects, and possibly—though Professor Moore is not sure about this—it may cover mirror-images as well. But Kant was wrong in equating "things to be met with in space" with "things *presented* in space," as he sometimes does. For this latter phrase would cover such "things" as after-images, double-vision images, and even bodily pains. (I may feel a pain in a particular part of my finger; this pain, then, is certainly presented in space.) The difference between things to be met with in space and things presented in space is that the former are all public, while some of the latter are private. Professor Moore maintains that though it is conceivable that your after-image is exactly like mine, it is inconceivable that you and I should be aware of *numerically the same* after-image, or that you and I should see numerically the same pair of double images when we both see double; or that you and I should feel numerically the same pain (pp. 9–11). Why he thinks these things inconceivable, he does not say. Is it because my point of view in space is always different at any given time from yours? But, then, is it *logically impossible* that two percipients should perceive from the same point of view at the same time; or is it merely an empirical fact that this never happens? But are we absolutely sure that it never does? What are we to say about co-consciousness?

To return to Professor Moore's argument: he concludes that "presented in space" and "to be met with in space" are not equivalent expressions. In one respect, "presented in space" is wider, since it covers after-images, bodily pains, etc., as well as material objects. But in another, it is narrower. For "$x$ is to be met with in space" does indeed entail that $x$ *might* be perceived ("presented"), but it by no means entails that $x$ *is* perceived. "$x$ is to be met with in space" is perfectly compatible with "$x$ is never *actually* perceived at all"; and this still holds good if $x$ is a shadow—and perhaps even if $x$ is a mirror-image.

But what is the relation between "$x$ is to be met with in space" and "$x$ is an external object," an object "external to our minds"? Are they synonymous expressions? Kant apparently thought they were. But as Professor Moore shows, if he did think so, he was mistaken. "External to our minds" is a technical phrase invented by philosophers; and if we wish to know what it means, we must consider the equally technical phrase "*in* our minds," with which it is contrasted. When philosophers say that $x$ is in our minds, they mean something like "$x$ would not exist unless we were having experiences." In fact, "$x$ is in my mind" is equivalent to "there would be a contradiction in opposing that the very same $x$ existed at a time when I was having no experience" (pp. 21 *fin.* 22). For example, after-images, imagination-images,

and bodily pains would all be "in our minds" in this sense. And when philosophers say that *y* is external to our minds, or ask whether it is, they are saying that (or asking whether) *y* would exist even if we were not having experiences. Now "we" is here understood to mean "we human beings." It follows that the pains, after-images, etc., which the lower animals experience are external to *our* minds, though not to theirs. But these pains, etc., are certainly not among the things which are to be met with in space. So more things are external to our minds than are to be met with in space. The two expressions are certainly not equivalent, as Kant thought they were.

On the other hand, it *is* true that if something is to be met with in space, then it is also external to our minds. For example, "that is a soap-bubble" implies that there would be *no contradiction* in supposing that it existed before I perceived it, and would have existed even though I had never perceived it at all: though *in fact*, perhaps (soap-bubbles being notoriously short-lived) it only does exist so long as I perceive it. Thus from "there is a soap-bubble" it follows that there is an external object, external to my mind and to other people's minds as well.

With this, Professor Moore has completed his process of preliminary clarification. He now proceeds to offer his proof (p. 25). If he can prove that there are now two human hands, he says, then he will have proved that there are things outside of us, objects external to our minds. And he *can* prove that there are now two human hands. How? "By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, 'Here is one hand,' and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, 'and here is another!'" This proof, he insists, is perfectly rigorous; and he adds, "it is perhaps impossible to give a better or more rigorous proof of anything whatever" (p. 25 *ad fin.*). For the conclusion is entailed by the premise; moreover, it does not merely repeat the premise in different phraseology (since it might have still been true even though the premise had been false); and—most important of all—he does *know* that the premise is true.

I do not know what the reader's reaction will be to Professor Moore's paper. But some, I think, will feel that they have been watching a kind of philosophical conjuring trick. With breathless attention they have followed Professor Moore's preliminary manipulation of the hat, dazzled with admiration at his skill. Then at last, quite suddenly, out pops the rabbit. But what a strange beast it is! Is it really a rabbit at all? We rub our eyes and wonder whether we are having hallucinations.

Professor Moore, of course, is not at all surprised at our perplexity. He is well aware that the proof which he has offered is not at all the sort of "proof of an external world" which philosophers have usually asked for. What, then, do they ask for? Roughly, he says, they will want him to prove the propositions which he used as his *premise*. "In other words, they want a proof of what I assert *now* when I hold up my hands and say 'Here's one hand and here's another'" (p. 29). But if this is what they want, Professor Moore says he cannot give it them, and he does not believe that anyone could give it them.

Why not? Professor Moore's answer is curious, and I do not fully understand it. He says: "I should need to prove for one thing, as Descartes pointed out, that I am not now dreaming. But how can I prove that I am not? I have no doubt conclusive reasons for asserting that I am not now dreaming; I have conclusive evidence that I am awake: but that is a very different thing from being able to prove it. I could not tell you what all my evidence is; and I should require to do this at least, in order to give you a proof" (p. 30).

Now in the first place—despite the authority of Descartes—I do not see

that Professor Moore *would* need first to prove that he is not dreaming. Is it not the other way round? That he is not dreaming, will *follow* from the fact (if I is a fact) that here is one human hand and here is another. One concludes that one is not dreaming, because one has *already* established that what one is seeing is a "real" external object: not conversely. Secondly, if he *has* got conclusive evidence that he is awake, why does he not tell us what it is? Or if, as he says, he could not tell us what *all* his evidence is, could he not at least tell us some of it? And what is the reason why he cannot tell us the rest? Is it because it is unspeakable, incapable of being communicated in words? But some people would say that the phrase "incommunicable evidence" makes no sense. Perhaps they are mistaken. But I greatly wish that Professor Moore had discussed the point.

Moreover, the philosophers who are discontented with the proof which Professor Moore *has* offered would not all of them demand that he should prove his premise (viz. the proposition 'here is one hand and here is another'). Some of them might demand this. But others would agree with him that one can *know* many things which one cannot prove: if not, they would say, nothing could ever be proved at all. Only they would question whether this is an instance of such unprovable knowledge. How would Professor Moore answer them? So far as I can see, his answer is just this: "How *absurd* it would be to say that I did not know it [i.e. did not know that here is one hand and here is another] but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case! You might as well suggest that I do not know that I am now standing up and talking—that perhaps after all I'm not, and that it's not quite certain that I am!" (p. 26, my italics). He adds that "we do all of us take proofs of this sort as absolutely conclusive proofs of certain conclusions—as finally settling questions, as to which we were previously in doubt" (p. 27). For instance, if someone doubts whether there are three misprints on a certain page, you show him the page and point to each misprint in turn; and that is agreed to settle the question conclusively (*ibid.*).

Now as to the "absurdity" argument, we may at first be inclined to object that it is a mere piece of dogmatism on Professor Moore's part, and to reply with Lord Russell that "whoever would be a philosopher must learn not to be afraid of absurdities." It seems highly probable that many true and important propositions have been called absurd at one time or another: for instance, the proposition that the earth rotates on its axis. I venture to think that in the present paper Professor Moore has not done much to meet this objection. For example, he has not told us what his criterion of "absurdity" is. But, if I may be forgiven for putting words into his mouth, he might perhaps make the following rejoinder: "In such circumstances as I have referred to, it is good English to say 'I know that there is a hand here,' and bad English to say 'I believe it, but don't know it.' Nor is this rule peculiar to English. If you maintain that we *ought not* to use the work 'know' in such circumstances, that we have *no right* to use it, etc., you are not merely saying something false; you are saying something absurd. The absurdity is this. If you admit that everyone does actually use a certain word, e.g. the word 'know,' in a certain type of situation, then it is self-contradictory to maintain at the same time that this way of speaking is wrong or unjustified. For in matters of vocabulary, the criterion of rightness or justifiedness is precisely common usage. Again, everyone agrees that the question about the misprints *is* conclusively settled in the way I described. To say in such circumstances 'we do not know that there are three misprints here, but we believe it, and very probably there are' is contrary to the rules of language. For, according to our ordinary usage of words, this remark would imply that the question

has *not* been conclusively settled, whereas in fact we all agree that it has been."

If this is the kind of rejoinder Professor Moore would make—and of course I am not sure that it is—what shall we say to it? I think we must concede that Professor Moore's opponents *were* breaking the rules of good English when they said "we do not know that there is a hand here, we only believe it." Nevertheless, they did not break them out of mere perversity or stupidity. They were calling attention to an important fact, which might otherwise have been overlooked. Let us use Professor Moore's own phrase "finally settling a question." Now obviously there are more ways than one in which questions may be finally settled. To settle a question by memory is one thing, to settle it by testimony is another; and to settle it *perceptually*, by going and looking, is a third. Again, if someone doubts whether the three interior angles of a Euclidean triangle are together equal to two right angles, we settle the question in quite another way, by deductive arguments; and if he doubts whether chalk dissolves in nitric acid, we settle it by experiment. Each of these ways of settling questions is conclusive in its own kind. Nevertheless, they are different. But in ordinary good English we apply the word "know" to all of them alike. Whenever the question "whether $p$?" has been finally settled, in whatever way, and whatever kind of question it is, it is good English to say "we now know that $p$."

Now the philosophers whom Professor Moore objects to and accuses of "absurdity" were trying to draw attention to those differences. Particularly, perhaps, they had in mind the difference which there is between settling a question perceptually, and settling a question by deductive argument. So far they were right. But they chose a misleading way of expressing their insight. For when they said "we can never know that there are external objects, we can only believe it" they did certainly suggest that the perceptual settlement of a question is never final and conclusive: that the question "are there any hands or any tables?" is still an *open* question, which has never been conclusively settled and never can be. And in this they were mistaken. They failed to see that the various ways of settling questions, although different, might nevertheless all of them be conclusive: not *equally* conclusive, for they cannot be quantitatively compared, but each completely conclusive in its own kind.

H. H. Price.

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*Social Groups in Modern England.* By Henry A. Mess, B.A., Ph.D. (London: Nelson & Sons. 1940. Pp. 168. Price 2s. 6d. net.)

This book consists of an expansion and rewriting of articles originally published in the *Listener*; though it was written before the war, the author has felt obliged to make only slight alterations in it. Apart from short general discussions at the beginning and end, its aim is to enumerate and describe the chief social groups to which the modern Englishman belongs, or which influence him even if he does not belong to them. The author describes as clearly and simply as he can, for the benefit of the general reader, the most relevant facts of the present situation; he abstains from all suggestions for its improvements, and from speculation on the deeper and more difficult issues which his subject-matter involves. The book does not therefore call for elaborate notice in this journal. But it displays such admirable gifts of analysis and description that it cannot fail to help in clearing the mind about the

important matters with which it deals. Particularly to be commended is the balance and good sense shown in its handling of difficult and controversial questions such as race, class, and group mentality, and in allowing for the influence on group life of the complicated and rapid developments of modern civilization. In these ways, indeed, it definitely gains from its self-imposed limitations.

O. DE SELINCOURT.

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Books received also:

E. O. JAMES. *The Social Function of Religion: A Comparative Study.* London: University of London Press, Ltd., Hodder & Stoughton, Ltd. 1940. Pp. xi + 312. 7s. 6d.

A. J. AYER: *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge.* London: Macmillan & Co. 1940. Pp. x + 276. 10s. 6d.

H. H. PRICE. *Hume's Theory of the External World.* Oxford at the Clarendon Press: Humphrey Milford. 1940. Pp. 231. 15s.

D. W. GOTSHALK. *Metaphysics in Modern Times: A Present-day Perspective.* Chicago: University Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 1940. Pp. xi + 110. 9s.

G. B. BENTLEY. *Catholic Design for Living* ("Signposts" series). London: Dacre Press. 1940. Pp. 130. 1s.

J. G. MACKENZIE: *Psychology, Psychotherapy and Evangelicalism.* London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1940. Pp. xiii + 238. 10s. 6d.

R. O. KAPP. *Science versus Materialism.* London: Methuen & Co. 1940. Pp. vi + 280. 10s. 6d.

*Plato: Selected Passages.* Chosen and edited by Sir R. W. Livingstone. Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1940. Pp. xxiv + 220. 2s. 6d.

H. DINGLE. *The Special Theory of Relativity.* London: Methuen & Co. 1940. Pp. vi + 94. 3s. 6d.

L. WOOD: *The Analysis of Knowledge.* London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1940. Pp. 263. 12s. 6d.

M. VERSFELD. *An Essay on the Metaphysics of Descartes.* London: Methuen & Co. 1940. Pp. 192. 7s. 6d.

A. SANDISON, R. HARGREAVES, H. CRICHTON-MILLER, F. M. EDWARDS (Individual Psychology Medical Pamphlets, No. 22). *Escape into Activities. The Flight into Normality. Discipline and Leadership. China under War Conditions.* London: C. W. Daniel Co. Pp. 48. 2s. 6d.

G. H. HARDY. *A Mathematician's Apology.* London: Cambridge University Press, 1940. Pp. 93. 3s. 6d.

SIR CHARLES SHERRINGTON: *Man on his Nature* (Gifford Lectures, 1937–8). Cambridge, at the University Press. 1940. Pp. 413. 21s.

SIR DAVID ROSS. *Presidential Address to the British Academy,* 10 *July,* 1940. London: Humphrey Milford. 1940. Pp. 8. 6d.

*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.* Vol. XL. 1939–40. London: Harrison & Sons. 1940. Pp. xviii + 265. 25s.

K. BEKKER: *Marx' philosophische Entwicklung, sein Verhaltnis zu Hegel.* Zürich: Dr. Oprecht & Helbling. Pp. 134.

# CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

Sir,

When Professor H. H. Price, in his admirable article on some philosophical questions about Telepathy and Clairvoyance, criticizes the Radiation Hypothesis as an explanation of psychic phenomena, it seems that he is subject to a misconception. He assumes that this hypothesis is based on "some form of physical radiation by the brain of the agent and picked up by the brain of the percipient." This assumption limits the scope of the Radiation Hypothesis to energy in the *physical* field, but the whole problem is much more complicated than his statement bears out. The Radiation Hypothesis suggests that waves and radiations to a great extent express the nature of things, and that the whole web of radiations is connected through the activity of release-systems whereby waves of one order may set waves of another moving and so attain ends outside the original field in which they operate. In this manner non-physical energy may cause physical effects and vice versa. The magnetic field of the brain—which nowadays undergoes measurements—seems to act as such a release-instrument and allow thought-vibrations to induce movements of the body. I recall the declaration of the eminent French scientist, Daniel Berthelot: "it would not be surprising if it were so that human thoughts expressed themselves through electrical currents corresponding to what we know of wireless telegraphy." In this manner "the new physics offer a contribution to the old metaphysical problem of the relationship between body and soul" (E. Zimmern, in *Revolution of Physics*, Foreword by Professor Max Planck).

This view has a direct bearing on the problem of Telepathy and Clairvoyance which, as Professor Price says, must be accepted as established facts. It is no question of "brain-waves." The brain is no container of thoughts or memory, according to this view, but operates as a transmitter and transformer of energy inside the individual human system. It is also worth while to notice that Telepathy and Clairvoyance mostly occur when bodily functions and the activity of the brain are low or detached. The vibrations of thought and our perceptive qualities belong to the soul and our senses transmit radiative impressions from the outside world in ordinary life, but occasionally they are passed over and direct contacts between the soul and other wave-systems is established and then Telepathy becomes possible.

If every body or event issues waves, and life radiates as well as solid crystals, then it would not become unplausible to think that waves are picked up whenever they synchronize with the wave-system of a detached perceiving soul. But to that end it is necessary to assume the existence of *fields* conveying the various forms of radiation in the universe.

Physical radiations bring pictures of the exterior world to our consciousness and without them we would know very little of things about us. These radiations depend on *distance in space* between bodies, but that is not the case with Telepathic communications. This well-known fact leads to the assumption of a special field of conveyance for transmissions which produce Telepathic phenomena.

In physics several fields for transmissions exist and their properties vary very widely. I once asked my friend, Lord Rutherford, if he believed in an Ether which transmits light-radiations, and his characteristic answer was that "it must exist but I do not like to talk about it." The possible properties of this Ether have been discussed since early times. Einstein has published his view that the properties of space offer a substitute for this Ether. Other writers suggest several kinds of Ether suitable for separate and different forms of radiations, physical as well as non-physical.

It is now suggested that non-physical radiations operate in a field which is independent of distance between bodies in space, or we could say that thought is the shortest distance between points in space. If Telepathic transmissions occur in such

a medium they are independent of distance between bodies, and this is what the Radiation Hypothesis assumes. Therefore Professor Price's argument against the theory in this respect becomes irrelevant.

We are well aware that human beings in bodies that move closely to each other may in reality feel miles apart in other respects. Their thoughts and emotions never touch. Their innermost beings—whatever we mean by that expression—seem to move in separate worlds. It is no far-fetched idea that in fact they do so, although our senses convey a picture of them as belonging to the same sphere. When we speak of Telepathy an analogous situation occurs. Sense-perceptions belong to physical space, but some psychic phenomena do not. They evidently move in a different field and it is of interest to notice that Professor Price—starting from other points than my own—also is brought to discuss the existence of a "realm which is neither mental in the ordinary sense nor physical in the ordinary sense, but possesses some properties of both." This idea is in line with the field of psychic events which the Radiation Hypothesis accepts.

But separate individual agents need means of contact within that realm and such means are offered through waves and radiations interacting between themselves and inducing movements in other fields through special releases.

Professor Price regards it difficult to accept the idea that a "complex proposition" or even a "complex picture" could be transmitted by radiation, but our sense-perceptions do depend on "complex" radiations and how our Self collects them to render a representative picture of the exterior world remains an unsolved problem. Exactly a similar problem meets us when radiations of a non-physical nature are transmitted to and enter our consciousness. The objection mentioned by Professor Price evidently belongs to the function of consciousness and has nothing to do with the Radiation Hypothesis as such.

I fully agree with Professor Price that a discussion of this kind must suffer from inadequacy of words. Modern physics have broken the frame of our distinctly delineated earlier picture of existence, but we still labour with terms like 'physical,' 'matter,' etc. We need a new terminology that covers the present situation, but must struggle along with the deficient means available. It is a handicap, but I hope the general idea of thoughts expressed above will be sufficiently comprehended.

It has been my wish to focus the discussion originated by Professor Price in this direction, as I believe it would become helpful to the many who with him realize that we are in fact facing a new conception of fundamental problems.

Yours faithfully,
ERIK PALMSTIERNA.

LONDON,
*November* 27, 1940.

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PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED
LONDON AND WOKING